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Introduction and Overview
Why are there market makers, where a bargainer has limited information about the reser-
vation prices of other buyers and sellers? What are the conditions such that a bargainer
prefers the market maker over direct bilateral or multilateral trade, even if full information
about his peer’s reservation prices may be available in direct negotiations?
Within this work, four papers address these questions. Each paper analyses how bargainers
determine prices on diﬀerent platforms, where buyers and sellers reveal their respective oﬀers
for a good or a service to each other. A special focus lies upon the distribution of informa-
tion between the bargaining parties and their inability of precise valuation. Each platform’s
eﬃciency is analysed in detail. Additionally, each paper introduces a market maker’s market,
where bid and ask prices for a good or service are quoted. Despite a bid or an ask price, no
more information is revealed to a seller or a buyer. Each paper compares the eﬃciency of the
market maker and the platform market and develops conditions when the market maker is
preferred by the bargainers. When these conditions are satisﬁed, then a market with limited
information is Pareto eﬃcient over a market design where full information may be available.
A bargainer’s inability of precise valuation is an important ingredient to this work. While
a buyer (or a seller) can arrive at an individual reservation price, that buyer can not determine
whether that price is high or low compared to some unknown average valuation and how his
reservation price compares to the other bargainers’ reservation prices. This statement is valid
until the bargainers reveal their reservation prices or full information is available. Assuming
a buyer with a certain valuation of a good, that buyer can only determine or estimate his
valuation imprecision with some eﬀort.
Following, each paper’s individual focus on this topic will be summarised.
Paper 1
In order to trade a good or service, one needs at least two traders; one buyer and one
seller. They engage in bilateral negotiations, which can be modelled as a double auction. In
this paper, the buyer and the seller simultaneously reveal their respective oﬀers. If the buyer
is willing to pay a higher price than the seller requires, the trade is successful at a price that
is between the seller’s requirement and the buyer’s oﬀer.
The ﬁrst paper analyses this bilateral bargaining procedure1. It shows that a double
1We work with a bilateral bargaining model that was introduced by Flood and Dresher (1952) and reﬁned
by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) as well as Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). In their work, the authors
assume reservation prices to be distributed on an interval [v, v], with 0 ≤ v < v <∞ (and often v = 0). This
distribution is common knowledge in the sense of Aumann (1976). In the present work, this assumption is
relaxed by allowing reservation prices to be imprecisely distributed around some unknown average valuation.
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auction2 is most eﬃcient, when a buyer and a seller are aware of their respective reservation
prices. In this case, they make oﬀers that are equal to their reservation prices. As a result, a
double auction generates most proﬁt for the bargainers when full information is available.
In contrast, a market maker quotes bid and ask prices in the Dealer’s Market. He reveals
nothing else to the traders. Thus information is limited regarding a buyer’s and a seller’s reser-
vation prices. However, the paper proves that the market maker is more eﬃcient than direct
bilateral trade when he sets his fee scheme accordingly. This fee scheme is non-restrictive and
generates a positive gain for the market maker on each round-trip transaction.
Two examples illustrate the ﬁrst paper’s theory. First, the Headhunter Game provides a
numerical example that explains why an employer and a job candidate may be in favour of
engaging a recruitment ﬁrm rather than taking part in bilateral salary negotiations.
The second example considers a corporation that wants to sell a ﬁxed share of its owner
rights. This corporation’s management may either try to sell the share privately by negoti-
ating and placing it with an individual or an institution, such as a venture capitalist. The
corporation’s management may, on the other hand, hire an investment banker to place the
corporation’s shares in an IPO. The example provides conditions that allow the IPO to be the
ﬁrst preference of all parties. It is proven that the average share price is below the bargainers’
average valuation when they negotiate bilaterally. An investment banker can exploit this fact
by underpricing the IPO.
Paper 2
The second paper expands the ﬁrst paper’s theory. Here, not only one seller, but a group
of sellers bargains over the price of a good or service with one buyer. The paper models
these negotiations as a reverse auction. It shows that the sellers loose proﬁt when they place
their bids without coordinating them. When all sellers commit to a shared bid strategy, their
individual as well as their shared proﬁt is maximised. Without coordinating their bids, each
seller’s proﬁt converges to zero with an increasing group size of bidding sellers.
Furthermore, the second paper introduces a market maker under information asymmetry.
This market maker can be the most eﬃcient trading partner for all parties under the condition
that his fee scheme is set appropriately. At the same time, his inventory level can be kept at
a decent size.
The paper provides an example, where the parties’ preference for a market maker over
a reverse auction is illustrated. It shows how a ﬁrm chooses to place a bond on the capital
market rather than meeting a ﬁnancing agreement directly with an investor.
2The term double auction is commonly used in more present literature, such as by Gibbons (1992). A
double auction and bilateral bargaining often are used as synonyms.
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Our model has testable implications. Consider the Industrial Revolution in the 18th and
early 19th century. Then, workers were not organised and the competition for jobs in the
labour force was high. As a result, each worker had to sell his time and labour for a lower
salary that his competitors. This process necessarily lead to extremely low wages. The rise
of labour unions and upcoming political support helped the labour force to ensure a better
coordination of their negotiations with an employer. Our model explains that an employer
was able to exploit the unorganised labour force. Further, our model implies that coordinated
negotiations with an employer are beneﬁcial for workers. In addition, the paper’s model may
be used to calculate a union’s optimal salary negotiation strategy.
Paper 3
A market with a group of buyers bargaining with a group of sellers is a further generalisa-
tion of the trading model introduced in paper 1 and 2. In this model, all sellers simultaneously
reveal their oﬀers on a platform. Buyers arrive one after another and buy at the lowest oﬀer
available at that moment, if that oﬀer does not exceed that buyer’s reservation price. Thus,
there is full price information available on the analysed platform. Real world phenomena,
such as the Amazon online market platform serve as examples for this market design.
In this paper, the focus lies upon the eﬃciency of the bargaining procedure and analyses
its properties in detail. Furthermore, it proves that there is a signiﬁcant proportion of buyers
and sellers that are not matched by this procedure.
Alternatively, a buyer (seller) may consult a dealer. The parties are given the option
to buy from (sell to) that dealer. He quotes each party an individual price and hides this
information from that party’s peers. The paper shows that when the dealer’s prices are set
accurately, all parties prefer the dealer over the direct trading platform.
In particular, the paper shows that the market design is a major determinant to allocate
resources optimally and thus is in accordance with Roth (2008).
Paper 4
The last paper also deals with two diﬀerent market designs. Namely, direct negotiations of
the bargaining parties in contrast to a concept where a market maker intermediates between
the negotiators. The paper focuses on a practical ﬁnancing decision and compares two diﬀerent
forms of debt ﬁnancing: bank loans and the public placement of bonds by an investment
banker.
First of all, the bilateral negotiation process until achieving a satisfactory loan agreement
is modelled and analysed in detail. During this process a ﬁrm opens its books to potential
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creditors and provides full information. Nevertheless, the negotiating parties can not value the
ﬁrm precisely. A ﬁrm’s management updates its estimation of valuation imprecision during
the negotiation process in a Bayesian way. However, the paper proves that an investment
banker who operates under information asymmetry may Pareto dominate ﬁnancing with bank
loans.
The paper’s theory is accompanied by two numerical examples of negotiation processes.
Using these examples, we show how an investment banker under information asymmetry can
be Pareto eﬃcient over direct loan negotiations.
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Information Asymmetry Allows Investment Bankers to Underprice IPOs
Achieving a more Eﬃcient Allocation than Raising Venture Capital
under Full Information
Johannes Seemüller
Abstract
This paper models investment banking under information asymmetry, when the investors
are unable to precisely value the newly issued shares. It provides a solution for the IPO
underpricing puzzle. Under reasonably general conditions, we show that using investment
banking under information asymmetry Pareto dominates raising venture capital under full
information. In our model social welfare increases when investors are less precise in valuing
the newly issued shares. Investors may use a portfolio of seasoned shares, with precise market
prices, to span the risk and the return of the IPO shares. In order to compete with precisely
valued investment opportunities, an investment banker underprices imprecisely valued newly
issued shares. Thereby, an IPO generates additional wealth over raising venture capital that
compensates the issuing ﬁrm for the IPO underpricing.
We calculate a unique Nash equilibrium for a version of the bargaining model of Chatterjee
and Samuelson (1983), with less restrictive assumptions and under a variety of information
sets. In our model, the valuation of the bargainers is imprecise. We show that both the
regulators and the intermediaries may optimally restrict access to full information in order to
achieve a better allocation and to generate social wealth. In summary, asymmetric informa-
tion and valuation imprecision may create wealth.
Key words: Investment Banking, IPO Underpricing, IPO Long-term Under-Performance, Venture Capital, Information
Asymmetry, Imprecise Valuation, Bilateral Monopoly Bargaining Model, Double Auction, Pareto Eﬃcient Market, Naive
Agents, JEL Classiﬁcations: G10, G14, G38, D44
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1 Introduction
An immediate concern with information asymmetry is that it harms the market. For
example, the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) shows that the market under information asym-
metry can break down. Additionally, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that intermediaries in
the credit market will optimally ration credit under information asymmetry. A regularity im-
plication might be that full information markets should be promoted to increase social wealth
compared to markets with asymmetric information. This paper shows that traders who value
an asset imprecisely may proﬁt from information asymmetry.
In our analysis, we consider a two-player double auction with valuation imprecision. Our
model is an extension of the work of Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) on bilateral monopolies.
In addition, we consider diﬀerent settings of information and rationality. As opposed to
Akerlof (1970) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), this paper introduces conditions under which
information asymmetry is preferred over full information. To do so, we install a market maker
under information asymmetry. When that market maker sets his prices reasonably, then the
traders prefer his market over a double auction under full information.
We apply our ﬁndings to a ﬁrm wanting to sell a share of its owner rights. The paper
provides conditions for an IPO under information asymmetry being optimal. Thereby our
model provides an explanation for the IPO underpricing puzzle.
From 1980 to 2001, an investor buying shares at an IPO just prior to the ﬁrst day of
trading and holding them until the market closes that day, would have been able to sell
those shares at an average of 18.8% above the price at which the issuing ﬁrm sold them
(see Welch and Ritter (2002)). If the same investor held these shares for a period of three
years, his investment would have underperformed the CRSP value-weighted market index by
23.4%. In addition, these three-year IPO investments would have underperformed investments
in seasoned companies with the same market capitalization and book-to-market ratio by
5.1%. However, this long-term IPO underperformance does not explain the one-day IPO
underpricing, as an investor may solely choose a short investment horizon. For a detailed
literature survey of IPO underpricing see Ljungqvist (2004).
Some of the more successful theories of IPO underpricing rely on asymmetric information.
In particular, the following four asymmetric information explanations for IPO underpricing
are noteworthy. Baron (1982) presents an IPO model where underpricing is used to induce
optimal selling eﬀort by an investment banker who is better informed about demand conditions
than the issuing ﬁrm. Welch (1989) introduces a model with an equilibrium in which higher-
valued ﬁrms use underpricing to signal their quality. Rock (1986) models a winner’s curse
which may be remedied by underpricing. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) propose a model in
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which underpricing is used to encourage investors to reveal their private information.
None of the above models stablishes that information asymmetry leads to a more eﬃcient
allocation than that under full information. In contrast, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) show
that a reduction of information asymmetry by revealing information to the public can reduce
a ﬁrm’s cost of capital. Thereby large ﬁrms disclose more information because their proﬁt
from that eﬀect is higher than that of small ﬁrms. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) note that
the lowest cost of capital occurs with a certain level of information asymmetry.
Where Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) analyse securities that are already publicly traded,
we analyse the process that leads to the decision to conduct an IPO, rather than placing a
ﬁrm’s shares privately. In this process, it is easier for an investment banker to pursue a ﬁrm
to conduct an IPO when there is no full information between ﬁrm and investors. When ﬁrms
and investors are in favour of an IPO, then disclosing information to the public may have a
positive eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s proﬁt. However, we concentrate on a ﬁrm’s decision between placing
its shares privately or publicly. Thereby we explore market conditions in which a regulator
or market participants may prefer to promote information asymmetry over full information.
To do so, let us start with the introduction of a simple bargaining procedure.
Kilgur et al. (2011) deﬁne a bargaining procedure as a set of rules for two bargainers
making oﬀers in order to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) introduce a bilateral bargaining procedure where a buyer’s and a seller’s valuation is
random and independent. They show that there is no ex post eﬃcient bargaining strategy
for both players in that bilateral monopoly. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) also prove
that when two bargainers haggle, they inevitably miss some feasible trades, because they
exaggerate their oﬀers (in opposite directions) in order to maximize their expected returns.
Saran (2011) further analyses this issue and shows that naive traders may increase eﬃciency
over strategic players. Kilgur et. al (2011) analyse three procedures that induce honest
oﬀers and thereby increase eﬃciency in bargaining. However, their procedures do not achieve
maximum eﬃciency.
In the above literature each trader has a reservation price, V ≥ 0, which is distributed
on the known interval [0, v] (see Chatterjee (1983) for an example). Often that interval is
restricted to [0, 1], as for instance in the double auction considered by Gibbons1. In this
paper, these constraints are relaxed as we allow more general intervals for reservation prices.
In addition, these intervals are unknown to the traders.
Reservation prices depend on an individual’s taste and preferences which can be expressed
by a utility function. Even though the reservation prices of two individuals are not neces-
sarily equal, both individuals are assumed to precisely value the assets in the economy. In
valuing ﬁnancial assets, that generate positive future cash ﬂows, individual taste and prefer-
1See Gibbons (1992), pages 158ﬀ.
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ences regarding cash receipts is not relied on in ﬁnance literature. In our model, individuals
disagree over the value of a (ﬁnancial) asset due to their valuation imprecision. We consider
symmetrically distributed imprecision in valuation.
In addition, pricing functions in the bargaining literature usually allow linear oﬀer strate-
gies, which is only a subset of all feasible strategies. Our study considers all feasible strategies.
Furthermore, bilateral trading literature commonly assumes that each player knows her own
valuation and the distribution of valuations for both players. Thus, in order to formulate a
detailed oﬀer strategy, each player may compare her valuation with its distribution. However,
valuation imprecision implies that individuals do not have a valuation benchmark2. Assum-
ing a buyer with a certain valuation of a good, that buyer might determine or estimate his
valuation imprecision with some eﬀort. However, he is not able to determine whether his valu-
ation is high or low compared to the average valuation because ex-ante he has no benchmark.
In this paper we model valuation imprecision by assuming that the bargainers are aware of
the common distribution of their valuation imprecision. They however have no indication,
whether their reservation price is above or below average.
More generally, our bargaining model can be considered as a Bayesian game with (un)known
common prior3. These games have thoroughly been studied. Conditions for the existence of
equilibrium strategies have been established by Nikaido and Isoda (1955) for instance. Studies
of Bayesian games are usually conducted in abstract terms. Our modelled bargaining game
is more practical, as it provides concrete formulas and advice on how bargainers should best
set their prices. At the same time, our model is more abstract and thus realistic than those
in the bargaining literature discussed above.
We show that in our double auction bargaining model under imprecise valuation, rational
and non-cooperative bargainers inevitably miss feasible trades. We prove that ex-ante, a naive
oﬀer strategy (which is also the only available strategy under full information), is the most ef-
ﬁcient one. However, eﬃciency may be further increased under asymmetric information. That
is, an intermediary (such as an investment banker) may introduce a market mechanism un-
der information asymmetry that is more eﬃcient than a double auction under full information.
In section 2, we provide a detailed analysis of the two-player double auction under dif-
ferent sets of information and rationality. Section 3 studies a market with a dealer who
2Assume for instance that a player’s valuation is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,100]. Then, in
the mentioned bargaining literature an individual with the reservation price of 50 knows that her valuation
is exactly average. Therefore that player can implement a linear bidding strategy of a50 + b. In our model,
a player with a reservation price of 50 does not have a benchmark to determine whether that valuation is
high or low. Therefore, she optimally implements bidding strategy 50s. This factor s represents all feasible
strategies, whereas a linear response contains only a subset of all possible strategies when the distribution of
the valuations is known.
3See Harsanyi (1967) for reference.
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intermediates between a buyer and a seller. Pareto eﬃciency of intermediation in markets
with asymmetric information versus the double auction under full information is considered
in section 4. That section also presents a numerical example of our theory that shows how
information asymmetry Pareto dominates full information. Section 5 applies our model to
capital markets and presents a solution for the IPO underpricing puzzle. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Two-Player Double Auction
We consider a seller S, who owns an indivisible good or a ﬁnancial security, such as a share
of stock, and a buyer B. These players individually value this asset as VS and VB, respectively.
A seller S will sell the asset if and only if the deal price is not below her valuation VS, whereas
a buyer B buys the asset if and only if the deal price is not above his valuation VB.
We model the sale as a two-person single-stage non-cooperative game of trading a single
indivisible asset, as Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). The buyer and the seller each make a
sealed oﬀer. If the buyer’s oﬀer OB exceeds the seller’s oﬀer OS then the good is traded at a
price P from the interval [OS, OB].
Let us introduce valuation imprecision to this two-player double auction. Assume that the
two parties that value a good independently may over- or underestimate its value by an iid
random imprecision factor that is uniformly distributed on the interval [1− α, 1 + α], with
valuation imprecision α ∈ [0, 1)4. Due to the lack of a valuation benchmark, neither party
knows whether it underestimates or overestimates the value of the asset. The bargainers just
know that their valuation is on the interval [(1−α)V, (1+α)V ], with some unknown average
valuation V > 0.
At the beginning of our double auction game, the buyer and the seller reveal their oﬀer
to each other simultaneously. If the buyer’s oﬀer OB is at least as high as the seller’s OS,
then the deal is successful. We model relative negotiation skills of the parties by the factor
k ∈ [0, 1]. The successful bargaining price is P = kOB+(1−k)OS2 ∈ [OS, OB].
In the above equation, when the seller possesses supreme negotiation skills k = 1. In
contrast k = 0 deﬁnes the buyer to be the most skilful negotiant. Thus k = 1/2 represents
equal negotiation skills.
When market participants behave naively in our model, then they make oﬀers at their
4A more abstract framework for the party’s imprecision may be considered. In such a framework, valuation
imprecision would not necessarily be identically and uniformly distributed. For instance, a buyer’s imprecision
may be uniformly distributed on the interval [b1, b2] and a seller’s imprecision uniformly distributed on [s1, s2].
We discuss this point in more detail in several proofs. Some propositions are proven for this more general
framework and are then applied to the double auction as deﬁned here. That approach is taken in proposition
1, for instance. Furthermore, uniform distributions of imprecision may be exchanged for other distributions,
e.g. a (log-)normal distribution. Our research suggests that symmetric distributions of valuation imprecision
are suﬃcient in order to obtain similar results as proven in this paper. In summary, we focus on providing a
realistic bargaining model, while maintaining a suﬃcient degree of abstraction.
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actual reservation prices. In that case, OB = VB and OS = VS. Rationally behaving market
participants strategically determine their respective oﬀers OS and OB depending on their
reservation prices. That is, a rational seller’s oﬀer is given by OS = sVS and a rational buyer’s
oﬀer is OB = bVB, with the scalars s and b. The buyer and the seller may determine their
oﬀer strategies b and s such that their individual expected proﬁts are maximised. A buyer’s
proﬁt is the diﬀerence between his reservation price and the deal price P . Thus, a buyer’s
proﬁt is represented by the formula PB = VB − P . Likewise, a seller’s proﬁt is PS = P − VS.
To analyse this game let us ﬁrst calculate the probability of a successful deal in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. The deal probability pd is given by
pd =
1s′1≤b′2
bs∆b∆s
(
b
′
2(min(b
′
2, s
′
2)− s
′
1)− b
′
1(max(b
′
1, s
′
1)− s
′
1)
−12
(
min(b′2, s
′
2)2 −max(b
′
1, s
′
1)2
))
,
where b′1 = bb1, b
′
2 = bb2, s
′
1 = ss1 and s
′
2 = ss2. When the conditions b1 = s1, b2 = s2,
b ∈ [b1/b2, 1], s ∈ [1, b2/b1] and b2/b1 > s/b hold, then deal probability simpliﬁes to
pd =
(bb2 − sb1)2
2bs∆b2.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above formula shows that for the oﬀer strategies b = s = 1, the deal probability is
0.5. The proposition also shows that reducing b, or increasing s, reduces the deal probability.
That is, when the buyer decreases his oﬀer price (reducing b), then the probability of the deal
being successful decreases. Similarly, an increase in the seller’s price (increasing s) decreases
the deal probability.
In our model, the buyer’s (seller’s) valuation imprecision is uniformly distributed on the
interval [b1, b2] = [1−α, 1+α] ([s1, s2] = [1−α, 1+α]). As a result, the formula for the deal
probability simpliﬁes signiﬁcantly when the conditions as stated in the above proposition are
satisﬁed. Following proposition 2, we will show that these conditions arise naturally.
Let us now analyse expected proﬁt of the two players.
Proposition 2. Let oﬀer strategies be bounded by b ∈ [b1/b2, 1], s ∈ [1, b2/b1] and b2/b1 > s/b.
Then, in a two-person double auction a buyer’s expected proﬁt as a function of his oﬀer strategy
b is
E (PB) (b) =
1
∆b∆s
(
(1− kb)
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Deal x dxdy − (1− k) s
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Deal y dxdy
)
.
11
A seller’s expected proﬁt as a function of the oﬀer strategy s is
E (PS) (s) =
1
∆b∆s
(
kb
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Deal x dxdy + ((1− k)s− 1)
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Deal y dxdy
)
.
The integrals are
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Deal x dxdy =
b b23
3 s − b1
(
b22
2 −
b12 s2
6 b2
)
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Deal y dxdy =
b2 b23
6 s2 − b1
2
(
b2
2 −
b1 s
3 b
)
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above formulas show that the two players’ proﬁts are dependent on their relative
negotiation skills and their respective oﬀers. Therefore both, the buyer’s and seller’s oﬀer
strategy b and s aﬀect their expected proﬁts. Expected proﬁt of both players must be greater
than or equal to zero, otherwise the player with a loss would refuse to trade. We assume that
when the gain is zero, the players are willing to trade.
An upper bound for the buyer’s oﬀer strategy b is 1. That is, when b > 1, then the
buyer’s oﬀer exceeds his reservation price and his expected proﬁt is negative. The same line
of reasoning shows that the seller’s oﬀer strategy s has the lower bound of 1.
If the seller’s oﬀer strategy s is greater than b2/b1, then the seller’s minimum oﬀer price
exceeds b2. As the buyer’s oﬀer strategy b is bounded by one, his maximum oﬀer price is b2.
In this case the seller’s price exceeds the buyer’s oﬀer with probability 1 and the deal fails
deterministically. Therefore an upper bound for the seller’s oﬀer strategy is s ≤ b2/b1. Similar
arguments leads to b1/b2 being a lower bound for the buyer’s oﬀer strategy. Therefore the
feasible oﬀer strategies are b ∈ [b1/b2, 1] and s ∈ [1, b2/b1]. While the traders apply feasible
oﬀer strategies, the deal probability simpliﬁes to
pd =
(bb2 − sb1)2
2bs∆b2 ,
according to proposition 1.
Let us now focus on the welfare eﬀect of double auctions.
Proposition 3. The sum of the buyer’s and the seller’s expected proﬁt is
E (PS) (s) +E (PB) (b) =
6
∆b∆s
(
b2
s2
b21 +
(
2b
s
− b
2
s2
)
b22 −
2s
b
b31 − 3b1b2∆b
)
.
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If there is a positive deal probability in a double auction, then the sum of the two players’
proﬁts is increasing when the buyer increases his oﬀer strategy b. The sum of the players’
proﬁts is decreasing when the seller increases her oﬀer strategy s.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that the sum of the players’ expected proﬁts decreases when they
selﬁshly pursue individually optimal oﬀer strategies. That is, when the buyer lowers the price
that he is willing to pay for the good or the seller raises the price that she expects from trade,
then the sum of their proﬁts diminishes.
The two players’ strategies must not be too extreme, i.e. s/b < b2/s1. Otherwise accord-
ing to proposition 1, the deal probability is zero. Thus reasonable response strategies are
always within the above bounds. The total wealth in a double auction shrinks when players
optimise their individual proﬁts. Consequently, an increase in the expected proﬁt of one party
lowers the combined wealth of the two parties and thus diminishes the other party’s proﬁt
signiﬁcantly.
A rational buyer maximizes his expected proﬁt. That is, the buyer maximizes E (PB) by
optimizing his oﬀer strategy bopt(s) as a best response to the seller’s strategy s. Similarly, a
rational seller optimises her oﬀer strategy sopt(b) as a function of the buyer’s strategy b.
Solving the ﬁrst order condition, an optimum strategy for each player, based on the other
player’s strategy can be calculated. An equilibrium is a set of oﬀer strategies (b, s) such that
no player proﬁts from changing her strategy. From here onwards we assume that the buyer
and the seller have equally strong negotiation skills (that is, k = 1/2). Then the optimal
response strategies for the two players are characterised in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Optimal strategies for the buyer bopt(s) and the seller sopt(b) are given by
bopt(s) =
1
18 b2
(
B(s, b1, b2)− (3 b1 s− 4 b2 ) (15 b1 s+ 4 b2 )
B(s, b1, b2)
− 3b1s+ 4b2
)
sopt(b) =
1
18 b1
(
B(b, b2, b1)− (3 b2 b− 4 b1 ) (15 b2 b+ 4 b1 )
B(b, b2, b1)
− 3b2b+ 4b1
)
,
where A and B are
A(s, b1, b2) :=
√
189 b1 4s4 + 432 b1 3s3b2 + 3168 b1 2s2b2 2 + 1280 b1 sb2 3 + 256 b2 4
B(s, b1, b2) := 3
√
216 b1 3s3 + 1404 b1 2s2b2 + 288 b2 2b1 s+ 64 b2 3 + 27 b1 sA(s, b1, b2).
Proof: See the Appendix.
The formulas above hold while b ∈ [b1/b2, 1] and s ∈ [1, b2/b1]. This condition implies
two properties. First, the seller’s lowest oﬀer is at least as high as the buyer’s minimal oﬀer.
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Furthermore, deal probability is greater than zero. As a result, each party has non-negative
expected proﬁt from participating in the double auction.
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Let us analyse optimal oﬀer strategies. Figures 1 and 2 show the expected proﬁt of the two
players as a function of their strategies b and s. In these ﬁgures, we have numerically illustrated
the formulas with an imprecision rate of 10 %. On the x-axis, the buyer’s oﬀer strategy b
is drawn, the seller’s oﬀer strategy s is displayed by the y coordinate. The coloured area in
ﬁgure 1 (ﬁgure 2) shows the buyer’s (the seller’s) expected proﬁt for each set of strategies
(b, s). The lines in each ﬁgure represent the two players’ optimal response strategies. The
optimal buyer’s response strategy is represented by a red line in ﬁgure 1, while the optimal
seller’s strategy is shown by a black line in ﬁgure 2.
When the seller makes an oﬀer close to her reservation price, then the buyer gains from
this lower oﬀer. This may be observed towards the bottom of ﬁgure 1, where the maximum
buyer’s expected proﬁt is shown in red. In contrast, the buyer’s proﬁt decreases as the seller
increases her oﬀer. This may be seen towards the top of ﬁgure 1 (shown in dark blue), where
the buyer’s proﬁt is almost zero.
Figure 2 shows that the seller’s proﬁt increases when the buyer is willing to pay a higher
price. This can be observed on the right of that ﬁgure, where the seller’s expected proﬁt is
maximal (indicated in red). In contrast, when the buyer reduces his oﬀer, then the seller’s
beneﬁt in the double auction is reduced. This can be seen on the left of ﬁgure 2 (which is
coloured in dark blue).
In the above extreme scenarios, one party’s expected proﬁt is close to zero. To ensure a
well functioning market, both players need to choose their oﬀer strategies b and s such that
they generate suﬃciently high, non-zero proﬁt for the other party.
The optimal buyer’s response strategy is an increasing function in seller’s strategy s. Sim-
ilarly, the same holds for the seller’s optimal response as a function of the buyer’s strategy.
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Therefore the two party’s optimal response strategies are strategic complements. The remain-
der of this section presents a more detailed analysis of the players’ optimal response strategies
and their eﬀect on the double auction’s eﬃciency.
2.1 Full Information
In this section we analyse bargaining behaviour of the players under mutual full informa-
tion in the sense of Aumann (1976). This means that each player knows the reservation price
of her counter party, knows that the counter party knows, and so forth. Given full informa-
tion, the parties do not need to submit sealed bids, as each party knows the reservation price
of his counter party. As a consequence, oﬀers are equal to the parties’ reservation prices.
In fact, full information and naive behaviour of the parties imply the same bargaining
strategy. To illustrate this fact, suppose that each side’s oﬀer strategy is naive. Then each
trader makes an oﬀer at his reservation price. That is, a player’s oﬀer is not the best reaction
on the latter side’s anticipated behaviour. This is the same situation as that under full
information. Therefore full information and naive behaviour induce equivalent oﬀer strategies.
Let us calculate the deal probability under full information.
Proposition 5. In a double auction, when there is full information and there are two players
with uniform iid valuation imprecision on the interval [1− α, 1 + α], then the deal probability
is 0.5 for any imprecision parameter 0 < α < 1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
When there is full information in a double auction, on average half of the deals fail. In our
model, trade occurs if and only if both parties beneﬁt from it. This occurs, when the seller’s
oﬀer does not exceed the buyer’s oﬀer. Thus naive oﬀer strategies allow for all feasible trades
that are of mutual beneﬁt for both parties.
The next proposition derives the two players’ expected proﬁts as a linear function of their
valuation imprecision.
Proposition 6. In a double auction, when there is full information and there are two players
with uniform iid valuation imprecision on the interval [1−α, 1+α], then the players’ expected
proﬁts are equal. This expected proﬁt is a linear function of the two parties’ imprecision and
is given by the following formula: E (PB,S) = α/6.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 6 shows that each player may expect a proﬁt equal to 1/6 of the valuation
imprecision α. This immediately implies that valuation imprecision is wealth increasing.
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Intuitively, two individuals who are endowed with supreme valuation abilities, will arrive at
the same value for an asset and ﬁnd trade unsatisfactory. Mathematically speaking, players
expect to proﬁt from a double auction if and only if there is imprecision in valuation, that
is α > 0. Furthermore, imprecision and expected proﬁt are positively correlated. Therefore,
a higher imprecision in valuation causes an increased beneﬁt for both players. Without
valuation imprecision, the expected proﬁt in a double auction is zero. Let us formally state
this intuition in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. In a double auction, when there is full information and there are two players with
uniform iid valuation imprecision on the interval [1−α, 1+α], then both market participants
proﬁt from a higher valuation imprecision. Higher imprecision generates a higher expected
proﬁt and is socially wealth increasing. When there is no imprecision, the expected proﬁt is
zero for both players.
Proof: See the Appendix.
So far, we have analysed double auctions under full information. As explained above,
naive players who do not hide their valuation strategically, also play under full information.
In sections 2.2 and 2.3, we analyse double auctions where a strategic player trades with a
naive party.
2.2 A Rational Buyer and a Naive Seller
This section considers double auctions with a rational buyer who determines his oﬀer
strategy in order to maximize his expected proﬁt. In contrast, there is a revealed naive seller
who makes an oﬀer equal to her reservation price. Let us analyse the buyer’s optimal oﬀer
strategy within this double auction setting in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. In a two-player double auction with a rational buyer and a naive seller, the
buyer’s optimal oﬀer strategy is
bopt(1) =
1
18 b2
(
B(1, b1, b2)− (3 b1 − 4 b2 ) (15 b1 + 4 b2 )
B(1, b1, b2)
− 3b1 + 4b2
)
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
From the buyer’s optimal strategy we derive the probability of bargaining success.
Proposition 8. In a two-player double auction with a rational buyer and a naive seller, the
deal probability is
pd =
(bopt(1)b2 − b1)2
2bopt(1)∆b2
.
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Proof: See the Appendix.
Les us now analyse the players’ expected proﬁt.
Proposition 9. In a two-player double auction with a rational buyer and a naive seller, the
buyer’s expected proﬁt is
E (PB) =
(
bopt−1 − 1/2
) (
3 b2 2bopt2 (b2 bopt − b1 )− b2 3bopt3 + b1 3
)
6 (b2 − b1 )2 bopt
+
−3 b2 bopt
(
b2 2bopt2 − b1 2
)
+ 2 b2 3bopt3 − 2 b1 3
12 (b2 − b1 )2 bopt
and the seller’s expected proﬁt is
E (PS) =
b32b
3
opt − b1 (b21 − 3b2bopt(b2bopt − b1))
12bopt(b2 − b1)2 .
Proof: See the Appendix.
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Fig. 3 – A two-player double auction with a rational buyer and a naive seller
Propositions 7 - 9 are illustrated in ﬁgure 3. Figure 3 (a) shows the buyer’s oﬀer strategy
as a function of imprecision. The seller’s naive behaviour is represented by her oﬀer strategy
s ≡ 1. This means that her oﬀer, independent of imprecision, is given by her reservation price.
The buyer’s oﬀer strategy is a strictly decreasing function of imprecision. Therefore, higher
imprecision causes the buyer to make an oﬀer that is a smaller fraction of his reservation price.
One might expect that the buyer’s optimal oﬀer strategy causes a decrease in the probability
of bargaining success. This however is not the case, as can be seen from ﬁgure 3 (b).
Figure 3 (b) shows that the deal probability decreases until valuation imprecision ap-
proaches approximately 20%. For imprecision values higher than 20%, the deal probability is
strictly increasing. The deal probability in the above example is between 31.9% and 32.1%
for an imprecision parameter below 50%. When the diﬀerent double auction settings are
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compared in section 2.5, we will show that a deal probability within the above range is not
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the level of valuation imprecision.
Figure 3 (c) shows the players’ expected proﬁts. Due to strategic behaviour, the buyer has
a higher expected proﬁt than the seller in this ﬁgure. Moreover, the expected proﬁts of the two
players (E (PB) and E (PS)) are both strictly increasing functions of the valuation imprecision
α. This means that a higher valuation imprecision increases each parties’ expected proﬁt. The
seller’s expected proﬁt is positive; its maximum is 4% of the average good’s valuation and it is
always lower than the buyer’s expected proﬁt. The buyer’s expected proﬁt exceeds the seller’s,
with a maximum of approximately 11% of the average good’s valuation. The buyer proﬁts
more than the seller, because the strategic behaviour of the buyer gives him an advantage
over the naive seller. However, both parties have a positive proﬁt from the double auction.
This section provided an analysis of double auctions with a strategic buyer and a naively
behaving seller. Contrary, double auctions with a strategic seller and a naive buyer are
analysed in the following section.
2.3 A Rational Seller and a Naive Buyer
In this section, there is a revealed naive buyer, who makes an oﬀer equal to his reservation
price. In contrast, the seller determines her oﬀer strategically. Within this double auction
setting we analyse the seller’s optimal oﬀer strategy as follows.
Proposition 10. In two-player double auctions with a rational seller and naive buyer, the
seller’s optimal oﬀer strategy is
sopt(1) =
1
18 b1
(
B(1, b2, b1)− (3 b2 − 4 b1 ) (15 b2 + 4 b1 )
B(1, b2, b1)
− 3b2 + 4b1
)
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Given the above optimal strategy, let us derive the probability of bargaining success.
Proposition 11. In two-player double auctions with a rational seller and naive buyer, the
deal probability is
pd =
(b2 − sopt(1)b1)2
2sopt(1)∆b2
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The players’ expected proﬁts may be calculated as follows.
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Proposition 12. In two-player double auctions with a rational seller and a naive buyer, the
seller’s expected proﬁt is
E (PS) =
(0.5− sopt−1)
(
3 b2
(
b2 2 − b1 2sopt2
)
− 2 b2 3 + 2 b1 3sopt3
)
6 (b2 − b1 )2 sopt
+ 3 b2
2 (b2 − b1 sopt)− b2 3 + b1 3sopt3
12 (b2 − b1 )2 sopt
and the buyer’s expected proﬁt is
E (PB) =
−b31s3opt − b2 (b22 − 3b1sopt(b2 − b1sopt))
12sopt(b2 − b1)2 .
Proof: See the Appendix.
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Fig. 4 – A two-player double auction with a rational seller and a naive buyer
The results of propositions 10 - 12 are illustrated in ﬁgure 4. Figure 4 (a) shows the
players’ oﬀer strategies as a function of their valuation imprecision. Obviously b ≡ 1 holds,
as the buyer is a naive player in this double auction setting. That is, the naive buyer makes
an oﬀer at his reservation price. In contrast, the seller makes a strategic oﬀer that maximizes
her expected proﬁt. Consequently, the seller makes an oﬀer sopt(1), which is an increasing
function of the valuation imprecision. That is, a higher imprecision in valuation causes the
seller to make a higher oﬀer compared to her valuation.
Figure 4 (b) shows the deal probability as a function of the valuation imprecision. In
a double auction with a rational seller and a naive buyer, the deal probability is strictly
increasing in imprecision. It rises from 32% to 33.25% for 0 < α ≤ 0.5. As in the case of
double auctions with a rational buyer and a naive seller from section 2.2, in the present
double auction setting, the deal probability changes slightly as a function of imprecision.
However, in this case, it increases monotonically as valuation imprecision rises.
Figure 4 (c) shows the two parties’ expected proﬁts in a double auction with a rational
seller and a naive buyer. Both parties’ expected proﬁts (E (PB) and E (PS)) are strictly
19
positive and increasing functions of valuation imprecision α. That is, on average the trade
is proﬁtable for both players. Furthermore, each party has a higher proﬁt from the double
auction as the imprecision increases.
In this example, the buyer’s maximum expected proﬁt is 5% of the good’s average value.
The seller’s expected proﬁt exceeds the buyer’s proﬁt and is at the most 10% of the average
good’s value. That is, the seller’s proﬁt is roughly twice as high as the naive buyer’s proﬁt.
Let us now analyse a double auction where both, the buyer and the seller, behave strate-
gically.
2.4 A Rational Buyer and a Rational Seller
In this section we analyse a two-player double auction with two strategically playing
individuals. That is, both, the buyer and the seller optimize their oﬀer strategies such that
their individual expected proﬁt is maximized. We explain this concept with some examples
in the ﬁrst place. Later in this section, the ﬁndings from the examples will be generalised.
In proposition 4, we calculated the optimal buyer’s and seller’s oﬀer strategy as a function
of the other party’s oﬀer strategy. Figure 5 graphs these combined strategies. In ﬁgure 5 (a)
we use a valuation imprecision of α = 10%, while in ﬁgure 5 (b) the valuation imprecision
is α = 25%. In both cases there is exactly one set of equilibrium oﬀer strategies. In the
equilibrium neither the buyer nor the seller proﬁts from a change in his oﬀer strategy bopt(s)
or sopt(b). It is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies under rational expectations.
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Fig. 5 – Optimal response oﬀer strategies and their equilibrium
Let us replicate the equilibria from ﬁgure 5 for diﬀerent imprecision levels α = 5%, 10%,
20%, 25% and 50%. The results are summarized in table 1. In this example, there is always
exactly one set of equilibrium oﬀer strategies (bopt, sopt). The buyer’s oﬀer strategy bopt is
a decreasing function of the imprecision level, while the seller’s oﬀer strategy increases as
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valuation imprecision α rises. As the valuation imprecision increases, the buyer asks for more
of a discount and the seller increases her price. This results in a higher expected proﬁt for
both parties.
Table 1 – Properties of a double auction with a rational buyer and a rational seller
bopt sopt E (PB) E (PS) pd
α = 5% 0.9834 1.0168 0.63% 0.61% 22.22%
α = 10% 0.9670 1.0337 1.27% 1.20% 22.23%
α = 20% 0.9345 1.0684 2.60% 2.33% 22.25%
α = 25% 0.9184 1.0862 3.29% 2.87% 22.27%
α = 50% 0.8376 1.1795 7.01% 5.28% 22.49%
A surprising property of the equilibrium oﬀer strategies is that they are not symmetrically
distributed. That is, in equilibrium the buyer has a higher proﬁt than the seller. Note
that this analysis covers proﬁt in absolute terms. When proﬁt is calculated relative to each
player’s valuation, then the results are reversed (the seller has a higher proﬁt than the buyer
in equilibrium).
So far, we have analysed double auctions using ﬁxed values for the valuation imprecision.
In all our examples there is exactly one equilibrium set of strategies (bopt, sopt). Let us gen-
eralize these examples in the following proposition in order to rigorously show that there is
exactly one equilibrium for any feasible imprecision parameter α.
Proposition 13. For each imprecision parameter 0 < α < 1, there is exactly one set of equi-
librium oﬀer strategies (bopt, sopt).
Proof: See the Appendix.
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Fig. 6 – Two-player double auction with a rational buyer and a rational seller
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Figure 6 (a) shows the players’ oﬀer strategies in equilibrium. As the imprecision increases,
the buyer decreases his oﬀer (compared to his valuation) and the seller increases her oﬀer
(compared to her valuation).
Figure 6 (b) shows that the deal probability increases as imprecision increases. However,
because the deal probability varies only in the small range between 22.2% and 22.5%, its
ﬂuctuation with the imprecision level is almost imperceivable.
It can be observed in ﬁgure 6 (c) that a higher imprecision level leads to higher expected
proﬁts. The buyer’s expected proﬁt is higher than the seller’s. However, both parties proﬁt
from participation in this double auction. Their proﬁt increases as the valuation imprecision
α increases.
The next section analyses relative eﬃciency of the double auction settings, which were
introduced in sections 2.1 - 2.4.
2.5 The Downside of Rationality
In the last four sections we discussed four diﬀerent settings of double auctions. In section
2.1 we analysed double auctions under full information. We showed that this setting cor-
responds to the setting of naive players. Thereby their oﬀers reﬂect exactly their valuation.
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 discussed the double auction settings with exactly one market participant
(in section 2.2 the buyer and in section 2.3 the seller) being fully rational whereas the other
participant behaves naively. The rational acting market participant’s strategy is to adjust the
reservation price in order to maximize the expected proﬁt. The naively acting market partici-
pant’s reservation price equals exactly that party’s valuation. The market setting where buyer
and seller behave fully rational was discussed in section 2.4. For each valuation imprecision
there is a unique equilibrium in bidding strategies.
This section closes the analysis of double auctions by comparing the diﬀerent market
settings. We focus on the question, which setting is most preferable for the players.
A buyer’s and a seller’s expected proﬁt in each double auction setting has been calculated
in propositions 6, 9 and 12. Applying equilibrium strategies to the formulas from proposition
2 returns the players’ expected proﬁt in the market setting where they both place their bids
strategically.
Figure 7 draws a buyer’s expected proﬁt in the diﬀerent double auction market settings.
It shows that there is a clear ranking order for the market settings that is independent of
valuation imprecision. The most preferable market setting for a buyer is being the only
rational trader. His second best alternative is a double auction under full information. The
setting where the players both act rational is the buyer’s third best alternative, followed by
the setting where just the seller behaves rational.
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The seller’s proﬁt in the double auction market settings are drawn in ﬁgure 8. There
is also a clear ranking order regarding the seller’s preferences. The highest expected proﬁt
is obtained if only the seller behaves rationally. Just like the buyer, the seller expects the
second highest proﬁt in a double auction under full information. The third and fourth best
alternatives are the fully rational and buyer rational settings, respectively.
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Fig. 7 – Buyer’s expected proﬁt in diﬀer-
ent market settings
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Fig. 8 – Seller’s expected proﬁt in diﬀerent
market settings
Both parties have the full information market setting as their second priority. Thus full
information dominates the setting where both parties place their bids strategically, which is
priority three for both players. The naive setting is therefore more preferable for both parties
than placing strategic bids. Consequently, both parties would proﬁt from committing to the
naive setting. However, given the counter party’s naive strategy, one party then could adjust
its oﬀer strategy such that its expected proﬁt is maximized (and thereby the other party’s
proﬁt is minimized). Each party anticipating rational behaviour from the counterpart needs
to behave rationally as well, in order to at least get priority three. Thus the parties break
their commitment for the naive strategy, if they do not trust each other.
The diﬀerent double auction settings therefore are a typical example of a prisoner’s
dilemma5. Compared to bidding strategically, the buyer as well as the seller would proﬁt
if they would commit to placing their bids naively. However, anticipating rational behaviour
of their counterpart leads to a market setting where both parties are proﬁting less from trade
than they could. In other words they share a smaller proﬁt-pie in equilibrium as they could
by placing naive bids.
In contrast to zero sum games, that are Pareto eﬃcient according to von Neumann (1928),
a double auction is a non-zero sum game. Furthermore, the sum greater zero that may be
distributed between a buyer and a seller is dependent on their oﬀer strategies. In fact, the sum
is decreasing when the parties’ oﬀers diverge from their reservation prices. Thus individual
5See e.g. Flood and Dresher (1952) for reference
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best responses are not Pareto eﬃcient. Opposed to Cournot competition (2001 (org. 1838)),
naive strategies (which are equivalent to honest behaviour) develop more eﬃcient allocations
in a double auction.
There may be procedures to implement honesty, as for instance shown by Kilgur et. al
(2011). Further, Schelling (1960) proposes to include criteria such as cultural background
into the strategy decision. While the trading mechanism of a double auction is not altered
and players behave rationally in terms of individual proﬁt maximisation, we conclude that
in equilibrium otherwise feasible trades are missed. In conclusion, the equilibrium bidding
strategy turns out to be not Pareto eﬃcient.
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Fig. 9 – Properties of diﬀerent market settings
Figure 9 compares further properties of the diﬀerent market settings. The functions are
calculated from proposition 2 and optimal oﬀer strategies as discussed in this section. Figures
9 (a) and (b) show the oﬀer strategies the buyer and the seller choose in each market setting.
Both parties choose the most extreme strategies when they are the rational individual and
their counterpart behaves naively. Deal probabilities in each market setting are summarized
in ﬁgure 9 (c). The highest deal probability of 50% is given under full information. A deal
probability of approximately 22.5% is achieved in the rational setting. This is the lowest
possible deal probability. When one of the players behaves rationally and the counterpart
naively, a deal probability of approximately 32% is achieved in both cases.
Figure 10 shows the buyer’s expected proﬁt in the diﬀerent market settings, with a val-
uation imprecision of 10%. That proﬁt is indicated by the colour scale. The ranking order
of the buyer’s preferred double auction settings can be observed from that ﬁgure. The buyer
prefers the setting, where he behaves strategically and his counterpart naively. Followed by
the setting, where both players place their bids naively. The third (fourth) best alternative is
the setting, where both parties place their bids strategically (the buyer plays naively and the
seller places her bid strategically). Likewise, the seller’s preferences can be observed in ﬁgure
11.
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If there were costs associated with the participation in a double auction, which are higher
than either player’s expected proﬁt, then neither the buyer nor the seller would use this
platform. For instance, if the valuation imprecision α is 10 %, then a seller’s expected proﬁt
is 1.20% if both players place their bids strategically. As a result the double auction is not
attractive for a seller when her costs for market participation exceed her expected proﬁt of
1.20%.
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Fig. 10 – Buyer’s expected proﬁt in diﬀer-
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ent market settings
After a detailed analysis of double auctions, the next section is concerned with a market
maker’s market. We will show that even without costs for bilateral trade in a double auction
and under non-restrictive conditions, this dealer is preferable for both market participants.
3 The Dealer’s Market
In the Dealer’s Market, there is a dealer present. The dealer has experience regarding
the good and knows its average value. Thus he can value the good precisely. He acts as a
market maker and charges a bid-ask spread. The dealer oﬀers to buy the good for its average
value multiplied by 1− f and oﬀers to sell the good for its average value multiplied by 1+ f ,
with fee f > 0. The bid-ask spread guarantees the dealer a positive proﬁt on each round-trip
transaction, given by 2f > 0. Hence, he deterministically proﬁts from his strategy.
Buyers and sellers do not know the average valuation. Therefore they are unaware whether
the dealer truly shows them prices (1− f)V and (1 + f)V , respectively. This means that the
parties need to trust the intermediary to charge truthful prices. Consequently, the intermedi-
ary needs to be endowed with exogenous reputation capital such that the bargainers consider
him trustworthy.
The dealer pursues the strategy to install an environment under information asymmetry.
In the Dealer’s Market buyers and sellers do not interact. They solely communicate with
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the dealer and choose whether to accept his oﬀer, or not. In this sense there is information
asymmetry in the Dealer’s Market. Asymmetric information is important to the success of
the dealer’s strategy. This means that a buyer and a seller should either consult the dealer
or choose to trade in a double auction. Additionally, a buyer and a seller can ﬁrst bargain
in a double auction and, in case they are unsuccessful, they may consult the dealer in the
next step. While this sequential strategy is beneﬁcial for a buyer and a seller, the dealer
is left with a Lemons problem: buyers with a low reservation price and sellers with a high
reservation price. Thus the dealer suﬀers from adverse selection. Installing a beneﬁcial fee
strategy consequently becomes more complicated for the dealer under full information because
then the players may engage in bilateral negotiations prior to consulting the dealer. Then the
dealer’s strategy may even collapse.
We start to formally analyse properties of the Dealer’s Market by calculating the deal
probability.
Proposition 14. When f ≤ α, then the probability that the buyer makes a gain from the
dealer’s oﬀer is given by p = (α− f)/(2α). The same is true for the seller.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Obviously, the deal probability in the Dealer’s Market is a strictly decreasing linear func-
tion of the dealer’s fee f . For f = 0 deal probability is exactly 50 %. It decreases linearly
for an increasing dealer fee f . For f = α, the deal probability is zero. We ﬁnd that there
will be no successful deals in the Dealer’s Market if the fee f exceeds the maximum players’
valuation imprecision α.
The next proposition calculates a buyer’s and a seller’s proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market.
Proposition 15. When f < α, then the buyer has a positive expected proﬁt from consulting
the dealer. It is given by E (PD(B)) = (α− f)2 /(2∆b). The same is true for the seller’s
expected proﬁt, that is given by E (PD(S)) = (α− f)2 /(2∆b).
Proof: See the Appendix.
We ﬁnd that both the buyer and the seller have positive expected proﬁt from participating
in the Dealer’s Market if the condition f < α is satisﬁed. The higher the market participants’
valuation imprecision α, the more likely is it that they participate in the Dealer’s Market.
Furthermore, the attractiveness of the Dealer’s Market increases when the dealer lowers his
fee f .
The next section compares the double auction and the Dealer’s Market. It provides non-
restrictive criteria, when the players prefer the Dealer’s Market.
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4 The Downside of Full Information
This section analyses the relative attractiveness of double auctions and the Dealer’s Mar-
ket. Section 4.1 introduces an optimal dealer strategy to Pareto dominate double auctions.
The introduction of less restrictive assumptions in section 4.2 allows us to show that Pareto
eﬃciency of the Dealer’s Market can be achieved even in more general frameworks. Section
4.3 presents a numerical example on how a dealer Pareto dominates bilateral negotiations.
4.1 Pareto Eﬃciency of Information Asymmetry
In this section we establish upper bounds for the dealer’s fee such that the Dealer’s Market
is Pareto eﬃcient over the diﬀerent double auction settings that were introduced in section 2.
First, the next proposition analyses in which cases the deal probability in the Dealer’s
Market is higher than that of a double auction.
Proposition 16. Let pd be the deal probability in a double auction. Then the deal probability
in the Dealer’s Market exceeds that of a double auction if f < α(1− 2pd).
Proof: See the Appendix.
The attractiveness of the Dealer’s Market increases when the dealer reduces his fee. Fur-
thermore, the probability for deal success increases when the fee is reduced. Proposition 16
establishes an upper bound for the dealer’s fee such that the Dealer’s Market oﬀers a higher
probability of deal success than a double auction. That upper bound is f < α(1− 2pd).
While f is below this bound, success probability in the Dealer’s Market is higher than that
in a double auction.
The next 5 propositions establish upper bounds for the dealer’s fee, such that the Dealer’s
Market is Pareto eﬃcient over the diﬀerent double auction settings. The following proposition
develops a general formula for a higher expected proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market compared to a
double auction.
Proposition 17. Let E
(
P(·)
)
be a player’s expected proﬁt in a double auction. Then that
player’s expected proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market exceeds that proﬁt if f < α − 2
√
αE
(
P(·)
)
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 17 provides a general formula for an appropriate dealer’s fee strategy. Given
a player’s expected proﬁt in a double auction, the dealer may determine his fee according to
proposition 17 in order to Pareto dominate that double auction.
Let us concentrate on the diﬀerent double auction settings as introduced in section 2. First,
we will develop a dealer’s strategy to Pareto dominate double auctions under full information.
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Proposition 18. Compared to a two-player double auction under full information, the players
prefer the Dealer’s Market if f < α
(
1−
√
2
3
)
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 19. Let E (PB) be the buyer’s expected proﬁt in a double auction with a rational
buyer and a naive seller. Then both players prefer the Dealer’s Market over the double auction
if f < α − 2
√
αE (PB).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 20. Let E (PS) be the seller’s expected proﬁt in a double auction with a rational
seller and a naive buyer. Then both players prefer the Dealer’s Market over the double auction
if f < α − 2
√
αE (PS).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 21. Let E (PB) be the buyer’s expected proﬁt in a double auction with rational
players. Then both players prefer the Dealer’s Market over that double auction if f < α −
2
√
αE (PB).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Propositions 18 - 21 determine upper bounds for the dealer’s fee such that the Dealer’s
Market is preferred over diﬀerent double auction settings by both the buyer and the seller. If
the dealer’s fee f reaches the upper bound, then one of the market participants is indiﬀerent
between the Dealer’s Market and a double auction, and the other party prefers the Dealer’s
Market. Therefore this upper bound fmax is the highest fee the dealer can charge for the
Dealer’s Market to be preferred over a double auction by the buyer and the seller. Secondly,
this fee maximizes the dealer’s proﬁt.
Figure 12 shows this maximum fee that the dealer can charge each market participant,
such that this player prefers the Dealer’s Market over a double auction. The maximum fee
fmax(B) for the buyer to be indiﬀerent is shown in ﬁgure 12 (a). Accordingly, ﬁgure 12
(b) shows the maximum dealer’s fee fmax(S) such that the seller is indiﬀerent between the
Dealer’s Market and a double auction.
Figure 13 shows the fee fmax as a function of valuation imprecision. This is the upper
bound for a dealer’s fee such that a buyer and a seller are indiﬀerent between a double auction
and the Dealer’s Market.
It can be seen that a higher valuation imprecision leads to a higher fee fmax. This is true
for each double auction setting. As a result, the dealer proﬁts from an increase in the players’
valuation imprecision.
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Fig. 12 – Maximum fee such that the buyer or the seller is indiﬀerent between the Dealer’s
Market and diﬀerent double auction settings
In section 2.5 it was shown that a double auction with rational players is the unique
Nash equilibrium of the four double auction settings. When a buyer and a seller place their
bids rationally in a double auction, then there is exactly one such optimal strategy for either
player. In particular, ﬁgure 13 shows the dealer’s fee that makes the Dealer’s Market exactly
as favourable as double auctions in the bidding strategy equilibrium. That is, when both
parties place their bids strategically. The buyer and the seller prefer the Dealer’s Market over
a double auction if the dealer’s fee is below or equal to the fee fmax.
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Fig. 13 – fmax such that both market participants are indiﬀerent between the Dealer’s Market
and diﬀerent double auction settings
We have analysed optimal dealer’s fee schemes that allow the Dealer’s Market to be Pareto
eﬃcient over the four double auction settings. The next theorem summarises this analysis and
shows when the Dealer’s Market is Pareto eﬃcient over double auctions in bidding equilibrium.
That is, when both players place their bids strategically.
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Theorem 1. Let the buyer and the seller be rational bidders in a two-player double auction.
Let E (PB) be the buyer’s expected proﬁt in that double auction. Then the Dealer’s Market is
Pareto eﬃcient over the double auction if and only if
0 < f < α − 2
√
αE (PB).
In this case the market under information asymmetry Pareto dominates the market under full
information.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above theorem presents an equivalent condition for the Dealer’s Market to be Pareto
eﬃcient over a double auction in bidding equilibrium. The theorem states that when the
condition 0 < f < α − 2
√
αE (PB) is satisﬁed, then all parties favour the Dealer’s Market
over a double auction in bidding equilibrium.
The condition is closely linked to the dealer’s fee strategy. By applying a reasonable fee
strategy, the dealer can therefore inﬂuence the players’ market preferences. When he sets
his fee accordingly, the buyer and the seller will prefer the Dealer’s Market over bilateral
negotiations.
Propositions 18 - 21 and theorem 1 are true for the players’ ex-ante decisions. In fact,
parties have to decide on their market preference ﬁrst and choose either market according
to their ex-ante preference. It is of importance for our model that players face an "either
or" decision between a double auction and the Dealer’s Market. Otherwise a buyer and a
seller might bargain in a double auction in the ﬁrst place. If their bilateral bargaining at-
tempt is unsuccessful, they might consult the dealer in their attempt of successful bargaining.
This strategy encourages adverse selection and thus disfavours the dealer. Consequently, the
dealer should create an environment of information asymmetry, where he hides the respective
reservation price of a buyer and a seller from each other.
Table 2 presents a numerical example to illustrate this section’s analysis. It shows a
buyer’s and a seller’s strategic options as a normal-form game. For this example, we set
valuation imprecision to a maximum of α = 10% and the dealer charges a fee of f = 1.5%6.
When bilateral trade in a double auction is the only option to the bargainers, then the naive
strategy’s proﬁt is highest with α/6 ≈ 1.67%. Playing naively is however not dominant. The
equilibrium strategy in a double auction is that both players place their bids strategically.
Their proﬁt then is 1.20% (seller) and 1.27% (buyer). The dealer oﬀers each party an expected
proﬁt of 1.81%. He dominates double auctions with rational players and further dominates
6The maximal dealer’s fee for Pareto dominance of the Dealer’s Market is f = 10% · (1−√2/3) ≈ 1.84%,
according to proposition 18.
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bilateral trading with naively behaving players. Therefore both players prefer the Dealer’s
Market over a double auction. Thus, the Dealer’s Market is Pareto eﬃcient.
Table 2 – Illustration of the players’ strategic options and their expected outcome. Valuation
imprecision is α = 10% and the dealer’s fee is f = 1.5%
Buyer’s strategy
Rational Naive Dealer
Rational 1.20% / 1.27% 2.12% / 0.87%
Seller’s strategy Naive 0.83% / 2.15% 1.67% / 1.67%
Dealer 1.81% / 1.81%
Table 3 calculates the maximum dealer’s fee fmax that the dealer may charge the buyer
and the seller. It shows that, independent of the valuation imprecision α, the dealer can
charge the seller a higher fee than the buyer and still the Dealer’s Market Pareto dominates
double auctions. The optimal price the dealer oﬀers the seller is thus V (1− fmax(S)). The
optimal price he charges the buyer is V (1 + fmax(B)). When a dealer applies this fee scheme,
then his earnings per round trip transaction are fmax(B) + fmax(S). That asymmetric fee
strategy can further increase the dealer’s earnings.
Table 3 – Preference of Dealer’s Market over a double auction
Buyer fmax(B) Seller fmax(S) Pareto Dominance fmax
α = 5% 1.46% 1.51% 1.46%
α = 10% 2.28% 3.07% 2.28%
α = 20% 5.58% 6.33% 5.58%
α = 25% 6.86% 8.05% 6.86%
α = 50% 12.56% 17.51% 12.56%
Figure 14 analyses the relative attractiveness of the Dealer’s Market and the double auc-
tion. Assume a player, say the buyer, has some reservation price. Then the buyer’s imprecision
z ∈ [−α, α] is below (or above) the average valuation. On the basis of z, the expected buyer’s
proﬁt may be calculated.
In ﬁgures 14 (a) and (b), the players’ actual valuation imprecision z is drawn on the x-axis.
Expected proﬁt, given z is drawn on the y-axis. Thus the area between each function and
the x-axis represents a player’s expected proﬁt (not conditioned on z). Both players’ proﬁts
are drawn for naive players and in bidding equilibrium, where both players place their bids
strategically. This is compared to expected proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market.
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Fig. 14 – Expected players’ proﬁts as a function of their actual imprecision
When the buyer has a relatively high reservation price, then the Dealer’s Market is most
preferable for him. For an actual valuation imprecision below f , a buyer’s expected proﬁt in
the Dealer’s Market is zero. This can be seen by the red line in ﬁgure 14 (a), where a buyer’s
proﬁt is zero for an actual imprecision below f . In this case a double auction generates a
higher expected proﬁt. This can be seen in ﬁgure 14 (a), when the black line (double auction
with naive players) and the blue line (double auction with rational players) are above the red
line (proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market).
In ﬁgure 14 (b) the opposite is true. The seller proﬁts most from the Dealer’s Market, if
her reservation price is minimal. In fact, an actual valuation imprecision above −f causes zero
proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market, whereas the expected proﬁt in a double auction still exceeds
zero.
As shown in section 2, double auctions under full information always dominate those with
rational individuals, because in a double auction the expected proﬁt is always higher under
full information. If the proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market on average is higher than the average
proﬁt in a double auction, then the Dealer’s Market is Pareto eﬃcient. In ﬁgure 14 the
dealer’s fee is f ∗ = α(1−
√
2/3). As shown in proposition 18, this fee allows for the players’
indiﬀerence between double auctions under full information and the Dealer’s Market. As a
result, the areas under the red and black graphs in ﬁgure 14 are identical. For fees lower than
f ∗, the Dealer’s Market is more eﬃcient than double auctions under full information and we
have Pareto eﬃciency of information asymmetry over full information. In this case, the area
under the red line is bigger than the area under the black line, in ﬁgures 14 (a) and (b).
We have shown that the Dealer’s Market under information asymmetry can be Pareto
eﬃcient over double auctions, even those under full information. By relaxing our assumptions,
the next section generalizes this result in a variety of aspects.
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4.2 Pareto Eﬃciency in more General Frameworks
This section analyses a more general framework of double auctions than presented in
section 2. It proves that the dealer can determine a suitable fee strategy such that his fee
scheme is Pareto eﬃcient over the more general double auction framework.
In the prior sections, a buyer and a seller are assumed to have "true" identical distribu-
tions of valuation imprecision. Further, the players are aware of these "true" distributions of
imprecision. However, in a more general framework, both players anticipate their own distri-
bution of valuation imprecision and their negotiant’s imprecision distribution. In addition,
true imprecision distributions and anticipated distributions are not identical in general. This
matter will be discussed in the remaining part of this section.
Let us model the conditions given above. Assume the buyer anticipates his valuation
imprecision to be represented by a random variableXB and the seller’s valuation as anticipated
by the buyer is given by the random variable YB. Now the buyer may determine his optimal
oﬀer strategy b ≤ 1, as shown in proposition 4. Analogously, the seller anticipates her and
the buyer’s valuation imprecision to be represented by the random variables XS and YS,
respectively. Like the buyer, the seller may determine her optimal oﬀer strategy s ≥ 1 from
her anticipations.
As in double auctions from section 2, rational behaviour disfavours both parties.
Theorem 2. Assume the true buyer’s valuation imprecision is represented by the random
variable X. Likewise, the seller’s true valuation imprecision is represented by the random
variable Y . Assume that P(X > Y ) > 0 (otherwise the deal probability is zero deterministi-
cally). Let the buyer’s anticipated optimal oﬀer strategy be b ≤ 1 and the seller’s anticipated
optimal oﬀer strategy be s ≥ 1.
Then the buyer’s and seller’s expected proﬁt is highest when they apply oﬀer strategies
b = s = 1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above theorem implies that a buyer and a seller are better oﬀ if they place their
oﬀers naively. Rational behaviour therefore harms the buyer and the seller in general terms.
According to theorem 2, the more general double auction in bidding equilibrium is at most as
eﬃcient as a double auction with naive individuals. Thus the proﬁt-pie (sum of the proﬁts of
the players) in equilibrium is smaller than the proﬁt-pie naively behaving players share. The
ineﬃciency of the bidding equilibrium can be exploited by the dealer.
Theorem 3. If a buyer and a seller behave rationally in a double auction, the dealer may
ﬁnd a suitable fee strategy such that his earnings are positive and the players prefer engaging
the dealer. Thus the Dealer’s Market Pareto dominates that double auction.
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Proof: See the Appendix.
From theorems 2 and 3 general results about double auctions and the Pareto dominance
of the Dealer’s Market can be derived. In double auctions rational behaviour of the players
harms both parties. Thus, generalising double auctions, the players would proﬁt more if
their oﬀer price is equal to their reservation price. This naive strategy however, is not an
equilibrium. When a seller’s strategy is ﬁxed, then a buyer’s attempt to increase his share of
the proﬁt-pie shrinks the overall proﬁt-pie at the same time. The buyer’s strategy therefore
ensures him maximal proﬁt and the seller is left with a smaller share of a smaller proﬁt-pie.
The same eﬀect is true for a strategic seller. In equilibrium, a buyer and a seller then share
a smaller proﬁt-pie than that, which would have resulted from the naive strategy.
In the Dealer’s Market, the proﬁt-pie has maximum size. The overall proﬁt may even be
bigger than in a double auction with naive individuals7. The dealer’s optimal strategy is to
oﬀer the bargainers more proﬁt in absolute terms than they would expect from the smaller
proﬁt-pie in a double auction. This way, there is some proportion of the bigger proﬁt-pie left
that he can have for himself.
As an example, this is illustrated in ﬁgure 15. It provides the proﬁts from a double auction
with valuation imprecision of α = 10% and an average valuation that is given by 10.000. In
this example, the dealer’s fee is f = 0.25%.
Figure 15 (a) shows the expected proﬁt of a rational buyer and a rational seller in the
double auction: the buyer’s expected proﬁt is 127 and that of the seller is 120. Thus they
share a proﬁt-pie of size 247. When the parties behave naively, as shown in ﬁgure 15 (b),
each player gets half of the proﬁt-pie. The naive strategy generates a proﬁt of 167 per player.
That is, the proﬁt-pie has a size of 334. In comparison to placing their bids strategically, the
naive strategy thus results in a bigger proﬁt-pie.
Proposition 18 additionally states that the Dealer’s Market can in fact Pareto dominate
double auctions under full information. This means that the dealer may install a fee structure
such that the proﬁt-pie in the Dealer’s Market is bigger than the biggest pie available in a
double auction; even bigger than the pie that full information oﬀers. As a consequence, a
buyer and a seller always prefer the Dealer’s Market ex-ante, even if full information was
available in a double auction. This fact can be observed by comparing ﬁgures 15 (b) and (c).
The Dealer’s Market oﬀers a buyer and a seller each a proﬁt of 238. At the same time, the
dealer’s gain is 50 per round-trip transaction. Thus, the Dealer’s Market oﬀers a proﬁt-pie
of size 526. Therefore, the proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market exceeds that from a double auction
with naive or strategic players.
7When the dealer’s fee is below α(1−√2/3), then the proﬁt-pie in the Dealer’s Market is bigger than that
of a double auction with naive individuals, according to proposition 18.
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(a) A double auction with ra-
tional players with a total
proﬁt of 247
Seller: 167 Buyer: 167
(b) A double auction with naive
players with a total proﬁt of 334
Seller: 238
Dealer: 50
Buyer: 238
(c) The Dealer’s Market with a total
proﬁt of 526
Fig. 15 – Size of the proﬁt-pie in double auctions and the Dealer’s Market. Average valuation
is 10.000, valuation imprecision is α = 10% and the dealer’s fee is 0.25%
So far, we have presented a theory that explains when information asymmetry can be
Pareto eﬃcient over full information. Let us illustrate the theory by a practical example.
4.3 Example: The Headhunter Game
In this game the job candidate is asked to propose the salary S she expects to earn. The
candidate gets hired with salary S if the employer is willing to pay at least the proposed
salary S. Otherwise the candidate is not hired.
In our model, the candidate can be considered the seller who oﬀers her time and skills
to the buyer (the employer). Both players have a certain reservation price. The employer
does not need to adjust his reservation price as the level of salary exclusively depends on
the candidate’s proposed salary S. The candidate can ask the employer for a higher salary
S as she truly requires. This strategy is risky because the probability of not getting hired
increases. However, the strategy’s possible beneﬁt is a higher compensation. In fact, a
reasonable increase of the job candidate’s minimum salary requirement is optimal. For a
job candidate, this reasonable increase can be modelled within the framework of a double
auction with rational seller, as in section 2.3. Furthermore, the negotiation skill parameter
satisﬁes k = 0, because the salary only depends on her proposed salary. Negotiation skills are
irrelevant.
In our example, we set the average salary to 50, 000e and the maximum valuation impre-
cision to α = 20%. Then reservation prices are uniformly distributed on [40, 000; 60, 000]e.
Assume the candidate to have a salary requirement of 49, 000e and the employer to have
a reservation price of 54, 000e. If the candidate pursues an optimal oﬀer strategy accord-
ing to proposition 48, then her optimal strategy is to increase her salary requirement by
8Here k = 0, whereas in the proposition k = 1/2.
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sopt(1) = 14.57%. In fact, her optimal proposed salary then is S = 56, 139.30e. When
the candidate acts upon the optimal strategy, her proposed salary exceeds the employer’s
reservation price and the candidate is not hired. In a double auction, negotiations therefore
fail.
Now consider a recruitment ﬁrm (the dealer) that has experience and suﬃcient market
expertise to know that the average salary for the job is 50, 000e. Moreover, the recruiter’s
fee strategy is asymmetric and the recruitment fee is fully charged to the employer. Let that
fee be 4% of the average salary9.
The recruiter oﬀers the job to the job seeker with a salary of 50, 000e. The job seeker
accepts as the oﬀer is above her salary requirement. The employer pays 50, 000e for salary
and 2, 000e recruitment fee. The employer’s total expenses are below his reservation price
of 54, 000e. When she places the candidate successfully, then the recruiter earns 2, 000e in
fees.
It is worth mentioning that the employer and the employee proﬁt from this even more,
when the employment relationship holds longer, as the recruiter’s fee needs to be paid only
once. With the argument of longer relationships, the recruiter may even charge a higher fee.
In this numerical example, direct negotiations are unsuccessful but the recruitment ﬁrm
is able to place the candidate successfully. Therefore all players prefer hiring the recruitment
ﬁrm. Even if direct negotiations lead to success it is ex-ante optimal for all players to hire
the recruitment ﬁrm.
However, it is necessary that the recruiter limits information between both parties. Oth-
erwise players call upon the recruiter’s services only when direct negotiations were unsuc-
cessful. Then the recruiter is consulted by lemons to a greater extent: employers who pay
small salaries and job-seekers with high salary requirements. Due to adverse selection, the
recruiter’s expected earnings would be smaller. Therefore the recruiter beneﬁts from infor-
mation asymmetry between employer and employee.
The Headhunter game has presented an example for the theory of this article. It showed
how a Dealer’s Market (i.e. the headhunter) is preferred by all parties compared to direct
loan negotiations. The next section presents an application on initial public oﬀerings (IPOs).
We will show that our theory can be applied to solve the IPO underpricing puzzle.
5 A Solution for the IPO Underpricing Puzzle
In this section we apply our theory to capital markets and present a solution for the IPO
underpricing puzzle. Let us introduce our capital market model and adopt it to our theory.
9The employer’s expected proﬁt from that double auction is 2.07%, according to proposition 2. Then
proposition 17 calculates a maximum fee of 7.13% that the recruiter may charge the employer. When the
recruiter does not exceed that fee, then ex-ante his services are preferable over bilateral salary negotiations.
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First, we focus on a ﬁrm that has the alternative of raising private or public equity capital.
In our model, the ﬁrm may be viewed as the seller of its equity securities. In section 5.1 we
concentrate on the ﬁrm’s alternatives. Section 5.2 provides an analysis of an investor’s options
on how to buy equity capital of a ﬁrm. Conditions for an IPO to be preferred by all parties
are established in section 5.3. This section further shows that an IPO is underpriced on at
least average. Moreover it provides conditions, when an IPO is underpriced deterministically.
Finally, section 5.4 discusses a numerical example for the Pareto dominance of an IPO and
its underpricing.
5.1 Alternatives for raising Capital: IPO and Venture Capital
Assume a corporation wants to sell a ﬁxed share S of its owner rights. This corporation’s
management then may try to sell the share S privately by negotiating and placing it with
an individual or an institution, such as a venture capitalist. The corporation’s management
further may hire an investment banker to place the corporation’s share in an IPO. According
to our model, the ﬁrm and the venture capitalist are unable to precisely value the ﬁrm’s
share. Each party makes an estimation error that is uniformly distributed around an average
valuation V for the share.
Let us ﬁrst model negotiations for private placement, for example with a venture capitalist:
the ﬁrm’s management’s valuation is VM and a venture capitalist’s valuation is VC . The
management wants to raise at least the amount VM for the corporation’s share S. The venture
capitalist is willing to pay at the most VC for it. Then VM and VC are the players’ reservation
prices. During price negotiations, the parties simultaneously reveal their oﬀers OM and OV to
their counter party. The deal price for the corporation’s share then is P = kOM + (1− k)OV
(for some k on the interval [0, 1]), if the venture capitalist’s oﬀer is higher than or equal to
the management’s oﬀer. Otherwise the deal is unsuccessful. As described in the introduction
to section 2, the parameter k represents the players’ negotiation skills. The oﬀers OM and OV
are derived by the oﬀer strategies and the reservation prices of the negotiators. Negotiations
between a corporation and a venture capitalists are consequently an example of bilateral
negotiations as discussed in section 2.4, where both parties behave strategically.
We showed in section 4, that a dealer (an investment banker), may determine his fee
strategy such that the seller (a ﬁrm), prefers the Dealer’s Market over bilateral negotiations
with the buyer (a venture capitalist). In this case, the investment banker would sell the share
S to the public. When the investment banker’s fee strategy is chosen adequately, the ﬁrm
chooses employing the investment banker to issue an IPO over bilateral negotiations with a
venture capitalist.
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5.2 The Investor’s Alternatives
Assume an investor is interested in a certain share of a ﬁrm that is considering an IPO.
Then the investor faces three options: the investor may (a) engage in bilateral negotiations
with the ﬁrm. Alternatively it can (b) wait for the IPO to be issued and buy the newly issued
shares. Finally, the investor may (c) invest in a portfolio that spans the issuing ﬁrm’s shares,
that is, the investor buys a duplicating portfolio that generates returns and bares risk exactly
as the ﬁrm’s newly issued shares.
As in the previous section 5.1, case (a) can be modelled as a double auction, where an
investor and the ﬁrm strategically place their bids. We have already shown in section 4 that
an investment banker with reasonable fee strategy dominates that double auction by issuing
an IPO. Thus case (a) is dominated by case (b).
Since the stock market provides an exact stock price for each asset in the spanning portfo-
lio, the value of the spanning portfolio V is known with certainty in case (c). In other words,
there is perfect valuation for the spanning portfolio and thus also perfect valuation for the
ﬁrms share.
The following section proves that, in order to dominate option (c), the investment banker
(option (b)) needs to underprice the IPO. Otherwise the investor prefers the spanning port-
folio.
5.3 An IPO under Asymmetric Information dominates raising Capital from a Venture
Capitalist with Full Information
This section formalises the prior argumentations and proves under which conditions an
IPO is the dominant alternative for an investor and the ﬁrm. We furthermore present condi-
tions that cause underpricing of an IPO. First, an analysis of the average prices in bilateral
negotiations between a ﬁrm and a venture capitalist is conducted. It will be shown that this
price is below the average valuation V . This means that even in bilateral negotiations we ﬁnd
underpricing. To understand this, we ﬁrst calculate the average price resulting from bilateral
negotiations.
Proposition 22. When bilateral negotiations between a ﬁrm and a venture capitalist are
successful, the average deal price is
E(P |Success) = 1(bb2 − ss1)2
(
kb
[
b b23
3 s − b1
(
b22
2 −
b12 s2
6 b2
)]
+ (1− k)s
[
b2 b23
6 s2 − b1
2
(
b2
2 −
b1 s
3 b
)])
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
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Proposition 22 gives a formula for the average deal price in case of a bargaining success.
In section 2 we established optimal oﬀer strategies (b, s) for both players in diﬀerent bilateral
negotiation settings. Using these strategies makes it possible to calculate the average deal
price in the diﬀerent bilateral negotiation settings discussed in section 2.
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Fig. 16 – Average deal prices in bilateral negotiations
Figure 16 shows these prices as a function of valuation imprecision. When both players
place their oﬀers naively, the average deal price is V , according to proposition 22. Figure 16
(a) analyses the remaining bilateral negotiation alternatives10. When the ﬁrm is behaving
strategically and the investor naively, there is some overpricing that increases with valuation
imprecision. It reaches approximately 5% of V at the most. When the investor behaves
strategically and the ﬁrm naively, then the investor reduces his oﬀer, whereas the ﬁrm’s oﬀer
and reservation price are identical. This has the eﬀect, that the average price is below V
and decreasing in valuation imprecision. That price reaches down to approximately 86% of
V , which is equivalent to 14% underpricing. When one player behaves strategically and the
other naively, then the strategic player can shift the average price to his advantage. When
both players behave strategically (this is indicated by the blue graph) the average deal price
is decreasing in valuation imprecision and always below the average valuation V . In this case,
there is signiﬁcant underpricing of up to approximately 7% of V . This property of bilateral
negotiations is unexpected, as one might reason that the price behaves symmetrically when
both parties place their bids strategically. This eﬀect has been explained in section 2, where
it was shown that a buyer has the upper hand in bilateral negotiations. That section showed
that a buyer’s proﬁt is higher than that of a seller when they both bid strategically.
Figure 16 (b) analyses the inﬂuence of negotiation skills on the average deal price in
bilateral negotiations with strategic individuals. The parameter k represents the relative
10Without loss of generality we set V = 1 in this ﬁgure
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negotiation skills of the parties. When k = 0, the deal price is given by the ﬁrm’s oﬀer. This
means that the ﬁrm has superior negotiation skills compared to the investor. When k = 1 the
opposite is true. Then the deal price is given by the investor’s oﬀer and his negotiation skills
exceed the ﬁrm’s. If k = 1/2, both parties share the same negotiation skills. The graph shows
that when the investor’s negotiation skills are better than the ﬁrm’s, the deal price decreases,
and vice versa. If the ﬁrm gains the upper hand in bilateral negotiations (for k = 0.25),
the deal price is approximately constant at V . The average deal price even diminishes for a
valuation imprecision above 20%. We conclude that in bilateral negotiations with strategic
individuals, there is underpricing, even when the ﬁrm’s negotiation skills exceed that of the
investor.
The next proposition shows that an IPO with asymmetric information dominates bilateral
negotiations of a ﬁrm and a venture capitalist under full information. However, the investment
banker needs to underprice an IPO in order to compete with the capital market which provides
a spanning portfolio.
Proposition 23. Let E (PS) be the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt in bilateral negotiations with strategic
players. Deﬁne
fmax := α − 2
√
αE (PS).
When the investment banker oﬀers to buy a ﬁrm’s shares for Bd > V (1 − fmax) and oﬀers
to sell the shares at the price Sd within the bounds Bd < Sd < V , then an IPO is Pareto
eﬃcient.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 23 develops a pricing strategy such that the IPO is Pareto eﬃcient. The
intuition behind the proposition is that, while the investment banker does not exaggerate
his fee, the IPO is Pareto eﬃcient over bilateral negotiations between a ﬁrm and a venture
capitalist. We can infer from proposition 23 that the investment banker oﬀers the IPO shares
to investors below their average valuation V .
The next lemma shows an interesting property of an IPO which can be derived from
proposition 23.
Lemma 2. When the investment banker applies a fee strategy as in proposition 23, IPOs are
underpriced.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 states that IPOs are underpriced. In order to attract investors for the IPO,
the investment banker needs to compete with an eﬃcient market, according to proposition
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23. Prices in the eﬃcient market are exact and therefore the spanning portfolio for the IPO
shares has the exact price V . To attract investors, the investment banker needs to price the
IPO shares below that value V . In other words, the investment banker underprices the IPO
shares. Otherwise investors will reject the investment banker’s oﬀer.
Note that when a spanning portfolio for the ﬁrm’s shares does not exist, the investor looses
option (c), the exactly priced duplicating portfolio. Then the investment banker’s strategy
to attract an investor and a ﬁrm to the IPO is simpler.
Proposition 24. Assume there is no spanning portfolio for the ﬁrm’s shares. Let E (PB) and
E (PS) be an investor’s and a ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts in bilateral negotiations with strategic
players, respectively. Deﬁne
fb := α − 2
√
αE (PB)
fs := α − 2
√
αE (PS).
When the investment banker oﬀers to buy a ﬁrm’s shares for Bd > V (1 − fs) and oﬀers to
sell the shares at price Sd, with Bd < Sd < V (1 + fb), then an IPO is Pareto eﬃcient.
Proof: See the Appendix.
When there is no spanning portfolio for the ﬁrm’s shares, it is simpler for the investment
banker to install a fee structure such that an investor and a ﬁrm are in preference of an IPO.
Dropping the spanning portfolio assumption, IPOs are still underpriced on average, but to a
smaller extent.
Lemma 3. Assume there is no spanning portfolio for the ﬁrm’s shares. When the investment
banker applies a fee scheme as in proposition 24, IPOs are underpriced on average.
Proof: See the Appendix.
In general it is possible that IPOs may be overpriced if the assumption of the existence of
a spanning portfolio is dropped. Lemma 3 however states, that on average they are under-
priced. Furthermore, section 2 proved that a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is lower than that of an investor in
bilateral negotiations. Section 4 discussed that the investment banker may therefore install
an asymmetric fee structure to make his market Pareto eﬃcient over bilateral negotiations.
In fact, to successfully compete with bilateral negotiations, the investment banker may oﬀer
the ﬁrm a lower proﬁt than an investor, because a ﬁrm’s gain in bilateral negotiations is
lower than an investor’s. This asymmetric oﬀer strategy is responsible for the IPO to be
underpriced on average. We conclude that IPO underpricing is a robust property. However,
an IPO is deterministically underpriced when a spanning portfolio exists.
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The underpricing of IPOs is illustrated in ﬁgure 17. Using propositions 23 and 24 we
computed feasible IPO prices for diﬀerent valuation imprecision.
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Fig. 17 – Feasible price strategies of the dealer
Figure 17 (a) shows feasible IPO prices with the spanning portfolio hypothesis, that is an
investor’s option (c). The blue area in this ﬁgure represents feasible investment banker’s price
strategies. It can be seen that IPOs are always underpriced. The intensity of the underpricing
is the dealer’s choice and depends on several factors. For example, when a ﬁrm is more inclined
to sell its shares, it is easier for the investment banker to satisfy the ﬁrm with a lower price.
As a result, the IPO can be underpriced to a greater extent, if the investment banker does not
change his fee. When a ﬁrm needs more encouragement for an IPO, the investment banker
may oﬀer a higher price. While the investment banker’s earnings are constant, the initial
shares become more costly. They are, however, still underpriced in order to dominate the
investor’s spanning portfolio alternative.
Figure 17 (b) shows price bounds without the option of a spanning portfolio. The minimum
price the ﬁrm demands is illustrated by the red line. It is equal to the lower price bound in
ﬁgure 17 (a). The investment banker needs to oﬀer the ﬁrm a higher price than this lower
bound. When there is no spanning portfolio, the investment banker may charge the investor a
price higher than V . The maximum price he may charge the investor is illustrated by the black
line in ﬁgure 17 (b). The investment banker has more freedom in pricing and thus possibly
more fee earnings when imprecision increases. In this case however, IPOs are not necessarily
underpriced: the investment banker may set an IPO price from the whole spectrum between
1−fs (the red line) and 1+fb (the black line). Actual pricing may be dependent on numerous
parameters, such as the necessity for sellers to raise capital and investors to buy those shares.
The size of the IPO market and the supply of investment capital, negotiation skills and the
investment banker’s minimum fee requirement are further factors that determine the actual
IPO price.
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5.4 Numerical Example: IPO Underpricing
For the numerical example we allow a share of a company to have average value V = 100.
Assume maximum valuation imprecision is 20%. Then the players’ valuations are uniformly
distributed on [80, 120]. However, the players do not know the valuation interval. Let the
management’s valuation be VM = 95 and the venture capitalist’s valuation be VC = 105. Both
players behave strategically. Therefore they adjust their reservation prices by certain factors
s and b, respectively. The ﬁrm’s management increases its valuation by a certain percentage
and the venture capitalist reduces his valuation by a certain percentage. Table 1 on page 21
gives these optimal oﬀer strategies s = 1.0684 and b = 0.9345. Thus the management’s oﬀer
price is OM ≈ 101.50 and the venture capitalist’s oﬀer price is OC ≈ 98.12. In this case,
the ﬁrm’s management demands more for the corporation’s share than the venture capitalist
is willing to pay. That is, with strategically behaving players the deal is unsuccessful, even
though with naive behaviour it would have taken place.
Let there be an investment banker with market expertise. In this case the investment
banker knows the average valuation V . She strategically conducts an IPO and oﬀers the ﬁrm
a price of Bd for its shares. Further, the investment banker oﬀers to sell the shares to the
investor at price Sd. Proposition 23 introduces the bounds for these prices. Accordingly11,
the lower bound of the oﬀer to the ﬁrm is Bd > V (1− fmax) ≈ V (1− 0.0635) = 0.9365V . An
investor needs to be priced within the bounds 0.9365V < Bd < Sd < V .
Assume the investment banker’s strategy is Bd = 0.97V = 97 and Sd = 0.99V = 99. In
this case the investment banker sells the share for 99 and the ﬁrm raises 97 for the share
after the investment banker’s fee. In fact, 97 exceeds the management’s valuation and the
management agrees to sell. Further, 99 is less than the investor’s valuation and consequently
he agrees to buy the share. The ﬁrm thus earns an additional value of 2 compared to its
minimum requirement. The investor accepts the oﬀer that represents a gain of 6 compared
to his imprecise valuation. As the deal is successful, the investment banker earns a fee of 2
for successful placement. The IPO is underpriced, since it is sold for 99 and its precise value
is 100. The investor may therefore generate an additional gain of 1, if the shares are later
priced precisely in the stock market.
The analysis of the example shows that employing an investment banker and conducting
an IPO is preferable over raising funds from a venture capitalist. In addition, in the example
above it is critical to hide information from the ﬁrm and the venture capitalist and to create
information asymmetry. In fact, in a world of full information, the valuation of the ﬁrm
and the venture capitalist would be common knowledge. Then direct negotiations would
11According to table 1 on page 21, the ﬁrm’s (the seller’s) expected proﬁt in bilateral negotiations is 2.33%.
From that proﬁt, a maximum fee fmax ≈ 6.35% can be calculated with the formula that proposition 23
provides.
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be successful and the dealer would not conduct the IPO. As a result, both, a ﬁrm and
investors would only go to the investment banker when direct negotiations fail. Thus, when
all valuations are known, the IPO is not the preferable solution. An IPO is Pareto dominant
only when investor and ﬁrm are unaware of their counterpart’s valuation under information
asymmetry. The investment banker thus faces a Lemons problem under full information.
To avoid this adverse selection, the investment banker systematically hides information from
the ﬁrm and the investors. This strategy ensures ex-ante Pareto eﬃciency of the IPO over
bilateral negotiations. In other words, the IPO is the ﬁrst priority of investors and a ﬁrm in
this case.
6 Conclusion
In contrast to common bilateral trading literature the model that has been developed in
this paper also considers imprecise valuation. This means that each player has a reservation
price for a good, a service or a share of a ﬁrm. Although each player knows that his valuation is
imprecise, a player can not determine whether his reservation price is high or low compared to
the other player’s reservation price, as he has no benchmark. Considering bilateral trade with
imprecise valuation, the players’ optimal oﬀer strategies were calculated and implications
for the market’s eﬃciency were analysed. Furthermore, the advantage of a market maker
over bilateral trade was discussed. Finally, it was shown that an IPO under information
asymmetry may be Pareto eﬃcient over direct negotiations under full information. This
application further presented an explanation for IPO underpricing.
We have shown that in a two-player double auction, the bargainers have the highest
expected proﬁt when they behave naively. Naive behaviour leads the parties to make oﬀers at
their reservation price. In fact, we proved that naive behaviour and full information lead to
equivalent strategies in a double auction. Even though naive behaviour is optimal, it is not an
equilibrium strategy. The equilibrium, under which both players strategically determine their
oﬀer strategies, generates less expected proﬁt than that which is generated under the naive
strategy. Strategic behaviour maximises individual proﬁt, however it leads to the reduction of
the set of feasible trades. A party’s rational behaviour thus harms the other party signiﬁcantly.
Section 2 calculated the optimal bidding strategies within double auctions and the players’
resulting proﬁts explicitly.
Section 3 introduced a dealer who quotes bid and ask prices. This is the only information
that is revealed to a buyer or a seller. As the parties’ reservation prices remain sealed, there
is information asymmetry in the Dealer’s Market. A buyer’s and a seller’s proﬁt as well as
the dealer’s gain in the Dealer’s Market were analysed in detail in that section.
Double auctions and the Dealer’s Market were compared in section 4. That section intro-
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duced conditions on the parties’ market preferences. When a dealer sets his prices reasonably,
then all parties are in favour for the Dealer’s Market. This signiﬁcant section helped to un-
derstand why traders may prefer the Dealer’s Market under information asymmetry over a
double auction under full information.
We showed in section 4 that a dealer’s strategy can Pareto dominate a double auction with
a rational buyer and a rational seller under non-restrictive conditions. Even when a double
auction is most eﬃcient (when full information is available), the dealer may set his fee low
enough such that the Dealer’s Market under information asymmetry is Pareto eﬃcient over
the double auction.
In summary, double auctions with two rational players are suboptimal. When a dealer
is not involved, a double auction with naive players is the most eﬃcient option. However,
employing a dealer generates the highest gain for buyer and seller as long as the dealer’s fee
is set reasonably. When the surplus of wealth that a dealer generates is shared among all
parties, the Dealer’s Market is eﬃcient and information asymmetry Pareto dominates full
information. At last, section 4 showed that this major result is true, even when our model is
further generalised.
In our model, the diﬀerence between a player’s reservation price and the deal price is
that player’s proﬁt. Imprecise valuation causes reservation prices to diverge from deal prices
and thereby leads to an increased gain from trade. Furthermore, the dealer may receive
more fees when deal and reservation prices diverge. Therefore all parties gain from increasing
imprecision in valuation.
Our theory may be applied to salary negotiations. We modelled a two-player headhunter
game as a two-player double auction. We showed that the employer and the employee proﬁt
from hiring a recruitment ﬁrm, despite paying fees for that service.
Comparing double auctions and a Dealer’s Market naturally leads us to the capital market
in section 5, where we tied our theory to a ﬁrm that is raising equity capital and an investor
that faces several options of investing in the ﬁrm’s shares. With the developed strategy we
proved that a dealer (i.e. an investment banker) can use information asymmetry and an ad-
equate fee structure such that ﬁrm and investor prefer an IPO over their other alternatives.
When there is a portfolio that spans the ﬁrm’s share, the IPO is signiﬁcantly underpriced.
However, when we drop this condition, then IPOs may be overpriced. However, in this case,
they are still underpriced on average. IPO underpricing thus is robust with respect to the
existence of a spanning portfolio. A numerical example was presented to support this theory.
Our underpricing model has testable implications that are distinct from other information
asymmetry IPO models. In particular, Baron (1982) is consistent with the one-day abnormal
returns in IPOs. In that IPO model, underpricing is used to induce an optimal selling eﬀort
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by an investment banker who is better informed about demand conditions than the issuing
ﬁrm. However, Baron (1982) is not consistent with the long-term IPO underperformance,
as both, the ﬁrm and the investment banker have compatible incentives to attract long-term
investors. In Welch (1989) higher valued ﬁrms use underpricing to signal their quality. Long-
term underperformance of the supposedly higher valued ﬁrms is therefore inconsistent with
that model. Rock (1986) is not necessarily inconsistent with long-term underperformance.
However, in that model, the investment banker has an incentive to reduce information asym-
metry. A testable implication of our model is, that empirical investigation of investment
banking should show that an investment banker does not assert eﬀort to mitigate information
asymmetry and to remove valuation uncertainty ex-ante. That is, the valuation uncertainty
of an investor and the issuing ﬁrm is the key to generate wealth from an IPO.
Our paper relates to two philosophical ideas. First, we predict that the economies which
use the IPO process as a signiﬁcant method for ﬁnancing their corporate output generate
more wealth than those that use more private ﬁnancing. Not only public corporations have
easier access to raising capital due to limited liability, but also the IPO process is subject to
less failure than privately raising equity capital. Secondly, there is an alternative behavioural
ﬁnance philosophy behind our arguments. We showed that equity investors gain when their
reservation price is higher than the IPO price. This gain may exist due to valuation im-
precision or explained psychologically. In either case, an investment banker operating under
information asymmetry, is able to ﬁnance more projects than privately raising equity in bi-
lateral negotiations. IPO investors immediately gain from IPO underpricing. Our model is
also consistent with investors’ reservation prices adjusting to post-IPO information, revealed
in market places. Therefore the IPO process may optimistically ﬁnance net present value
positive projects that perform relatively worse than privately ﬁnanced ones. That is, there is
long-term IPO underperformance. We believe that as long as these projects are net present
value positive, an economy that uses the IPO process prominently generates more wealth
than economies that do not.
Our analysis applies to any market, where players can not value an asset precisely. For
example it can be used to analyse auctions or "buy it now"-oﬀers on eBay or optimal pricing
strategies for sellers on Amazon. When more players are present on both sides, a group of
buyers may bargain with a group of sellers on a platform with a certain design. As we did
with the two-player double auction, that platform’s eﬃciency can be analysed and compared
to an intermediary’s market design. Interesting capital market applications, as for instance
the analysis of treasury bond auctions, develop naturally.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Let a buyer’s and a seller’s valuation be iB d= unif [b1, b2] and
iS
d= unif [s1, s2] with b1 ≤ b2 and s1 ≤ s2. Then the deal probability is
pd = P (iB ≥ iS) =

0 b1 ≤ b2 ≤ s1 ≤ s2
1 s1 ≤ s2 ≤ b1 ≤ b2
1
2∆b∆s(b2 − s1)2 b1 ≤ s1 ≤ b2 ≤ s2
1
2∆b∆s
(
(b2 − s2)∆s+ 12∆s2
)
b1 ≤ s1 ≤ s2 ≤ b2
1
2∆b∆s (2∆b∆s− (s2 − b1)2) s1 ≤ b1 ≤ s2 ≤ b2
1
2∆b∆s (2∆b(b1 − s1) + ∆b2) s1 ≤ b1 ≤ b2 ≤ s2.
Merging the cases above, we obtain
pd =
1s1≤b2
∆b∆s
(
b2(min(b2, s2)− s1)− b1(max(b1, s1)− s1)− 12
(
min(b2, s2)2 −max(b1, s1)2
))
.
From that formula we derive the special case that is considered in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2: We calculate expected proﬁt of the buyer. The seller’s expected
proﬁt is obtained analogously.
E (PB) = E (1Deal (VB − P )) = E (1Deal (VB − kbVB − (1− k)sVS))
= 1∆b∆s
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Deal (x− kbx− (1− k)sy) dxdy
= 1∆b∆s
(
(1− kb)
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Deal x dxdy − (1− k)s
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Deal y dxdy
)
We calculate the two integrals separately in order to keep the terms more clear:
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Deal x dxdy =
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1{bx≥sy} x dxdy
=
∫ (b/s)b2
b1
∫ b2
(s/b)y
x dxdy = b b2
3
3 s − b1
(
b22
2 −
b12 s2
6 b2
)
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Deal y dxdy =
∫ (b/s)b2
b1
∫ b2
(s/b)y
y dxdy = b
2 b23
6 s2 − b1
2
(
b2
2 −
b1 s
3 b
)
.
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Proof of Proposition 3: Adding up buyer’s and seller’s expected proﬁts that were calcu-
lated in proposition 2 yields
Sum(b, s) = E (PS) (s) + E (PB) (b) =
6
∆b∆s
(
b2
s2
b21 +
(
2b
s
− b
2
s2
)
b22 −
2s
b
b31 − 3b1b2∆b
)
.
We take the ﬁrst derivative, as a function of b, of the sum of proﬁts
∂Sum(b, s)
∂b
= b32
(
2
s
− 2b
s2
)
+ b31
(
2s
b2
− 2s
2
b3
)
= b32
2s− 2b
s2
+ b31
2sb− 2s2
b3
= b32
2
s2
(s− b) + b31
2s
b3
(b− s) .
In order to be strictly increasing in oﬀer strategy b, the term needs to be greater zero. This
is true if and only if
∂Sum(b, s)
∂b
> 0 ⇐⇒ b32
2
s2
(s− b) > b31
2s
b3
(s− b) ⇐⇒ b32/b31
b3
s3
> 1 ⇐⇒ b2
b1
>
s
b
.
When b2
b1
≤ s
b
holds, deal probability is zero according to proposition 1. Then expected proﬁt
of both parties is zero. Consequently b2
b1
> s
b
guarantees deal probability to be greater zero.
Analogous arguments apply for the sum of proﬁts to be decreasing in the seller’s oﬀer strategy
s.
Proof of Proposition 4: Due to the length of the formulas we used a computer algebra
system to optimize the expected proﬁts. We programmed it to take the ﬁrst derivatives
of respective expected proﬁts to ﬁnd respective maximal points. The mathematics thus is
straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 5: The imprecision of both players has the same distribution. There-
fore we have b1 = s1 and b2 = s2. There is full information in the two-player double auction.
Thus the players’ oﬀers are given by their valuations, i.e. their oﬀer strategies are b = 1
and s = 1. We refer to proposition 1, where we established a general formula for the deal
probability. Under the imposed restrictions, the formula reduces to12
pd =
1s1≤b2
∆b∆s
(
b2(min(b2, s2)− s1)− b1(max(b1, s1)− s1)− 12
(
min(b2, s2)2 −max(b1, s1)2
))
= 1∆b2
(
b2(b2 − b1)− 12
(
b22 − b21
))
= 1∆b2
(1
2b
2
2 − b1b2 +
1
2b
2
1
)
=
1
2∆b
2
∆b2 =
1
2 .
12It is not necessary for valuation imprecision to be symmetrically distributed. Therefore the proposition
holds in particular for more general frameworks than considered here.
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Proof of Proposition 6: The buyer’s expected proﬁt is
E (PB) =
1
∆b∆s
1
bs
((1
b
− 12
) ∫ s′2
s′1
∫ b′2
b′1
1Dealb dbds− 12
∫ s′2
s′1
∫ b′2
b′1
1Deals dbds
)
.
The players’ naive oﬀer strategy is given by b = s = 1. Inserting this into the formula above
yields
E (PB) =
1
∆b∆s
((
1− 12
) ∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Dealb dbds− 12
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Deals dbds
)
= 12∆b∆s
(∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1Deal (b− s) dbds
)
= 12∆b∆s
(∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
s
b− s dbds
)
= 12∆b∆s
(∫ s2
s1
1
2b
2
2 − b2s−
1
2s
2 ds
)
= 14∆b∆s
(
s2b
2
2 − b2s22 + s21b2 − s1b22 +
1
3(s
3
1 − s32)
)
s1 = b1
s2 = b2
= 14∆b2
(1
3b
3
2 + b21b2 − b1b22 −
1
3b
1
2
) b1 = 1− α
b2 = 1 + α
= 16α
The proof for the seller’s expected proﬁt can be conducted analogously.
Proof of Lemma 1. A player’s expected proﬁt as introduced in proposition 6 is zero for
α = 0 and increasing in α. Both parties proﬁt from higher imprecision, so it is furthermore
wealth increasing.
Proof of Proposition 7: Proposition 4 introduced a general formula for bopt(s) as a function
of s. The seller’s oﬀer strategy in a double auction with a rational buyer and a naive seller
is given by the oﬀer strategy s = 1. The calculation of bopt as a function of s = 1 ﬁnishes the
proof:
bopt(1) = C(1, b1, b2) :=
1
18 b2
(
B(1, b1, b2)− (3 b1 − 4 b2 ) (15 b1 + 4 b2 )
B(1, b1, b2)
− 3b1 + 4b2
)
Proof of Proposition 8: Proposition 1 established a general formula for the deal probabil-
ity. In a double auction with a rational buyer and a naive seller the players’ oﬀer strategies
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are bopt(1) and s = 1. Adding up these facts we ﬁnd
pd =
1s′1≤b′2
∆b∆s
(
b
′
2(min(b
′
2, s
′
2)− s
′
1)− b
′
1(max(b
′
1, s
′
1)− s
′
1)−
1
2
(
min(b′2, s
′
2)2 −max(b
′
1, s
′
1)2
))
= 1
bopt∆b2
(
boptb2(boptb2 − b1)− 0− 12
(
b2optb
2
2 − b21
))
= 1
bopt∆b2
(
b2optb
2
2 − boptb1b2 −
1
2b
2
optb
2
2 +
1
2b
2
1
)
= 12bopt∆b2
(boptb2 − b1)2 .
Proof of Proposition 9: A general formula for both players’ expected proﬁt was established
in proposition 2. Adding the assumptions of a naive seller (s = 1) and a rational buyer
(b = bopt(1)) to the formula creates the terms as stated in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 10: Proposition 4 states the formula for sopt(b). Within the frame-
work of double auctions with a rational seller and a naive buyer, the buyer’s oﬀer strategy is
given by b = 1. This leads to
sopt(1) = C(1, b2, b1) =
1
18 b1
(
B(1, b2, b1)− (3 b2 − 4 b1 ) (15 b2 + 4 b1 )
B(1, b2, b1)
− 3b2 + 4b1
)
.
Proof of Proposition 11: In proposition 1 the general formula for the deal probability was
established. In the rational seller and naive buyer double auction setting the buyer does not
adjust his oﬀer, i.e. b = 1. In proposition 10 the form for sopt(1) was analysed. Adding up
these ﬁndings ﬁnishes the proof:
pd =
1s′1≤b′2
∆b∆s
(
b
′
2(min(b
′
2, s
′
2)− s
′
1)− b
′
1(max(b
′
1, s
′
1)− s
′
1)−
1
2
(
min(b′2, s
′
2)2 −max(b
′
1, s
′
1)2
))
= 1
sopt∆b∆b
(
b2(b2 − soptb1)− 0− 12
(
b22 − s2optb21
))
= 1
sopt∆b2
(1
2b
2
2 − soptb1b2 +
1
2s
2
optb
2
1
)
= 12sopt∆b2
(b2 − soptb1)2
Proof of Proposition 12: A general formula for both players’ expected proﬁt was estab-
lished in proposition 2. Adding the assumptions of a naive buyer (b = 1) and a rational seller
(s = sopt(1)) to the formula creates the terms as stated in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 13: Outlining a buyer’s optimal strategy on the x-axis and a seller’s
optimum strategy on the y-axis (see ﬁgure 5 for reference), optimal strategies are given by
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bopt(s) and sopt(b), respectively. From prior analysis we know bopt(s) ∈ [b2/b2, 1] and sopt(b) ∈
[1, b2/b1]. Due to Nash (1951), there is at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies. The set of
strategies is bounded, closed and convex. As players measure their proﬁt in monetary units,
players have linear utility. Therefore, there is at least one equilibrium strategy according to
Nikaido-Isoda13. Therefore it remains to be proven that this equilibrium is unique.
Optimal strategies are characterized by the coordinates (bopt(s), s) and (b, sopt(b)) . An
equilibrium thus is given if the two equations bopt(s) = b and sopt(b) = s hold. With Proposi-
tion 4 this is equivalent to
bopt(s) = C(s, b1, b2) =
1
18 b2
(
B(1, b1, b2)− (3 b1 − 4 b2 ) (15 b1 + 4 b2 )
B(1, b1, b2)
− 3b1 + 4b2
)
= b,
sopt(b) = C(b, b2, b1) =
1
18 b1
(
B(1, b2, b1)− (3 b2 − 4 b1 ) (15 b2 + 4 b1 )
B(1, b2, b1)
− 3b2 + 4b1
)
= s.
Therefore we have an equilibrium if and only if the set of the following equations holds:
b = C (C(b, b2, b1), b1, b2) (1.1)
s = C (C(s, b1, b2), b2, b1) . (1.2)
Equation (1.1) is independent of s and equation (1.2) is independent of b. Thus each equation
is dependent only on a buyer’s or a seller’s strategy, respectively. The solution of the set
of equations (1.1) and (1.2) is complex and an extensive analytical representation. As an
alternative, ﬁxed point iteration is applied in this proof. The iteration ﬁnds exactly one
equilibrium for any imprecision parameter 0 < α < 1 and starting points b and s within the
borders 1−α1+α < b < 1 < s <
1+α
1−α .
An equilibrium must be within the borders 1−α1+α < b < 1 and 1 < s <
1+α
1−α . Otherwise the
expected proﬁt of either party becomes negative with probability one or the deal probability
is zero. Oﬀer strategies that are not within these bounds are therefore infeasible. Let D be
the domain of b and s, i.e. D := {(b, s) : 1−α1+α < b < 1 < s < 1+α1−α}. We will prove that ﬁxed
point iteration converges for any starting value within D. In order to prove the convergence
of the iteration, we make use of a tool from analytic mathematics, the Banach ﬁxed-point
theorem.
We need to show that the Banach ﬁxed-point theorem can be applied to this situation.
For that purpose the two functions
f : b 7→ bopt (sopt(b))
g : s 7→ sopt (bopt(s))
13See Nikaido and Isoda (1955) for reference
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have to be contractions. This holds if and only if (f, g)(D) ⊂ D. If (f, g) is a contraction, the
Banach ﬁxed-point theorem states that both functions have exactly one ﬁxed point within D.
This means that there is exactly one buyer’s oﬀer strategy b∗ such that f(b∗) = bopt (sopt(b∗)) =
b∗ and exactly one seller’s oﬀer strategy s∗ such that g(s∗) = sopt (bopt(s∗)) = s∗. The set of
unique ﬁxed points (b∗, s∗) solves the set of equations (1.1) and (1.2). This observation then
ﬁnishes the proof.
Thus it remains to show that f and g are contractions: This is true if (1) f([1−α1+α , 1]) ⊆
[1−α1+α , 1]; (2) g([1,
1+α
1−α ]) ⊆ [1, 1+α1−α ]; and (3)
∣∣∣∂f
∂b
(d1)
∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∂g
∂s
(d2)
∣∣∣ < 1 for all (d1, d2) ∈ D. An
analysis of (1) shows that f([1−α1+α , 1]) = bopt(sopt([
1−α
1+α , 1])). This is the optimal response strat-
egy of the buyer, if he anticipates that the seller places her bid as the best response of a
feasible buyer’s strategy. An optimal seller’s strategy as a response to a feasible buyer’s
strategy is always feasible. Therefore it follows that sopt([1−α1+α , 1]) ⊆ [1, 1+α1−α ]. That is,
f([1−α1+α , 1]) ⊆ bopt([1, 1+α1−α ]). The optimal buyer’s strategy as a response to a feasible seller’s
strategy is always a feasible strategy and therefore on the interval [1−α1+α , 1]. In summary we
have f([1−α1+α , 1]) ⊆ [1−α1+α , 1].
Likewise, case (2) is necessarily a feasible strategy and therefore a subset of the demanded
interval.
Considering (3), ﬁgures 18 and 19 show the ﬁrst derivatives of f and g, respectively. It
can be seen that both derivatives are smaller than 1 in absolute terms.
Therefore according to the Banach ﬁxed-point theorem there is exactly one ﬁxed point
(b∗, s∗) in D. This is the unique Nash equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 14: The buyer suﬀers from valuation imprecision that is uniformly
distributed on [1− α, 1 + α]. He generates a gain if his valuation exceeds 1 + f . The proba-
bility of this event is p = α−f2α . The argument for the seller works analogously.
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Proof of Proposition 15: As f < α, the buyer’s expected proﬁt is
E (PD(B)) =
1
∆b
∫ b2
1+f
b− 1− f db = 1∆b
(1
2
(
(1 + α)2 − (1 + f)2
)
− (1 + f)(α− f)
)
= 1∆b
(1
2α
2 + 12f
2 − αf
)
= 12∆b (α− f)
2 .
The product is zero if and only if at least one of the factors is zero. As f and α are both
non-negative, the only possibility for expected proﬁt to be zero is f = α. Furthermore
E (PD(B)) > 0⇐= 0 < f < α.
The upper bound for the buyer’s expected proﬁt is α/4. The proof for the seller’s expected
proﬁt is performed along the lines of the proof for the buyer.
Proof of Proposition 16: In order to prove the proposition, the inequation
pd < (α− f)/(2α)
must hold. A rearrangement of that equation shows that is equivalent to f < α(1− 2pd).
Proof of Proposition 17: The expected proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market needs to be greater
than in a double auction. That is true if and only if
E (PD(B)) > E
(
P(·)
)
⇐⇒ 12∆b(α− f)
2 > E
(
P(·)
)
⇐⇒ 12∆b(α− f)
2 − E
(
P(·)
)
> 0
⇐⇒ f 2 − 2αf + α2 − 4αE
(
P(·)
)
> 0.
The term f 2 − 2αf + α2 − 4αE
(
P(·)
)
equals zero for
f1,2 =
2α±
√
4α2 − 4(α2 − 4αE
(
P(·)
)
)
2
= α±
√
4α4 − 4α2 + 16αE
(
P(·)
)
2 = α ± 2
√
αE
(
P(·)
)
.
Section 4 analysed the players’ expected proﬁts in double auctions. This analysis showed that
f1α− 2
√
αE
(
P(·)
)
> 0. When we set f = 0 in the term above, then it is positive if and only
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if
α− 4E
(
P(·)
)
> 0.
This inequation holds as shown in section 4. A polynomial of second order has at most 2 roots.
In the above case, these are given by f1,2. The term f 2 − 2αf + α2 − 4αE
(
P(·)
)
exceeds zero
for f = 0 and its roots are 0 < f1 ≤ f2. Therefore we conclude that
f 2 − 2αf + α2 − 4αE
(
P(·)
)
> 0
for all f < f1. Thus the Dealer’s Market is Pareto dominant.
Proof of Proposition 18: Proposition 6 states that in a double auction under full infor-
mation both players’ expected proﬁt is 16α. In proposition 17 a suﬃcient condition for the
Dealer’s Market to dominate a double auction was established. Merging these propositions
ﬁnishes the proof:
f < α − 2
√
αE
(
P(·)
)
= α − 2
√
1
6α
2 = α
1−
√
2
3
 .
Proof of Proposition 19: Proposition 9 introduced the players’ expected proﬁt in a double
auction with a rational buyer and a naive seller. It was shown that the buyer has higher
expected proﬁt than the seller in this market setting. Thus if the buyer prefers the Dealer’s
Market over a double auction, then the seller shares this preference. A suﬃcient and necessary
condition for the Dealer’s Market to be preferred was established in proposition 17. Combining
these arguments leads to the inequation f < α − 2
√
αE (PB) as a suﬃcient condition for
a double auction with a rational buyer and a naive seller to be dominated by the Dealer’s
Market.
Proof of Proposition 20: The statement of this proposition can be proven analogously to
proposition 19.
Proof of Proposition 21: It was shown that within this double auction setting the buyer’s
proﬁt is higher than the seller’s. Thus the proof of this proposition can be conduced analo-
gously to that of proposition 19.
Proof of Theorem 1: In order to show that the Dealer’s Market Pareto dominates a double
auction that is in bidding equilibrium, we have to prove that the dealer, the seller and the
buyer prefer the Dealer’s Market over a double auction:
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In a double auction the dealer generates no gain. He proﬁts from the Dealer’s Market if
and only if his fee is greater zero. Therefore the dealer prefers the Dealer’s Market a double
auction if his fee is greater zero.
A buyer’s expected proﬁt in a double auction in bidding equilibrium is greater than the
seller’s. As a result, the seller is in preference of the Dealer’s Market when the buyer has
this preference too. Thus it is suﬃcient that a buyer prefers the Dealer’s Market over the
double auction. Proposition 20 states that the buyer prefers the Dealer’s Market over double
auctions in bidding equilibrium if and only if f < α − 2
√
αE (PB). In summary, when
0 < f < α − 2
√
αE (PB), then all players prefer the Dealer’s Market over a double
auction in bidding equilibrium. That is, the Dealer’s Market Pareto dominates that double
auction.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let f and g be the densities of a buyer’s and a seller’s valuation
imprecision, respectively. Let b1 < b2 be the buyer’s lowest and highest possible imprecision.
Likewise s1 < s2 are the seller’s lowest and highest imprecision. The deal price is denoted by
P . A buyer’s and a seller’s oﬀer strategies are represented by b < 1 and s > 1, respectively.
Then the buyer’s expected proﬁt is
E(PB) =
∫ b2
b1
∫ s2
s1
f(x)g(y)1Deal (x− P ) dydx
=
∫ b2
b1
∫ s2
s1
f(x)g(y)1bx>sy (x− (sy + k(bx− sy))) dydx.
Likewise, the seller’s expected proﬁt is
E(PS) =
∫ b2
b1
∫ s2
s1
f(x)g(y)1Deal (P − y) dydx
=
∫ b2
b1
∫ s2
s1
f(x)g(y)1bx>sy (sy + k(bx− sy)− y) dydx.
These proﬁts accumulate to
E(PB) + E(PS) =
∫ b2
b1
∫ s2
s1
f(x)g(y)1bx>sy (x− y) dydx.
The function 1bx>sy is obviously decreasing for decreasing b and increasing s. Thus the sum
of a buyer’s and a seller’s proﬁt is decreasing for decreasing b and increasing s. Individual
proﬁt optimisation, represented by b < 1 and s > 1, therefore negatively aﬀects the sum of
proﬁts. The accumulated proﬁt is highest when the buyer and the seller apply a naive oﬀer
strategy and make oﬀers at their reservation prices. That is, b = s = 1.
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Proof of Theorem 3: We calculate the diﬀerence between the rational and naive strategies:
∆E(PB + PS) =
∫ b2
b1
∫ s2
s1
f(x)g(y)(1x>y − 1bx>sy) (x− y) dydx
=
∫ b2
b1
∫ s2
s1
f(x)g(y)1y∈x[b/s,1] (x− y) dydx.
This is the positive proﬁt the dealer may distribute among a buyer and a seller, after he
deducts his fee.
Proof of Proposition 22: The average price is
E(P ) = E (1DealP ) = E
(
1Deal
kPB + (1− k)PS
2
)
= 12E (1DealkPB + (1− k)PS) =
k
2E (1DealPB) +
1− k
2 E (1DealPS)
= kb2 E (1DealVB) +
(1− k)s
2 E (1DealVS)
= kb2∆b2
∫ b2
b1
∫ b2
b1
1Dealx dxdy +
(1− k)s
2∆b2
∫ b2
b1
∫ b2
b1
1Dealy dxdy.
Both integrals were computed in proposition 2. Let pd be the probability of bargain success
as in proposition 1. In case of feasible oﬀer strategies (which necessarily is the case when the
bargain is successful), the deal probability simpliﬁes to
pd =
(bb2 − ss1)2
2∆b2 .
The expected deal price conditioned on the event of bargaining success therefore is
E(P |Success) = E(P )
pd
= 1(bb2 − ss1)2
(
kb
∫ (b/s)b2
b1
∫ b2
(s/b)b1
x dxdy + (1− k)s
∫ (b/s)b2
b1
∫ b2
(s/b)b1
y dxdy
)
= 1(bb2 − ss1)2
(
kb
[
b b23
3 s − b1
(
b22
2 −
b12 s2
6 b2
)]
+(1− k)s
[
b2 b23
6 s2 − b1
2
(
b2
2 −
b1 s
3 b
)])
.
Proof of Proposition 23: A lower bound for the dealer’s oﬀer to the ﬁrm Bd is established
in proposition 20 and given by Bd > V (1 − fmax). The investor has the alternative of an
exactly priced spanning portfolio with value V . To attract the investor for the IPO, the
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investment banker needs to oﬀer the shares for a value Sd < V to an investor. Now, the
investment banker’s gain is positive, when the price an investor pays exceeds the amount the
ﬁrm receives, that is Bd < Sd. In summary, we have V (1− fmax) < Bd < Sd < V . Following
that pricing strategy, the IPO is Pareto eﬃcient compared to bilateral negotiations, as all
players prefer the IPO.
Proof of Lemma 2: Proposition 23 showed that the shares are oﬀered to the investor for
a price Sd < V , that is below the value of the spanning portfolio. Therefore the IPO is
underpriced.
Proof of Proposition 24: Proposition 23 introduces the lower bound for the investment
banker’s oﬀer to the ﬁrm. Dropping the spanning portfolio hypothesis, the only remaining
investor’s alternative is to negotiate bilaterally. According to proposition 17, the expected
proﬁt of this option is dominated by the intermediary’s oﬀer when Sd < V (1 + fb). As a
result, the investment banker’s strategy is Pareto eﬃcient because all parties prefer an IPO
over bilateral negotiations.
Proof of Lemma 3: In section 4 we showed that the intermediary can exaggerate his oﬀer
to the ﬁrm to a greater extent than his oﬀer to the investor. Figure 17 (b) on page 42
further illustrates this fact. Thus the average IPO share price is below V and thus and IPO
is underpriced on average.
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On the Pareto Eﬃciency of a Market Maker
over Reverse Auctions in Equilibrium
Johannes Seemüller
Abstract
This paper studies a reverse auction market under the ”independent private value model”
assumption, where auction participants value the auctioned good imprecisely. In our model,
there is a unique multilateral bidding strategy that maximises each seller’s proﬁt. At the same
time, that strategy generates the highest possible proﬁt for the seller-group. When there is
no mechanism that commits sellers to that strategy, a seller may increase her individual
proﬁt by pursuing a unilateral bidding strategy. When sellers follow that unilateral strategy,
then the reverse auction generates less proﬁt for each seller than that under the multilateral
strategy. We calculate these strategies and expected proﬁts explicitly. A dealer can exploit
this ineﬃciency of a reverse auction by providing market maker services. His strategy under
information asymmetry is Pareto eﬃcient over the auction market under non-restrictive con-
ditions. The dealer can maintain a reasonable inventory size, even when there are many sellers.
Key words: Reverse Auction, Valuation Imprecision, Independent Private Value Model, Optimal Pricing Strategy, Market
Maker, Bid-Ask Spread, Pareto Eﬃciency, Bond Underwriting. JEL Classiﬁcations: C72, D44, D47, G12
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1 Introduction
Typically, an auction is originated by a seller. This paper considers the reverse case, when
auctions serve to ﬁnd a suitable price for an initiating buyer. Such an auction that is set up
by a buyer is refereed to as a reverse auction. Then the buyer speciﬁes the auction type and
notiﬁes suppliers to submit their bids.
A popular example for an Internet auction platform is eBay, where dealers and private
individuals oﬀer their goods. In the form of Buy it now-oﬀers, eBay has implemented reverse
auctions into its trading platform as a buyer can choose among several sellers’ oﬀers. Amazon
also allows private sellers and businesses to oﬀer their goods on its trading platform. Both,
eBay and Amazon address the end-user of the buy side. Additionally to serving the end-user,
(reverse) auctions are increasingly used in the procurement side of supply chains, as Huhy
and Roundy (2004) note. They refer to Covisint and Fast Buyer as examples of business-
to-business solutions and product providers for the automobile industry. Both platforms are
founded by OEMs and provide online auction services. Furthermore, governments are required
to initiate reverse auctions to award contracts among competing bidders. Another example
are publicly oﬀered corporate bonds or treasury bills. Their prices are often determined by
reverse auctions as well.
A seller who wants to sell a speciﬁc good on eBay or Amazon can observe other sellers’
oﬀers and thereby gains information on his expected sale success. On the contrary, in a
procurement auction, a seller who places a bid can not compare it to those of the other
sellers. In this paper we study such reverse auctions, where each seller’s bid is hidden from
further bidding sellers.
A lot of research has already been done in auction theory, so this introduction serves to
embed our research into works which have previously been published within this ﬁeld.
”Many of the world’s most important markets are auction markets”, as Milgrom andWeber
(1982) note in their contribution to auction theory. Since then the popularity of auctions to
determine the prices for goods or services has further increased. This development has been
enforced by the rise of the Internet where platforms for electronic commerce and trade allow
an eﬃcient determination of prices and thus simplify the exchange of goods and services.
These virtual platforms allow the allocation process to be less cost intensive than conventional
trading.
Milgrom andWeber (1982) prove the existence of a unique equilibrium in bidding strategies
in English, ﬁrst- and second-price auctions. They also analyse the eﬀect of entry fees and
allow the seller to set a reserve price. Maskin and Riley (1984) analyse the eﬀect of risk
averse buyers on the auction type a seller prefers. Lebrun (1999) analyses ﬁrst-price auctions
in the asymmetric n bidder case. He considers bidders with valuations that are not identically
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distributed and he allows bidders to have diﬀerent oﬀer strategies. He develops restrictions
that allow an equilibrium in bidding strategies. Further asymmetric bidding strategies are
discussed by Lebrun (1998) and (1999) and Maskin and Riley (2000b). Bidding in combination
with signalling is studied by Maskin and Riley (2000a) and Rodriguez (2000). Bikchandani
and Riley (1991) as well as Milgrom and Weber (1982) study the inﬂuence of common values
on bidding strategies.
In particular, procurement auctions have been the subject of recent studies. Holt (1990)
analyses bidding strategies for contracts in diﬀerent auction procedures. Dasgupta and Spul-
ber (1990) as well as Chen (2001) particularly address procurement auctions. The impact of
the announcement of the buyer’s reservation price is studied by Carey (1993). Gallien and
Wein (2001) consider procurement auctions with capacity constraints. Teich et al. (2001)
study the design of electronic auctions, where they mix elements of auctions and negotiations
to a new market procedure. Jin and Wu (2002) further address the supply chain coordination
of electronic markets, whereas Seshadri and Zemel (2001) focus on supply chains in general.
Compte and Jehiel (2002) analyse the impact of competition in procurement auctions. The
procurement of options is studied by Schummer and Vohra (2003). Reiß and Scho¨ndube
(2003) and Brosig and Reiß (2007) study sequential procurement auctions, where similar auc-
tions are conducted in time overlapping intervals. They analyse the bidders’ participation
and their strategies theoretically and empirically. Reiß and Scho¨ndube (2010) further analyse
equilibria and revenue equivalence in their sequential procurement auction model.
The above examples of reverse auction literature mainly focus on supply chain applica-
tions. Huhy and Roundy (2004) note that the ﬁrst-price reverse auction bidding strategy,
corresponding to the lowest payment by the buyer, has the same expected payment as the
(unique) bidding strategy of the second-price reverse auction. In the second-price reverse
auction, by comparison, an extension of Vickrey (1961) shows an analogous result in the
ﬁrst-price auction that bidding one’s own cost is a dominant strategy of every seller. Huhy
and Roundy (2004) further study the impact of the buyer’s reserve price. They show that
this reserve price is eliminating the multiplicity of bidding strategies and also the associated
risk of very high costs, as well as maximizing the buyer’s cost. Such beneﬁts are consistent
with a recent trend in the automobile industry. More buyers are setting reserve prices when
they originate auctions, following a recommendation of the trading platform Covisint.
Suppose that a government sets up an auction to procure a certain service or that an
automobile plant wants to buy a new press. It is plausible to assume that the costs of potential
service providers are independent and identically distributed. In this paper, we study single-
unit single-period sealed-bid ﬁrst-price reverse auctions in which bidders are symmetric and
have independent and identically distributed private costs. The buyer has a random reserve
price that is independent of the bidders’ private costs. Our model thus is similar to Huhy
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and Roundy (2004). In addition, in our model the buyer does not reveal his reserve price to
bidding sellers.
In auction literature each trader often has a reservation price, V ≥ 0, which is distributed
on the interval [0, v]. See Chatterjee (1983) for an example. Often that interval is restricted
to [0, 1], as for instance in the double auction considered by Gibbons (1992)1. In this paper,
these constraints are relaxed.
The above literature often assumes that each player knows the distribution of the other
players’ valuations. Thus each player may compare her valuation to these distributions,
in order to formulate detailed oﬀer strategies. However, valuation imprecision implies that
individuals do not have a valuation benchmark.
In this paper we model valuation imprecision by assuming that the buyer and the bidding
sellers are aware only of their own reservation price and the common distribution of valuation
imprecision. They however have no indication, whether their reservation price is above or
below average and how it compares to the other players’ valuations2.
Our model can be considered as a Bayesian game with common, but unknown prior3.
Studies of Bayesian games are usually conducted abstractly, as for instance by Nikaido and
Isoda (1955). Our reverse auction model is more practical, as it provides concrete formulas
and advice on how sellers should best set their prices. Regarding valuation imprecision, our
model is more abstract and realistic than those of the double auction literature discussed
above.
A detailed analysis of the reverse auction is undertaken in section 2. Diﬀerent levels
or rational bidding strategies are discussed and their eﬀect on the platform’s eﬃciency is
analysed in detail. We show that in the reverse ﬁrst-price auction with reserve price, there is
a symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure bidding strategies. Each of these strategies corresponds
to a distinct expected payment of the buyer. When all sellers commit to a multilateral bidding
strategy, their individual expected proﬁt is higher than that in bidding equilibrium. Under
that strategy, the proﬁt of all sellers is increasing if the number of sellers increases. When
all sellers commit to this multilateral bidding strategy then it is preferable over individual
proﬁt maximisation. Section 3 introduces and analyses a market maker’s strategy of quoting
bid-ask prices. The market maker’s strategy and the reverse auction are compared in section
4. That section further provides conditions for the Pareto eﬃciency of the market maker’s
strategy compared to the double auction. A market maker exploits ineﬃciencies in the auction
1See Gibbons (1992), pages 158ﬀ.
2Assume for instance that a player’s valuation is uniformly distributed on the interval [50,150]. When
that distribution is known to the players, then an individual with the reservation price of 101 knows that her
valuation is almost average. In our model, a player with a reservation price of 101 does not have a benchmark
to determine whether that valuation is high or low. That player only knows that his valuation is imprecise
and distributed around some unknown average valuation.
3See Harsanyi (1967) for reference.
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market and successfully competes with that market. When the market maker applies a
reasonable price scheme, then his oﬀers are more attractive to a buyer and the sellers than
the participation in an auction. Thereby this paper shows that the market maker’s price
strategy is Pareto eﬃcient over that auction. Section 5 concludes the ﬁndings of this paper.
2 The Reverse Auction
We consider a platform market where sellers oﬀer an indivisible and indistinguishable
good. Each seller independently quotes a price that she sells the good for. A buyer observes
the sellers’ oﬀers and buys at the lowest price if his reservation price exceeds the lowest price.
The platform thus is similar to Buy it now-oﬀers on eBay. Another example is the Amazon
market platform, where the same good can be bought from diﬀerent sellers with diﬀerent
prices. Further, an automobile manufacturer that plans to procure a new machine may set
up a reverse auction to ﬁnd a suitable supplier. Then suppliers may bid to win the contract.
Let us rigorously model this reverse auction market. Several owners (sellers) of the good
disclose their oﬀers on a platform. A buyer observes the sellers’ oﬀers and decides whether
to buy at the lowest oﬀer or not. When the best oﬀer, i.e. the minimum of the sellers’ oﬀers
is below the buyer’s reservation price, then the good is traded for the price P of that lowest
oﬀer. In case of a successful trade, either party’s proﬁt is given by the diﬀerence between
their reserve price and the deal price P .
We assume that the parties suﬀer from valuation imprecision regarding their reservation
prices4. We model these imprecise valuations as independent and uniformly distributed ran-
dom variables with unknown mean valuation V > 0. When there are n sellers, then the i− th
seller’s reservation price is VSi
d= unif [s1, s2]V, with 0 < s1 < 1 < s2. The buyer’s reserva-
tion price is denoted by VB d= unif [b1, b2]V, with 0 < b1 < 1 < b2. In our model valuation
imprecision is symmetrically distributed around 1. Furthermore, the buyer’s and the sellers’
valuation imprecision is identically distributed. As a result, a valuation imprecision parame-
ter 0 < α < 1 is suﬃcient to model imprecision in our market. That is, s1 = b1 = 1− α and
s2 = b2 = 1 + α.
We distinguish two stages of the market: Stage 1 can be regarded as the initializing of
the trading platform. Each player knows that he suﬀers from valuation imprecision and
knows that the other players know, knows that they do and so forth. Thus there is mutual
full information in the sense of Aumann (1976). The players furthermore know the impreci-
sion’s distribution, know that the others know, etcetera. The players, however, are not aware
whether their reservation price is below or above average, because they do not have a bench-
4When the good is a machine or a similar product, then the term valuation imprecision may be misleading:
Diﬀerent suppliers have diﬀerent production costs and therefore they have diﬀerent prices they require. Thus,
in that case, valuation imprecision also may be caused by diﬀerent costs of production or manufacturing.
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mark to compare their price with. If for instance a seller’s reservation price is 160 and she
knows the distribution of the imprecision, she still can not determine neither over- nor under-
valuation. Stage 1 therefore can be regarded as the initializing of the platform because there
are no reference oﬀers present from which over- or undervaluation could be derived. Thus
although the reservation prices of the sellers are not identical, while they share homogeneous
oﬀer strategy, their expected proﬁt is the same ex ante. Proﬁt is furthermore dependent on
each seller’s oﬀer strategy: Assume there are two sellers. The ﬁrst seller places an oﬀer twice
her reservation price. The second seller places an oﬀer that exceeds her reservation price by
10%. Then it is likely that the oﬀer of seller two is lower than that of the ﬁrst seller. Therefore
a seller’s oﬀer strategy inﬂuences her proﬁt when her bid is successful, her deal probability
and eventually the expected proﬁt of all sellers.
After the initialisation of the platform, each seller observes the other sellers’ oﬀers. This
is the case on eBay or Amazon, when a good is traded there for some time. Sellers then can
compare their reservation price to the oﬀers of sellers that previously placed oﬀers on the
platform. A seller who enters the platform thereby is enabled to calculate her individual deal
success probability and expected proﬁt, as a function of the oﬀers she observes and her oﬀer
strategy. This post-initialisation phase is characterised as stage 2. That stage is not reached
in a variety of auctions, such as a single procurement auction. In this paper, the initialising
stage 1, where oﬀers are sealed, is analysed.
A sellers proﬁt is the diﬀerence between her reservation price VS and her oﬀer OS, that
is OS − VS. A positive proﬁt therefore requires that her oﬀer exceeds a seller’s reservation
price. Her oﬀer strategy further is a function of her reservation price. We model a seller’s
oﬀer strategy as a scalar s ≥ 1, that is OS = sVS. The scalar s necessarily is greater than or
equal to 1 because a seller’s proﬁt would be negative otherwise. That strategy furthermore
is the only feasible strategy. A seller does not know the distribution of the reservation price.
She only is aware of the distribution of valuation imprecision. Therefore a reasonable oﬀer
strategy must only be dependent on a seller’s valuation. Rational behaving sellers determine
their oﬀer strategies s in order to maximize expected proﬁt.
When a seller’s oﬀer strategy exceeds the bound s2/s1, then that seller overbids the buyer’s
reservation price with probability 1. Thus, that seller’s probability to win the auction is 0.
Furthermore, a seller’s oﬀer strategy should exceed 1, as otherwise her oﬀer is below her
reservation price. In this case, a seller’s proﬁt would be negative. In summary, feasible oﬀer
strategies are within the interval s ∈ [1, s2/s1]. If not stated otherwise, sellers are assumed to
bid feasibly.
Let us analyse diﬀerent possibilities of proﬁt maximisation. We start with level 1 optimi-
sation, where all sellers agree on the same oﬀer strategy s.
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2.1 Level 1 Rationality
In this section, we analyse optimal sellers’ bidding strategies when they agree on a multi-
lateral oﬀer strategy s. This means that all sellers pursue the same oﬀer strategy and commit
to it. Then the sellers can multilaterally optimise their proﬁt as a function of their oﬀer
strategy s.
Note that, while no mechanism is established to commit each seller to this strategy, a seller
can optimise her oﬀer strategy, as a function of the other sellers’ multilateral oﬀer strategy.
This section, however, studies multilateral optimisation, where all sellers commit to the same
oﬀer strategy. We refer to this strategy as level 1 rationality.
We start with a lemma that will be of great beneﬁt in the remainder of this paper.
Lemma 1. Let X1, X2, ..., Xn be iid random variables, with X1 d= unif [x1, x2]. Then the cdf
of min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) is given by M(x) = 1−
(
x2−x
x2−x1
)n
. The pdf of min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) is
given by m(x) = n (x2−x)n−1(x2−x1)n .
Proof: See the Appendix.
If needed, the notation of the functions M and m will be expanded in an intuitive way.
Then we may for instance write M(x, x1, x2, n) instead of M(x).
This section calculates and analyses important properties of the sellers’ unilateral oﬀer
strategy. The next proposition introduces each seller’s probability to win the auction. It
further calculates the probability that there is an oﬀer below the buyer’s reservation price.
That probability can be characterized as the buyer’s success probability.
Proposition 1. When n sellers pursue a multilateral oﬀer strategy s ≥ 1, then each seller’s
probability to win the auction is
P(DS)(s) =
F (s2)− F (ss1)
sn∆sn+1 .
The buyer’s success probability is
P(DB)(s) =
s2 − ss1
∆s +
s
n+ 1
(s2(s− 1)
s∆s
)n+1
− 1
 .
Each seller’s probability to win the auction converges to zero for n → ∞. The buyer’s deal
probability converges to s2−ss1∆s for n→∞. To simplify the above notation, the function F is
deﬁned as
F (x) = (ss2 − x)
n (−ns2 − s2 + ss2 + nx)
n (n+ 1) .
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Proof: See the Appendix.
The proposition calculates a formula for a seller’s and the buyer’s success probability in
the auction. The buyer’s success probability exceeds a seller’s probability to place the lowest
bid. In fact, the buyer is successful in the auction if and only if exactly one seller is successful.
Therefore the probability that the buyer is successful and the probability that exactly one
seller is successful are equal. Due to the same oﬀer strategy of all sellers, each seller has the
same probability of winning the auction ex ante. When there is an inﬁnitely high number of
sellers, then the success probability of a single seller converges to zero. The buyer proﬁts from
an increasing number of sellers because the probability that his reservation prices exceeds the
lowest oﬀer increases. The success probability of each seller and the buyer is a decreasing
function in the sellers’ multilateral oﬀer strategy s. The intuition behind this observation is
that, when sellers increase their oﬀers, then the probability that the buyer’s reservation prices
exceeds the oﬀer of at least one seller decreases
The next proposition calculates the expected proﬁt in the auction. These formulas are
the key for the sellers’ multilateral proﬁt optimisation oﬀer strategy.
Proposition 2. When there are n sellers with multilateral oﬀer strategy s, then the ex ante
expected proﬁt of each seller is
E (PS) (s) =
(s− 1) ( A(s2)− A(ss1) )
sn+1 ∆sn+1 .
The function A is
A(x) = (s2 s− x)n
(
−xs2 n2 + x2n2 − 2xs2 n+ 2 xs2 sn+ x2n− s2 2sn− 2 s2 2s
+ 2 s2 2s2
)
/(n(n+ 1)(n+ 2)) .
The expected proﬁt of all sellers is
E (S) (s) = n(s− 1) ( A(s2)− A(ss1) )
sn+1 ∆sn+1 .
This can be interpreted as expected gain of the seller-group.
Proof: See the Appendix.
We have shown in proposition 1 that individual deal probability decreases with increasing
size of the seller-group. Combined with proposition 2 we further ﬁnd that each seller’s ex-
pected proﬁt decreases when the size of the seller-group increases. That is reasonable because
when there are more sellers, then the number of competitors increases. Thus each seller’s ex-
pected proﬁt decreases. In contrast, valuation imprecision has positive eﬀect on each seller’s
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expected proﬁt. The sellers thus proﬁt from a higher imprecision in their valuations. Figure
1 illustrates these properties later in this section.
The proﬁt of the seller-group increases with increasing size of the group. When the
seller-group is large, then the probability that one seller underbids the buyer’s reserve price
increases. This has the eﬀect that the proﬁt of the seller-group is aﬀected positively by its
size. However, the expected proﬁt of the seller-group is bounded, as the next proposition
shows.
Proposition 3. The expected proﬁt of the seller-group is convergent in group size. This
means that the proﬁt an additional seller adds to the group’s proﬁt converges to zero with
increasing group size. The maximum expected group proﬁt is
E (S) (s) n→∞−→ s1∆s(s− 1)(s2 − ss1).
For inﬁnitely large seller-group, the optimal multilateral oﬀer strategy is s1opt = 1/(1− α).
Proof: See the Appendix.
The proposition states that there is an upper bound for the proﬁt of the seller-group. That
bound is s1∆s(s− 1)(s2 − ss1). For a suﬃciently large seller-group, the optimal multilateral
oﬀer strategy s1opt thus can be determined with moderate eﬀort by ﬁnding the maximum
of that upper bound as a function of s. According to proposition 3, this optimal level 1
multilateral oﬀer strategy is s1opt = 1/(1 − α). This means that it is optimal for a seller to
bid her reservation price multiplied by s1opt = 1/(1− α) (as long as all sellers commit to this
strategy).
We summarize the major properties of each seller’s proﬁt in the next proposition.
Proposition 4. Let all sellers pursue a multilateral oﬀer strategy s. Then the expected proﬁt
of each seller is strictly increasing in valuation imprecision and strictly decreasing in the
number of sellers in the market.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 proves that the expected proﬁt of a seller is increasing in valuation im-
precision. That is, when the players suﬀer from a higher valuation imprecision, then their
expected proﬁt exceeds that, which results from an enhanced valuation ability. When more
sellers place bids on the good, then the probability that a speciﬁc seller places the lowest bid
decreases. As a result, each seller’s expected proﬁt decreases.
When the number of sellers is ﬁnite, then ﬁnding the optimal multilateral oﬀer strategy is
more diﬃcult than in the above case that was analysed in proposition 3. Further, there may
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be more than one oﬀer strategy that generates maximum expected proﬁt. The next theorem
proves however that, independent of the number of sellers and the valuation imprecision, there
is exactly one optimal multilateral oﬀer strategy.
Theorem 1. Let there be n ∈ N sellers with an identical oﬀer strategy. When they place
their bids level 1 rationally, then there is exactly one optimal strategy s1opt. An upper bound
for the optimal oﬀer strategy is s1opt ≤ 1/s1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
When all sellers pursue the same multilateral oﬀer strategy, then there is exactly one
optimal oﬀer strategy s1opt, according to theorem 1. That optimal strategy maximizes each
seller’s individual proﬁt, given that all sellers follow that same strategy.
This section so far analysed the optimal sellers’ multilateral oﬀer strategy and proved
major properties of that strategy and its implications on the sellers’ proﬁt. Next, we focus on
that strategy’s eﬀects on the buyer. We start with the buyer’s expected proﬁt in the auction.
Proposition 5. The buyer’s expected proﬁt as a function of the sellers’ multilateral oﬀer
strategy s is
E (PB) (s) =
n
2sn∆sn+1 (B(s2)−B(ss1)) ,
where the function B is deﬁned as
B(x) = 2 s2 (s s2 − x)
n+1 (s− 1)
n+ 1 −
(s s2 − x)n+2
n+ 2 −
s22 (s s2 − x)n (s− 1)2
n
= (ss2 − x)n
(
2 s2 (s s2 − x) (s− 1)
n+ 1 −
(s s2 − x)2
n+ 2 −
s22 (s− 1)2
n
)
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The proposition above allows us to analyse the inﬂuence that sellers have on the buyer’s
proﬁt. The buyer proﬁts when more sellers participate in the auction. In fact, more partici-
pating sellers have two positive eﬀect for the buyer. First of all, the probability that one seller
underbids the buyer’s reserve price increases. This aﬀects the probability that the auction
is successful positively. Secondly, the value of the expected lowest oﬀer of the seller-group
decreases when more sellers bid in the auction. The buyer’s proﬁt, which is the diﬀerence
between his reserve price and the lowest bid, thereby increases on average. However, if the
seller-group raises their oﬀer strategy s, then in particular the lowest oﬀer of the seller-group
increases as well. This has negative eﬀect on the buyer’s proﬁt.
As shown in proposition 5, the buyer’s expected proﬁt increases if the number of bidding
sellers increases. However, that proﬁt is bounded, according to the next proposition.
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Proposition 6. When there are inﬁnitely many sellers, then the buyer’s expected proﬁt as a
function of the sellers’ multilateral oﬀer strategy s is
E(B)(s) = (s2 − ss1)
2
2s∆s .
Proof: See the Appendix.
When there are inﬁnitely many sellers, then the above proposition proves that the buyer’s
proﬁt is dependent on 2 variables: the sellers’ multilateral oﬀer strategy s and the players’
valuation imprecision α. The buyer’s proﬁt is decreasing in the sellers’ oﬀer strategy, as in
the case of ﬁnitely many sellers. The buyer’s proﬁt increases with increasing valuation impre-
cision, when the sellers’ oﬀer strategy is constant. However, sellers select their optimal oﬀer
strategy as a function of imprecision. That strategy s increases with valuation imprecision.
As discussed above, a higher sellers’ oﬀer strategy aﬀects the buyer’s proﬁt negatively. That
is, the eﬀects of valuation imprecision on the buyer’s expected proﬁt need to be analysed in
more detail.
We summarize the above stated verbal analysis of the buyer’s proﬁt in the next proposition.
Proposition 7. The expected proﬁt of the buyer is increasing in the number of sellers and
decreasing in the sellers’ multilateral oﬀer strategy s.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that there is exactly one optimal level 1 oﬀer strategy s1opt for valuation
imprecision 0 < α < 1 and an arbitrary number of sellers. That is, even when the sellers
do not agree on an oﬀer strategy, they mutually choose the same optimal oﬀer strategy s1opt,
in level 1 rationality. Proposition 4 argues that if there are more sellers in the market, then
they aﬀect each seller’s expected proﬁt negatively. The intuition behind this fact is, that each
seller’s probability to place the lowest bid decreases when more sellers bid in the auction.
Proposition 4 furthermore shows that valuation imprecision is a valuable property in the
auction market: the higher the sellers’ valuation imprecision, the higher their expected proﬁt.
This section proved the intuition, that a buyer proﬁts when more sellers place their bids
in the auction. He further proﬁts when each seller places her oﬀer comparably low. As for a
seller, valuation imprecision is beneﬁcial for a buyer.
Let us illustrate this section’s analysis with some ﬁgures. Figure 1 illustrates major prop-
erties of the reverse auction under level 1 rationality. The propositions 2 to 4 established the
basis for these two ﬁgures. On the x-axis, the sellers’ multilateral oﬀer strategy s is shown.
The y-axis illustrates the expected proﬁt of a seller as calculated in proposition 2.
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Fig. 1 – A seller’s expected proﬁt
It can be seen that the expected proﬁt increases until sopt is reached. Optimal multilateral
oﬀer strategy is marked with a circle. Oﬀer strategies that exceed the optimal strategy
(s > sopt) lead to a lower expected proﬁt and therefore are ineﬃcient strategies. Proposition
1 proves that this optimal level 1 multilateral oﬀer strategy sopt is unique. This can be seen in
ﬁgure 1 (a) and (b), where markets with diﬀerent numbers of sellers and diﬀerent valuation
imprecision always have exactly one optimal multilateral oﬀer strategy.
Figure 1 (a) analyses the inﬂuence of the number of sellers on the expected proﬁt of a
single seller. In this ﬁgure, valuation imprecision α is ﬁxed at 10%. Proposition 4 states
that an increasing number of sellers leads to a decrease in a seller’s expected proﬁt. This
intuitive ﬁnding can be observed in ﬁgure 1 (a), where auctions with an increasing number
of sellers between 1 and 50 are illustrated. The ﬁgure shows that the expected proﬁt of a
seller is decreasing in the number of sellers for any multilateral oﬀer strategy s. Note that
the decrease is not linear in the number of sellers n. It furthermore can be observed that
the optimal oﬀer strategy sopt is increasing in the number of sellers n. That is, under level 1
rationality it is optimal for each seller to increase her oﬀer as more sellers bid in the auction.
Figure 1 (b) ﬁxes the number of sellers to n = 5 and shows the eﬀect of diﬀerent valuation
imprecision α on the optimal level 1 multilateral oﬀer strategy sopt and a seller’s expected
proﬁt. Higher valuation imprecision is a main driver for proﬁt. In fact, a seller’s expected
proﬁt is approximately linearly increasing in valuation imprecision. Further, the optimal level
1 oﬀer strategy is increasing in the number of sellers. This means that it is level 1 rational
for a seller to increase her oﬀer when the valuation imprecision α increases. The optimal oﬀer
strategy sopt is approximately linearly increasing in the number of sellers, just as a seller’s
expected proﬁt.
Figure 2 shows the expected proﬁt of the group of all sellers and compares that group’s
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proﬁt to that of the buyer. For this illustration valuation imprecision is set to α = 10%.
Figure 2 (a) analyses the eﬀect of the size of the seller-group on its expected proﬁt.
It can be seen that the expected group-proﬁt is increasing in the number of sellers, that
is, each additional seller increases the expected proﬁt of the seller-group. In comparison,
ﬁgure 1 (a) showed that each individual seller’s expected proﬁt is decreasing in the seller-
group size. Therefore the group size aﬀects the group proﬁt positively, but individual proﬁt
negatively. The seller-group’s expected proﬁt converges with increasing group size. As a
result, an additional seller inﬂuences the expected group proﬁt less, if the seller-group is
bigger. This observed convergence has been shown in proposition 3. The ﬁgure shows that a
group of 100 sellers is already close to the convergence state.
Figure 2 (b) shows the buyer’s expected proﬁt as a function of the sellers’ multilateral
oﬀer strategy s. Proposition 7 showed that the buyer’s expected proﬁt is increasing in the
number of sellers and furthermore decreasing in their multilateral oﬀer strategy. This can be
observed in the ﬁgure. For each number of sellers (n = 1, 5, 10, 100,∞), the buyer’s expected
proﬁt is decreasing in the sellers’ oﬀer strategy s. That is, when they increase their oﬀer price,
then the buyer’s proﬁt decreases. However, the higher the number of sellers n, the higher the
buyer’s expected proﬁt. This fact is independent on the sellers’ oﬀer strategy s.
In ﬁgure 2 (b), the green circle on each solid line shows the sellers’ optimal multilateral
level 1 oﬀer strategy s1opt. It can be seen that the buyer proﬁts from an increase in the number
of sellers when they place their bids level 1 optimally. Proposition 6 showed that the buyer’s
proﬁt converges with an increasing seller-group size. That proposition can be observed in the
ﬁgure, where the expected proﬁt of the buyer for n = 100 sellers is already close to the limit
proﬁt, for n→∞.
It is a necessary condition in proposition 2 that all sellers pursue the same oﬀer strategy
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s1opt. They choose their strategy such that each seller’s proﬁt is maximized. Thereby they
also maximise the proﬁt of the seller-group. We call that strategy rationality level 1.
Assume that a single seller knows the multilateral proﬁt optimizing oﬀer strategy s1opt
and anticipates that the other sellers place their bids accordingly. Then she may decide to
optimize her expected proﬁt given this uniform oﬀer strategy of the other sellers. We call
this behaviour rationality level 2. In other words, rationality level 2 means that all sellers
mutually agree on the proﬁt optimizing oﬀer strategy s1opt. One seller does not commit to
this multilateral strategy and optimizes her proﬁt as a best response to the remaining sellers’
multilateral oﬀer strategy. The next section discusses the reverse auction under this level 2
rationality.
2.2 Level 2 Rationality
In the last section all sellers pursue the same optimal multilateral oﬀer strategy s1opt. When
each seller knows the other sellers’ optimal oﬀer strategy s1opt, then a single seller can optimize
her expected proﬁt given the other sellers’ oﬀer strategies s1opt. That strategy puts the single
seller in an advantageous position as she knows the other sellers’ multilateral level 1 oﬀer
strategy and optimally reacts upon it. That strategy is called level 2 optimisation. In this
section, this level 2 strategy and its eﬀects on bidding sellers and the buyer are analysed and
interpreted.
We start with the deal probability for the unilateral behaving seller.
Proposition 8. When there are n− 1 sellers with a multilateral oﬀer strategy s ∈ [1, s2/s1],
then for a seller with the unilateral oﬀer strategy s′ the probability of winning the auction is
P(DS)(s, s′) =

1 , for s′ < s1/s2
F (s2)−F (ss1)
s′sn−1∆sn+1 +
s2 s1 (s−s′)−1/2 s1 2s2+1/2 s′2s1 2
∆s2s′ , for s1/s2 ≤ s′ < s
F (s2)−F (s′s1)
s′sn−1∆sn+1 , for s ≤ s′ ≤ s2/s1
0 otherwise.
The function F is deﬁned as in proposition 1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
When a seller with unilateral oﬀer strategy increases that strategy s′, then this seller’s oﬀer
price increases. As a result, the probability that this seller’s oﬀer exceeds that of the other
sellers increases. In this case, the unilateral bidding seller’s probability to win the auction
decreases. This eﬀect can be observed in the formula above, where the seller’s increase in s′
aﬀects her success probability negatively.
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When the multilateral bidding n− 1 sellers increase their oﬀer strategy s, then their oﬀer
prices increase. As a result, the probability that these sellers’ oﬀers exceed the unilateral
bidding seller’s oﬀer increases. In this case, the unilateral bidding seller’s probability to win
the auction increases. This eﬀect can be observed in the formula above, where the unilateral
bidding seller’s probability to win the auction increases when the remaining n − 1 sellers
increase their oﬀer strategy s.
In the next proposition the buyer’s deal probability is calculated.
Proposition 9. When there are n−1 sellers with the multilateral oﬀer strategy s ∈ [1, s2/s1]
and one seller with a unilateral oﬀer strategy s′ < s2/s1, then the probability that the buyer
receives a suitable oﬀer is
P(DB)(s, s′) =

1 , for s′ < s1/s2
s2−s1s′
∆s − s1(s−s
′)(s′s2−s1(s+s′))
2∆s2s′ − G(s2)−G(ss1)∆sn+1sn−1s′n(n+1) , for s1/s2 ≤ s′ ≤ s
s2−s1s
∆s − sn + (ss2−s
′s1)n
∆snsn−1n − G(s2)−G(s
′s1)
∆sn+1sn−1s′n(n+1) , for s < s
′ ≤ s2/s1.
The function G, to simplify the terms above, is deﬁned as
G(x) := (s s2 − x)n (nx+ s s2 − s2 s′ − n s2 s′).
Proof: See the Appendix.
When the n − 1 sellers’ increase their multilateral oﬀer strategy s or the seller with uni-
lateral oﬀer strategy s′ increases her oﬀer, then oﬀer prices rise. In particular, the price of
the lowest oﬀer rises. As a result, the probability that the buyer’s reservation price exceeds
the sellers’ lowest oﬀer decreases. Accordingly, the probability that the auction is successful
decreases. This can be seen from the above proposition, where an increase in s or s′ aﬀects
the auction success negatively.
When unilateral oﬀer strategy and multilateral oﬀer strategy are identical (that is, s = s′),
then the formula of proposition 9 simpliﬁes to that of proposition 1, where all sellers bid
multilaterally.
After formulas for the success probabilities have been introduced, the bidding sellers’ and
the buyer’s expected proﬁts in the auction is calculated. We start with the expected proﬁt of
the seller that bids unilaterally.
Proposition 10. When n−1 sellers pursue the oﬀer strategy s ∈ [1, s2/s1], then the expected
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proﬁt of the seller with unilateral oﬀer strategy s′ ∈ [1, s2/s1] is
Es′≥s (PS) (s, s′) =
(s′ − 1) ( A(s2)− A(s′s1) )
s′2 sn−1 ∆sn+1
Es′<s (PS) (s, s′) =
(s′ − 1) ( A(s2)− A(ss1) )
s′2 sn−1 ∆sn+1 +
2 s31 (s
′3 − s3) + 3 s21s2(s2 − s′2)
6s′2∆s2 .
The expected proﬁt of the seller with unilateral oﬀer strategy s′ can be summarized as
E (PS) (s, s′) = 1s′≥sEs′≥s (PS) + 1s′<sEs′<s (PS) .
The function A is deﬁned as in proposition 2.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above proposition calculates the expected proﬁt of the unilateral bidding seller who is
aware of the other sellers’ multilateral oﬀer strategy. In particular, we haveE (PS) (s, s) = E (PS).
That is intuitive, because when the unilateral bidding seller pursues the oﬀer strategy s′ = s,
then her expected proﬁt is the same as the other sellers’ proﬁt calculated in proposition 2.
Before we determine the optimal seller’s unilateral oﬀer strategy s′, we calculate the buyer’s
expected proﬁt.
Proposition 11. When n − 1 sellers pursue a multilateral oﬀer strategy s ∈ [1, s2/s1] and
one seller a unilateral oﬀer strategy s′ ∈ [1, s2/s1]. Then the buyer’s expected proﬁt is
E(PB)(s, s′) =

(s2−s′s1)3
6∆sn+1sn−1s′
(
(s∆s)n−1 − (s2(s− 1))n−1
)
+ (n−1)(H(s2)−H(ss1))3∆sn+1sn−1s′ , for s
′ ≤ s
(s2−s′s1)3
6∆sn+1sn−1s′
(
(ss2 − s′s1)n−1 − (s2(s− 1))n−1
)
+ (n−1)(H(s2)−H(s
′s1))
3∆sn+1sn−1s′
+ (n−1)(s2−s
′s1)(I(s′s1)−I(ss1))
2∆sn+1sn−1s′ , for s < s
′.
The functions H and I, that simplify the terms above, are
I(y) := −(y − s s2)
2 (s s2 − y)n
n+ 2 −
s22 (s s2 − y)n (s− 1)2
n
− 2 s2 (y − s s2) (s s2 − y)
n (s− 1)
n+ 1
H(y) := (y − s s2)
3 (s s2 − y)n
n+ 3 +
s23 (s s2 − y)n (s− 1)3
n
+ 3 s2 (y − s s2)
2 (s s2 − y)n (s− 1)
n+ 2 +
3 s22 (y − s s2) (s s2 − y)n (s− 1)2
n+ 1 .
Proof: See the Appendix.
When the n−1 sellers increase their multilateral oﬀer strategy s or the seller with unilateral
oﬀer strategy s′ increases her oﬀer strategy, then their oﬀer prices rise. That is, then the
probability that these oﬀers exceed the buyer’s reservation price increases. As a result, it is
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less likely that the auction is successful. Furthermore, in case of a successful auction, the
expected diﬀerence between the buyer’s reserve price and the winning seller’s bid is lower if
sellers have higher oﬀer strategies. In this case, the buyer’s expected proﬁt in the auction
decreases. This can be seen from the above proposition, where an increase in s and s′ aﬀect
the auction success negatively and vice versa.
When unilateral oﬀer strategy and multilateral oﬀer strategy are identical (that is, s = s′),
then the formula from proposition 11 simpliﬁes to that of proposition 5, where all sellers bid
multilaterally.
The next theorem shows that there is exactly one optimal level 2 oﬀer strategy. This
optimal strategy is lower than the optimal level 1 strategy.
Theorem 2. When n − 1 sellers choose an optimal multilateral oﬀer strategy s1opt and the
n−th seller is aware of their strategy, then that seller may optimise her oﬀer strategy s2opt
accordingly5. There is exactly one such optimal level 2 strategy. That strategy has the property
s2opt ≤ s1opt.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Theorem 1 proved that there is exactly one optimal level 1 strategy for all sellers. When
all sellers but one commit to that strategy, then that seller can optimise her oﬀer by exploiting
her knowledge of the other sellers’ strategy. Theorem 2 states that this unilateral behaving
seller has exactly one such optimal oﬀer strategy s2opt. The theorem further shows that the
optimal level 2 strategy is lower than the optimal level 1 strategy. Thus in these optima, the
unilateral bidding seller’s oﬀer is lower than the average oﬀer of the other sellers.
When a seller pursues a lower strategy than the other sellers, then this seller’s oﬀer is on
average lower than those of the other sellers. Accordingly, this seller has a higher chance to
win the auction by placing the lowest bid. Thus the unilateral seller with oﬀer s2opt ≤ s1opt
has a higher chance to win the auction. Furthermore that seller’s expected proﬁt is higher
than that of the other sellers. If this was not true, then that seller could choose oﬀer strategy
s1opt, just as the other sellers. That strategy would give her a proﬁt equal to that of the other
sellers.
In summary, the seller that does not commit to the multilateral level 1 strategy is in ad-
vantage over sellers that commit to this strategy. We call this oﬀer strategy level 2 rationality.
It is a reasonable label because a seller pursuing the level 2 strategy takes the optimal level
1 strategy into her consideration and places her bid accordingly. Thereby she optimises her
oﬀer under the constraint that the other sellers commit to the level 1 strategy.
5In this theorem, the unilateral strategy s2opt is a seller’s best response strategy, when the other sellers
pursue oﬀer strategy s1opt. In this paper we may also use the notation s2opt as a seller’s optimal response when
the other sellers pursue some feasible oﬀer strategy s. When we do so, the diﬀerent use will be mentioned.
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Fig. 3 – Optimal level 2 strategy for ﬁxed valuation imprecision α = 10%
The unilateral bidding seller on average uses a lower oﬀer than the multilateral bidding
sellers. That fact aﬀects the buyer’s expected proﬁt positively, as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 12. The buyer proﬁts when a seller places her bid level 2 optimally.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The buyer proﬁts from the unilateral oﬀer strategy of a single seller, as proven by the
proposition above. When a seller pursues the optimal level 2 strategy, then her oﬀer strategy
is lower than that of the other sellers, as shown in theorem 2 (s2opt ≤ s1opt). As a result, the
average lowest oﬀer decreases. This lowest oﬀer aﬀects the buyer’s expected proﬁt from the
auction positively. However, the unilateral bidding seller proﬁts from her strategy. However,
the sellers who commit to the multilateral level 1 oﬀer strategy suﬀer from a decreasing proﬁt.
This section provided the reader with the major properties of the level 2 bidding strategy.
Next, a detailed numeric and graphic analysis of this section’s result follows.
The main properties of this section’s propositions are illustrated in ﬁgure 3 and 4. For a
numerical illustration, the valuation imprecision is ﬁxed at α = 10%. The left graph of both
ﬁgures shows the analysis for n = 5 sellers, whereas the right shows the analysis for n = 10
sellers. This enables the reader to clearly see diﬀerent properties of the expected proﬁt and
its dependence on the size of the seller-group.
The dashed lines in ﬁgure 3 (a) and (b) are the same as in ﬁgure 1 (a): namely the
expected proﬁt of a single seller when all sellers pursue the multilateral oﬀer strategy s, as
indicated on the x-axis. The properties of this multilateral oﬀer strategy have thoroughly
been discussed in ﬁgure 1 (a).
Level 2 strategy and its inﬂuence on the seller who pursues this strategy can be observed
in ﬁgures 3 (a) and (b). These ﬁgures show the expected proﬁt of the single seller who pursues
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Fig. 4 – Optimal level 2 strategy for ﬁxed valuation imprecision α = 10%.
the unilateral oﬀer strategy s′ (indicated on the x-axis) assuming the other sellers commit to
multilateral optimal level 1 strategy s1opt. That seller’s expected proﬁt is illustrated as the
solid line in ﬁgure 3.
In ﬁgure 3 (a) the optimal level 1 strategy is s1opt = 1.0900. By applying the unilateral
oﬀer strategy s2opt = 1.0543, a seller can increase her expected proﬁt from 0.69% to 0.96%, i.e
almost by 50%. Analysing ﬁgure 3 (b), it can be seen that a seller can increase her expected
proﬁt by approximately 50%, when this unilateral bidding seller applies the optimal level 2
bidding strategy.
Figure 4 is rather similar to ﬁgure 3, but takes a diﬀerent point of view. Analogous to
ﬁgures 3 and 1 (a) it shows the expected level 1 proﬁt for n = 5 and n = 10 sellers. This
proﬁt is illustrated as the dashed lines in the ﬁgure. In contrast to previous ﬁgures, this ﬁgure
additionally shows a seller’s optimal level 2 response, when that seller anticipates the other
sellers to have bidding strategy s, as indicated on the x-axis.
The solid line shows a seller’s expected proﬁt in level 2 optimum, given the other sellers’
level 1 oﬀer strategy as shown on the x−axis. Figure 4 thus shows the increase in expected
proﬁt a single seller can achieve by not committing to the multilateral oﬀer strategy of the
other sellers. Obviously the unilateral level 2 strategy generates at least as much proﬁt as the
multilateral level 1 strategy. This is indicated in the ﬁgures, as the solid line (optimal level 2
response strategy) is at least as high as the dashed line (level 1 strategy). It can be seen that
there is exactly one level 1 oﬀer strategy such that level 2 strategy is exactly as good as level
1 strategy. This oﬀer strategy will later be characterizes as the level 3 strategy.
The above properties for the example with valuation imprecision α = 10% are true while
0 < α < 1. Further numerical examples are presented in table 1, where the number of sellers
is ﬁxed at n = 5 and valuation imprecision varies. The case α = 10% was discussed in
detail above, where optimal level 1 strategy is s1opt = 1.0900 and optimal level 2 response
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n = 5 Level 1 rationality Level 2 rationality
s1opt E (PS) (s1opt) pd s2opt E (PS) (s1opt, s2opt) pd
α = 5% 1.0434 0.3465% 8.2935% 1.0264 0.4840% 18.9685%
α = 10% 1.0900 0.6896% 8.3001% 1.0543 0.9556% 18.8505%
α = 20% 1.1940 1.3630% 8.3154% 1.1156 1.8577% 18.6028%
α = 25% 1.2523 1.6917% 8.3242% 1.1492 2.2860% 18.4727%
α = 50% 1.6379 3.2060% 8.3788% 1.3596 4.1410% 17.7741%
Table 1 – Properties of level 1 and 2 oﬀer strategies with n = 5 sellers
strategy is s2opt = 1.0543. It can be seen from the table that optimal level 1 strategy is
increasing in imprecision, as is optimal level 2 response strategy. The optimal response
strategy is approximately (1+s1opt)/2, independent of valuation imprecision. By applying level
2 optimization, the seller approximately doubles her chances to win the auction, compared
to level 1 oﬀer strategy. Her expected proﬁt furthermore is increasing in imprecision. Thus
valuation imprecision aﬀects her proﬁt positively.
Our analysis showed that for each seller it is optimal to apply the level 2 oﬀer strategy.
That is, it is optimal for each seller not to commit to a multilateral oﬀer strategy and thereby
to put herself in a better position than sellers who commit to a multilateral oﬀer strategy. If
all sellers are aware of this advantage and want to proﬁt from it, eventually no seller commits
to the multilateral level 1 strategy and all sellers apply the level 2 oﬀer strategy. As the game
is symmetric, the optimal level 2 strategy is the same for each seller. Thus, all sellers apply
the same level 2 oﬀer strategy. It therefore can be interpreted as another multilateral strategy
all sellers commit to. However, that oﬀer strategy must fulﬁl the axiom that no seller can
put herself in a better position than another seller by applying a diﬀerent oﬀer strategy. This
is equivalent to the condition that this multilateral strategy and a seller’s optimal response
upon it are identical. Then no seller proﬁts from applying a diﬀerent oﬀer strategy than the
other sellers. The next section studies this equilibrium strategy.
2.3 Level 3 Rationality
In this section all sellers place their bids fully rationally. That is, each seller anticipates the
other sellers’ bidding strategies and places a best response bid, accordingly. Then a seller’s
proﬁt is dependent on the other sellers’ oﬀer strategies and on her own strategy.
The auction is symmetrical. Therefore no seller will have a diﬀerent oﬀer strategy than
the other sellers. This implies that the sellers indirectly commit to placing their bids multilat-
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erally, as in section 2.1. In contrast to the optimal level 1 strategy, an individual’s deviation
from the multilateral bidding strategy can not have a positive eﬀect on a seller’s proﬁt, when
all sellers place their bids level 3 optimally.
More formally, let s3opt be a multilateral oﬀer strategy when all sellers place their bids
level 3 optimally. Then each seller can not increase her proﬁt when she applies another oﬀer
strategy s ∈ [1, s2/s1]. This is represented by the formula
E (PS) (s3opt, s3opt) ≥ E (PS) (s3opt, s) ∀s ∈ [1, s2/s1].
This section analyses this level 3 oﬀer strategy. We prove that there is exactly one such
optimal level 3 strategy and calculate it explicitly. The buyer proﬁts when the sellers place
their bids level 3 optimally, whereas the sellers’ expected proﬁt decreases in comparison to
level 1 and level 2 strategies.
The next theorem proves main properties of the level 3 optimum.
Theorem 3. There is exactly one optimum level 3 oﬀer strategy s3opt. This level 3 optimum
is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In equilibrium s3opt ≤ s2opt holds.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above theorem proves that there is exactly one level 3 strategy. That bidding strategy
therefore is the unique bidding equilibrium. When all sellers apply this oﬀer strategy and all
sellers anticipate that the other sellers apply it, then there is no seller that can increase her
proﬁt by choosing an oﬀer strategy that is diﬀerent from the equilibrium strategy.
The optimal level 1 strategy exceeds the level 2 optimum, which exceeds the optimal level
3 oﬀer strategy. Therefore the average oﬀers are lowest when the sellers apply the level 3
equilibrium bidding strategy. As a result, the probability that the auction is successful is
highest in that equilibrium. When a seller wins the auction, then this seller’s proﬁt is lowest
when bids are placed level 3 optimally. The buyer proﬁts from the sellers’ equilibrium strategy
in two ways. First of all, the probability that the auction is successful increases and secondly
the winning bid is lower on average.
The next propositions analyse the equilibrium bidding strategy and its implications for a
large number of sellers.
Proposition 13. The optimal level 3 bidding strategy s3opt converges to 1 for seller-group size
n→∞. The expected proﬁt of an individual seller thereby converges to zero.
Proof: See the Appendix.
When the number of sellers increases, then their oﬀer strategy becomes more aggressive.
Proposition 13 states that in the limit, the sellers’ equilibrium oﬀer strategy s3opt = 1. Then
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each seller’s expected proﬁt is zero because then a seller’s reservation and oﬀer price are
identical. When more sellers bid in the auction, then the negative eﬀects on each bidding
seller increase. That is, the sellers’ oﬀers cannibalize their individual proﬁt, which converges
to zero.
The eﬀects of the number of bidding sellers on the group-proﬁt are analysed in the propo-
sition below.
Proposition 14. In bidding equilibrium the expected proﬁt of the seller-group converges to
zero for seller-group size n→∞.
Proof: See the Appendix.
When we combine the statements from propositions 13 and 14, we can conclude that an
increasing number of bidding sellers harms both, each seller’s proﬁt and the proﬁt of the
seller-group at the same time. These proﬁts converge to zero for inﬁnitely many bidding
sellers. The sellers’ competition thus becomes so aggressive that all proﬁt on the sell side
ﬁnally diminishes.
On the contrary, the buyer, who initiates the auction, proﬁts from the increasing compe-
tition among a bigger seller-group. This statement is proven in the next proposition.
Proposition 15. The buyer’s expected proﬁt converges to the maximal valuation imprecision
α for n→∞ sellers, when they place their bids optimally level 3.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 15 shows that a buyer proﬁts from more bidding sellers in the auction. His
expected proﬁt converges to the maximal valuation imprecision α. The buyer’s expected
proﬁt thus is bounded by valuation imprecision. When the parties’ valuation abilities are less
precise, then a buyer’s expected proﬁt from the auction increases. That is, the buyer proﬁts
from a raise in valuation imprecision.
We close the analysis of the properties of the level 3 equilibrium bidding strategy by
calculating the auction success probability for inﬁnitely many bidding sellers in the proposition
below.
Proposition 16. The probability that the auction is successful converges to 1 for inﬁnitely
many sellers who place their bids optimally level 3.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above proposition shows that the buyer who initialises an auction has a probability of
1 that his reservation price exceeds the lowest bid, when inﬁnitely many sellers are bidding.
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n = 5 Level 1 rationality Level 2 rationality Level 3 rationality
s1opt E (PS) (s1opt) s2opt E (PS) (s1opt, s2opt) s3opt E (PS) (s3opt)
α = 5% 1.04 0.35% 1.03 0.48% 1.02 0.22%
α = 10% 1.09 0.69% 1.05 0.96% 1.04 0.44%
α = 20% 1.19 1.36% 1.12 1.86% 1.08 0.88%
α = 25% 1.25 1.69% 1.15 2.29% 1.10 1.11%
α = 50% 1.64 3.21% 1.36 4.14% 1.27 2.24%
Table 2 – Properties of level 1 to 3 oﬀer strategies with n = 5 sellers
That is, then the probability that the auction is successful is 1. For the buyer, this property
is desirable because he can be sure to get a suitable oﬀer that generates positive proﬁt.
One of inﬁnitely many sellers places the winning lowest bid. That bid however does not
generate a proﬁt for the winning seller because the winning seller’s reservation and oﬀer prices
are identical. In conclusion, more bidding sellers harm each other, while their cannibalising
oﬀer strategy is highly proﬁtable for the buyer.
We continue with numerical examples and illustrations of the optimal level 3 oﬀer strategy
and its implications for the buyer and the sellers. Table 2 shows the optimal level 1 to 3 oﬀer
strategies as a function of valuation imprecision α. In the numerical example, the number of
bidding sellers is set to n = 5.
Optimal level 1 and level 2 oﬀer strategies were discussed thoroughly in the last section.
It was shown that it is of advantage for each seller to pursue the level 2 strategy, as long as all
other sellers pursue on optimal level 1 strategy. However, when all sellers behave rationally
and optimize their oﬀer optimally level 2, then their combined individual strategies lead to
the level 3 optimum s3opt. Table 2 analyses major properties of these level 3 optima. The
level 3 optimum is lower or equal to the level 2 optimum, which does not exceed the level 1
optimum. That is, s3opt ≤ s2opt ≤ s1opt.
As a result of the level 3 optimization the sellers’ expected proﬁt decreases, compared to
optimal the level 2 and level 1 bidding strategies. Although optimal level 3 bidding is the
equilibrium bidding strategy, it is not of beneﬁt for each seller or the seller-group, compared
to levels 1 and 2 bidding strategies.
Figure 5 shows the expected proﬁt as a function of the bidding strategy for a ﬁxed valuation
imprecision α = 10% and n = 5 sellers in ﬁgure 5 (a) (n = 10 sellers in ﬁgure 5 (b)). In each
ﬁgure, the dotted line shows the expected proﬁt of a seller, when all sellers pursue multilateral
oﬀer strategy s as indicated on the x-axis. The solid line shows a seller’s proﬁt who applies
unilateral bidding strategy s (as indicated on the x-axis), while the remaining sellers bid
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Fig. 5 – Optimal level 3 equilibrium strategy for ﬁxed valuation imprecision α = 10%
optimally level 3. There is exactly one point of intersection, where both strategies share the
same expected proﬁt. That point of intersection is marked with a red dot. It is the level 3
optimal bidding strategy s3opt. When the sellers apply this oﬀer strategy, then a seller can not
increase her proﬁt by applying a strategy that is diﬀerent from s3opt. This can be observed
in the ﬁgure, as the solid line (that is, the proﬁt of the unilateral bidding seller) reaches its
maximum when her oﬀer strategy is s3opt. Compared to the level 1 optimal strategy, all sellers’
expected proﬁt decreases when they apply the optimal level 3 bidding strategy. However, the
level 3 optimum is the unique equilibrium bidding strategy.
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Fig. 6 – Optimal level 3 equilibrium strategy for ﬁxed valuation imprecision α = 10%
Figure 6 shows a single seller’s proﬁt for the bidding strategies levels 1, 2 and 3. The dashed
line shows a seller’s expected proﬁt, when all sellers apply a bidding strategy according to the
x-coordinate of the ﬁgure. The solid line shows the expected proﬁt (level 2) that a seller can
achieve, when she anticipates that the other sellers multilaterally place their bids according
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to the oﬀer strategy as indicated on the x-axis.
When a single seller knows the other sellers’ multilateral oﬀer strategy, then this single
seller can increase her expected proﬁt by optimizing her oﬀer strategy accordingly. The arrow
from level 1 to level 2 optimum shows a seller’s potential proﬁt increase. There is always
exactly one multilateral strategy, where unilateral optimization does not put a single seller in
favour of the other sellers, that is the level 3 optimum. The left downward-arrow indicates
the change of proﬁt from the level 2 to the level 3 optimum. In the level 3 optimum, each
seller’s proﬁt is lower than in the level 1 and 2 optima.
In bigger markets each seller’s expected proﬁt shrinks in all bidding optima. This can be
seen by the comparison of ﬁgure 6 (a) and (b). All optima are lower in the right ﬁgure, where
the seller-group consists of 10 sellers, compared to 5 sellers on the left. The optimal bidding
strategies in the left ﬁgure generate a higher proﬁt than those when more sellers bid in the
auction.
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Fig. 7 – Deal probabilities for n = 10 sellers and α = 10%
Figure 7 illustrates the success probability for a seller in ﬁgure 7 (a) and the buyer in
ﬁgure 7 (b). The probabilities are based on the formulas developed in propositions 8 and
9. The blue line shows the deal probabilities when all sellers commit to a multilateral oﬀer
strategy. The green line shows the deal probability under the constraint that a seller applies
oﬀer strategy as indicated on the x-axis, whereas the remaining sellers multilaterally pursue
oﬀer strategy s1opt. For these examples, n = 10 sellers and valuation imprecision α = 10%
where chosen.
Under multilateral level 1 optimum an individual seller has approximately a probability
of 5% for deal success, as 7 (a) shows. Unilateral optimisation allows a seller to increase her
success probability to almost 20%. In optimal level 3 bidding strategy, the deal probability is
slightly below 10%. In terms of expected proﬁt, the level 3 bidding equilibrium has a lower
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expected proﬁt than the optimal level 1 strategy. In contrast, the deal probability increases
from the optimal level 1 to level 3 bidding strategies. The level 3 optimal strategy is therefore
preferable compared to the level 1 optimum in terms of success probability.
Figure 7 (b) shows the buyer’s deal probability. That is, the probability that one seller
places a successful bid. It can be seen that the level 2 strategy leads to a higher success prob-
ability (approximately 55%) compared to the level 1 strategy (approximately 50%). Further,
the level 3 optimisation includes a higher deal probability of over 80%. The buyer thus proﬁts
from the sellers’ level 3 bidding equilibrium compared to the level 1 and 2 bidding strategies.
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Fig. 8 – Buyer’s expected proﬁt in oﬀer strategies levels 1 to 3
Proposition 11 introduced the buyer’s expected proﬁt under level 2 rationality. This
formula can be adapted to the level 3 rationality by applying s′ = s to the formula. As already
mentioned, that simpliﬁed formula is the one introduced in proposition 5. Additionally, we
have proven s3opt ≤ s2opt ≤ s1opt in theorem 2 and 3. That is, applying oﬀer strategies 1 to
3, the average sellers’ oﬀers decrease. Therefore the buyer’s expected proﬁt is increasing
in oﬀer strategies 1 to 3. That fact is illustrated in ﬁgure 8, where markets with n = 5
and n = 10 sellers are analysed. The buyer’s expected proﬁt in a multilateral strategy is
illustrated in blue. The green line shows the expected proﬁt of the buyer, given the optimal
according unilateral response strategy s2opt. Both ﬁgures show that the buyer has a positive
proﬁt from the level 1 bidding optimum. When a seller bids level 2 optimally, then the buyer’s
proﬁt increases. The buyer’s proﬁt further increases when all sellers place their bids level 3
optimally. These observation are intuitive because the sellers’ bids are lowest when they bid
optimally level 3.
Figure 9 (a) illustrates the eﬀects of level 3 bidding on the proﬁt of the seller-group. For
this illustration, the valuation imprecision is ﬁxed at α = 10%. The solid lines in the ﬁgure
show the expected proﬁt of the seller-group as a function of their multilateral oﬀer strategy
s, as is indicated on the x-axis. Thereby each solid line shows the expected proﬁt of the
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sellers group for a diﬀerent group size. It can be seen that group proﬁt is increasing in group
size and convergent for n → ∞ sellers. For each group size, the optimal multilateral level 1
bidding strategy is market with a circle. So far, the ﬁgure is identical to ﬁgure 2, where the
sellers’ multilateral strategy was analysed in detail. It can be seen that the optimal level 1
oﬀer strategy that maximises each seller’s proﬁt at the same time maximises the proﬁt of the
seller-group.
Additionally, the ﬁgure shows the optimal level 3 strategies for diﬀerent seller-group sizes.
These are marked with a cross. For n = 1 sellers, levels 1 and 3 strategies are identical,
as a single seller can optimise her strategy without taking a second, third, ... seller’s oﬀer
into consideration. For seller-group size n = 5, there is a loss of the expected proﬁt from
oﬀer strategy level 1 to level 3. In this case, the optimal strategy s1opt = 1.09 changes to
s3opt = 1.04. This represents a reduction from approximately 3.45% to 2.20% in the seller-
group’s proﬁt. The highest proﬁt decrease is achieved when inﬁnitely many sellers place their
bids. In the limit the optimal level 1 strategy is s1opt = 1/s1 = 10/9, according to proposition
3. Furthermore, the optimal level 3 strategy is s3opt = 1. In the latter case the expected group
proﬁt diminishes to zero.
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α = 10%
Figure 9 (b) shows the eﬀects of optimal level 1 and level 3 strategies on the buyer.
Section 2.1 proved that the expected proﬁt of the buyer decreases when sellers increase their
oﬀers. A buyer’s proﬁt increases when the seller-group size increases. These properties can
be observed in ﬁgure 9 (b), where the buyer’s expected proﬁt for n = 1, 5,∞ sellers is shown.
In the optimal level 1 strategy the buyer has positive expected proﬁt, that is increasing in
the number of sellers. The optimal level 3 strategy is lower or equal to the optimal level 1
strategy, i.e. s3opt ≤ s1opt. Therefore the buyer proﬁts from the sellers’ level 3 bidding strategy.
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This fact can be observed in the ﬁgure. When there is n = 1 seller present, then the level
1 and 3 optimisation strategies are equivalent. In this case the buyer therefore is indiﬀerent
to the seller’s bidding strategies. When more sellers bid in the auction, then level 1 and 3
bidding is diﬀerent, that is s3opt ≤ s1opt. Therefore the buyer’s proﬁt changes, when the sellers
bid diﬀerently. In the ﬁgure this can be seen at the example of n = 5 sellers, where the buyer’s
proﬁt increases when sellers change their bidding strategy from level 1 to level 3. When the
number of bidding sellers increases, then this eﬀect increases. In the limit of inﬁnitely many
sellers, where the optimal oﬀer strategy is s3opt = 1, the buyer’s proﬁt is maximal. Then it
is E(PB) = α (which is 10% in this example). Valuation imprecision is the upper bound for
the buyer’s expected proﬁt. This shows that valuation imprecision is beneﬁcial for the buyer.
That is, when valuation imprecision increases, then the upper bound for the buyer’s expected
proﬁt increases. In this case, the auction is more attractive for the buyer, when the parties
valuation abilities are limited to an even greater extent.
The next section summarizes the properties of the sellers’ bidding strategies.
2.4 Summary: The Downside of Unilateralism
This section so far introduced the reverse auction, where the initiating buyer hides his
reservation price. Diﬀerent bidding strategies of the sellers were discussed. While the bidding
strategies level 1 and 2 are no equilibria, we have proven that the optimal level 3 bidding
strategy is an equilibrium bidding strategy. When the sellers bid rationally, they place their
bids level 3 optimal. This optimal bidding strategy is unique. When the sellers place their
bids according to this strategy, then opposed eﬀects on the buyer and the sellers are achieved.
The buyer proﬁts from the sellers’ equilibrium bidding strategy in a variety of aspects.
First of all, when the sellers place their bids according to their equilibrium bidding strategy,
then the probability that the auction is successful increases, compared to optimal level 1
bidding strategy. Thereby the buyer’s expected proﬁt increases. Furthermore, he proﬁts from
an increasing number of bidding sellers and from increasing valuation imprecision. In fact,
when there are inﬁnitely many sellers, then buyer’s expected proﬁt is maximal and given by
the players’ valuation imprecision α. Therefore the buyer has an incentive to increase the
valuing parties’ valuation imprecision and to attract an increasing number of bidding sellers.
In summary, the buyer proﬁts in numerous aspects from the design of this auction market in
equilibrium.
In contrast to the buyer, seller that bid in the auction have the highest expected proﬁt
when all sellers mutually agree to place their bids level 1 optimal. As a result, all sellers
then share the same expected proﬁt. A single seller may increase her expected proﬁt by
applying a unilateral level 2 bidding strategy. By placing her bid unilaterally, each seller
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Fig. 10 – All sellers’ expected proﬁt in level 3 optimum as a function of group size
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Fig. 11 – All sellers’ expected proﬁt in level 1 optimum as a function of group size
has the possibility to increase her proﬁt by not committing to the optimal level 1 bidding
strategy. Therefore that level 1 optimum is not stable. These considerations lead to the level
3 bidding strategy. When all sellers place their bids according to the optimal level 3 strategy,
then no seller can increase her proﬁt by breaking the commitment. The advantage of that
strategy is its stability, as no seller proﬁts from altering her bidding strategy. Moreover,
the probability to place a winning bid increases when the sellers indirectly commit to place
their bids according the level 3 optimum. However, each seller’s expected proﬁt is lower in
equilibrium bidding strategy than if sellers would commit to the level 1 optimum strategy.
The seller-group proﬁts from an increasing group size in level 1 optimum. In contrast,
the expected group proﬁt converges to zero in the level 3 optimum. These properties are
illustrated in ﬁgure 10 and 11. Figure 10 shows in particular that there is an optimal number
of bidding sellers to optimise the seller-group proﬁt. This optimum is dependent on the
valuation imprecision.
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Each seller would proﬁt when all sellers place their bids according to the optimal level
1 strategy. Therefore the seller-group could employ a mechanism that commits each seller
to that bidding strategy. When no such mechanism is installed, then level 3 bidding is the
unique equilibrium bidding strategy, which has numerous downsides for the sellers and many
positive eﬀects for the buyer who initiates the auction.
Let us introduce a numerical example.
2.5 Example: Private Bond Placement
Assume that ﬁve investors bid on a ﬁrm’s bond with volume e1 billion and the maturity
of one year. Each of the ﬁve investors oﬀers a coupon that he requires from the issuing ﬁrm at
maturity. The investor with the lowest coupon requirement wins the bid. Each investor has a
reserve value for the coupon. In our example, these reserve values are uniformly distributed
on the interval [2%, 6%] of the bond volume. Thus the average coupon requirement is 4%
and the minimum (maximum) requirement is 0.5 lower (higher) than the average. In fact,
this represents a valuation imprecision of 50%. The investors only know their own coupon
requirement and that their common valuation imprecision is 50%.
In the example, the investors’ reserve values are
(V1, V2, V3, V4, V5)= (2.5, 3, 4, 5, 5.5)mio.
The reserve value of the ﬁrm is 4.5% of the bond volume, that is e4.5mio.
When the investors commit to optimal multilateral oﬀer strategy level 1, then they increase
their reserve values by the factor s1opt = 1.64. Their oﬀers then are
(O1, O2, O3, O4, O5)= (4.10, 4.92, 6.56, 8.20, 9.02)mio.
The lowest bid is e4.1mio, which is below the ﬁrm’s reserve value of e4.5mio. Thus the ﬁrm
accepts that oﬀer. The bidding investor’s proﬁt is e1.6mio and the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is e0.4mio.
Now, let us consider the inﬂuence of rationality level 2. The second investor knows that
the four other investors commit to the oﬀer strategy s1opt = 1.64. Then that investor’s optimal
strategy is to increase her valuation by s2opt = 1.36. The investors’ oﬀers thus are
(O1, O2, O3, O4, O5)= (4.10, 4.08, 6.56, 8.20, 9.02)mio.
The lowest bid is e4.08mio, which is below the ﬁrm’s reserve value of e4.5mio. Thus the ﬁrm
accepts that oﬀer. The second investor’s proﬁt is e1.08mio and the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is e0.42mio.
Level 2 rationality thus puts the second investor in favour over the ﬁrst investor. Further, the
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issuing ﬁrm proﬁts from the second seller’s strategy.
The optimal level 3 strategy avoids the possibility that one investor can create an ad-
vantage for himself over the other sellers. That equilibrium oﬀer strategy is that all sellers
increase their reserve value by s3opt = 1.27. The sellers’ equilibrium bids thus are
(O1, O2, O3, O4, O5)= (3.18, 3.81, 5.08, 6.35, 6.99)mio.
The lowest bid, oﬀered by investor 1, is e3.18mio, which is below the ﬁrm’s reserve value
of e4.5mio. Thus the ﬁrm accepts that oﬀer. The winning investor’s proﬁt is e0.68mio
and we calculate that the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is e1.32mio. The equilibrium strategy and the level
1 strategy produce the same winner of the auction. That winner is unknown to the sellers
ex ante. However, the winning investor’s proﬁt diminishes in equilibrium. In contrast, the
issuing ﬁrm’s proﬁt increases when the sellers apply the equilibrium bidding strategy.
The next section introduces a dealer’s oﬀer strategy.
3 The Dealer’s Market
The Dealer’s Market in this section is similar to the Dealer’s Market in Seemu¨ller (2013).
Although there might be some redundancy, its deﬁnition will be recapitulated at this point.
In the Dealer’s Market, there is a dealer present. The dealer is experienced in trading
and therefore knows the average value of a good. That is, he values the good precisely. He
acts as market maker and charges a bid-ask spread. The dealer oﬀers the seller a price which
is the good’s average value multiplied by 1 + fs and he oﬀers the buyer a price which is the
average value multiplied by 1+ fb, with fees fb ≥ fs. The bid-ask spread generates a positive
proﬁt on each round-trip transaction for the dealer, while he maintains fb − fs ≥ 0. Hence,
he deterministically proﬁts from his strategy on a round-trip transaction.
Buyers and sellers do not know the average valuation of a good. Therefore a seller and
a buyer are unaware whether the dealer truly shows them the prices (1 + fs)V and (1 +
fb)V , respectively. Thus the parties need to trust the intermediary to charge truthful prices.
Consequently, the intermediary needs to be indulged with exogenous reputation capital such
that the bargainers consider him trustworthy.
The dealer pursues the strategy to install an environment under information asymmetry.
In the Dealer’s Market buyers and sellers do not interact. They solely communicate with
the dealer and choose whether to accept his oﬀer, or not. In this sense there is information
asymmetry in the Dealer’s Market. Asymmetric information is important to the success of the
dealer’s strategy. This means that the buyer and the seller should either consult the dealer
or choose an alternative trading platform (e.g. an auction). Otherwise buyers and sellers
may ﬁrst bargain on a free trading platform and only consult the dealer if their auction is
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unsuccessful. While this sequential strategy is beneﬁcial for buyers and sellers, the dealer is left
with a lemons problem. Buyers with low reservation prices and sellers with high reservation
prices. Thus the dealer suﬀers from adverse selection. Installing a beneﬁcial fee strategy
consequently becomes more complicated under full information as the dealer’s strategy may
even collapse otherwise.
We start to formally analyse the properties of the Dealer’s Market by calculating the deal
probability.
Proposition 17. Assume that −α < fb, fs < α. Then the probability that a buyer proﬁts from
and thus accepts the dealer’s oﬀer is pb = (α − fb)/(2α). The probability that a seller proﬁts
and thus accepts the dealer’s oﬀer is ps = (α+ fs)/(2α).
Proof: See the Appendix.
A buyer (seller) accepts the dealer’s oﬀer if his reservation price is higher (lower) than
the dealer’s oﬀer. Therefore the probability for a successful deal increases when the dealer
reduces his oﬀer to a buyer. Further, that probability increases, when the dealer raises his
oﬀer to a seller.
The next proposition calculates a buyer’s and a seller’s expected proﬁt in the Dealer’s
Market.
Proposition 18. When fb < α or −α < fs then a buyer’s or a seller’s expected proﬁt in the
Dealer’s Market is positive. In this case a buyer’s expected proﬁt is
E (PD(B)) = (α− fb)2 /(2∆s)
and a seller’s expected proﬁt is
E (PD(S)) = (fs + α)2/(2∆s).
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above proposition shows that the dealer can attract buyers and sellers to his market
when he maintains reasonable fees fb < α and −α < fs. If, in addition, the price he charges
a buyer exceeds his oﬀer to a seller (that is, fb − fs > 0), then the dealer’s proﬁt on each
round-trip transaction is positive.
The next section analyses the relative attractiveness of the reverse auction and the Dealer’s
Market.
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4 The Advantage of Bid-Ask Prices
This section compares the reverse auction and the Dealer’s Market. It will be shown under
which circumstances the Dealer’s Market is preferable for all market participants over their
reverse auction alternative. Afterwards an example is presented to numerically illustrate the
theoretic discussion.
4.1 The Pareto Dominance of a Market Maker under Information Asymmetry
We introduce indiﬀerence fees fb,ind and fs,ind with the following properties: If the dealer
fee is below fb,ind, then buyer prefers the Dealer’s Market over his reverse auction alternative.
Analogously, sellers prefer the Dealer’s Market over their alternative to bid in the reverse
auction, if the dealer’s fee exceeds the indiﬀerence fee fs,ind. The theorem proves a major
property of these indiﬀerence fees.
Theorem 4. The buyer and sellers prefer the Dealer’s Market over the reverse auction, when
the condition fs,ind < fs < fb < fb,ind holds. Then the dealer’s earnings are greater zero. As
a result, the Dealer’s Market Pareto dominates the reverse auction, i.e. the market under
information asymmetry Pareto dominates the reverse auction.
Proof: See the Appendix.
When the condition fs,ind < fs < fb < fb,ind is satisﬁed, then all players are in preference
of the Dealer’s Market and the dealer has positive earnings on each round-trip transaction.
Then the Dealer’s Market is Pareto eﬃcient over the reverse auction alternative.
The seller’s indiﬀerence fee as a function of valuation imprecision α is shown in ﬁgure 12.
For the analysis the number of sellers is ﬁxed to n = 10 and the valuation imprecision α is set
to 10% in ﬁgure 12 (a) and 25% in ﬁgure 12 (b). The x-axis shows the dealer’s fee. A seller’s
expected proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market and the reverse auction is illustrated on the y-axis. In
both cases a seller’s proﬁt is comparably low when she bids in the reverse auction. In contrast,
her proﬁt is increasing in the dealer’s fee. When the dealer’s fee exceeds the indiﬀerence fee,
then the seller prefers the Dealer’s Market over bidding in the auction. In both ﬁgures, the
indiﬀerence fee is almost at the lower bound for the dealer’s fee: for α = 10% (α = 25%),
the indiﬀerence fee is fs,ind = −7.56% (fs,ind = −18.82%). When the scaling in the ﬁgures
12 (a) and (b) is not regarded, then the indiﬀerence fees and the expected proﬁts seem to
be almost the same in both ﬁgures. The analysis of the indiﬀerence fee as a proportion of
valuation imprecision in fact shows that frel = −75.6% (for α = 10%) and frel = −75.3% (for
α = 25%). It can be assumed that the seller’s indiﬀerence fee is almost linear in valuation
imprecision.
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Fig. 12 – A seller’s expected proﬁt in the reverse auction and in the Dealer’s Market for
n = 10 sellers
The buyer’s preferences as a function of the valuation imprecision αis shown in ﬁgure 13,
where n = 10 sellers is ﬁxed and valuation imprecision is set to α = 10% and α = 25% in
ﬁgures 13 (a) and (b), respectively. As in ﬁgure 12, the x-axis shows the dealer’s fee and a
buyer’s expected proﬁt is drawn on the y-axis.
The buyer’s expected proﬁt decreases with increasing dealer’s fee. Intuitively, a higher
fee implies a higher price. That higher price inﬂuences the buyer’s proﬁt negatively. When
valuation imprecision is set at α = 10%, then the buyer’s indiﬀerence fee is fb,ind = −5.55%.
That is, all fees below this indiﬀerence fee puts the buyer in favour for the Dealer’s Market over
setting up a reverse auction. In the case α = 25%, the indiﬀerence fee is fb,ind = −13.08%.
As a result, the dealer needs to oﬀer a buyer a lower price when the valuation imprecision
increases.
As in the above analysis of a seller’s indiﬀerence fee (when the scaling of the ﬁgure is
disregarded) it can be seen that this fee is almost a linear function in valuation imprecision.
This becomes even clearer when we calculate the indiﬀerence fees as a proportion of valuation
imprecision: For the valuation imprecision α = 10%, the relative indiﬀerence fee is 55.5%. In
the case of α = 25% that relative ﬁgure is 52.3%. The buyer’s indiﬀerence fee therefore is
almost a linear function.
The buyer’s and the seller’s indiﬀerence fee as a function of seller-group size is analysed
in ﬁgure 14. The ﬁgure compares the expected proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market and in a reverse
auction. In that ﬁgure valuation imprecision is held constant at α = 10%. The dealer’s fee is
shown on the x-axis. The y-axis illustrates the expected proﬁt.
Figure 14 (a) shows a seller’s indiﬀerence fee as a function of the number n of the sellers.
Previous analysis proved that a seller’s expected proﬁt in a reverse auction decreases in the
number of bidding sellers. This fact can be observed in the ﬁgure. An increasing seller
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Fig. 13 – The buyer’s expected proﬁt in the reverse auction and in the Dealer’s Market for
n = 10 sellers
number therefore aﬀects a seller’s indiﬀerence fee negatively. It decreases from -3.42% (for
n = 2 sellers) down to -7.56% (for n = 10 sellers) down to -10% in the limit of inﬁnitely many
sellers. A sellers always accepts a fee above her indiﬀerence fee. As a result, the dealer can
generate higher earnings, when more sellers are present.
Figure 14 (b) shows a buyer’s indiﬀerence fee as a function of the number nof the sellers.
Previous analysis proved that a buyer’s expected proﬁt in a reverse auction is an increasing
function in the number of bidding sellers. This fact can be observed in the ﬁgure. As a
result, an increasing number of sellers aﬀects a buyer’s indiﬀerence fee negatively. That fee
decreases from -2.47% (for n = 5 sellers) down to -5.55% (for n = 10 sellers) down to -8.04%
(for n = 25 sellers) down to 9.49% (for n = 100 sellers) down to -10% in the limit of inﬁnitely
many sellers. A buyer always accepts fees below her indiﬀerence fee. As a result, the dealer
may charge the buyer a smaller fee and thus a lower price, when more sellers are present.
This aﬀects the dealer’s earnings negatively.
When inﬁnitely many sellers are present, then a buyer’s and a seller’s indiﬀerence fee is
-10%. Then there is no pair of fees (fb, fs), such that the dealer can attract both, the buyer
and the seller to the Dealer’s Market while maintaining positive earnings. The dealer then
can not supply an environment that is Pareto eﬃcient over the reverse auction.
Next, we analyse when the dealer can create an environment that Pareto dominates a
reverse auction, while maintaining positive dealer’s earnings. The constraints that inﬂuence
the players’ indiﬀerence fees are the number of sellers n and the valuation imprecision α.
Figures 15 (a) and (b) show a seller’s and a buyer’s indiﬀerence fees, respectively. These
indiﬀerence fees are drawn as functions of valuation imprecision. The ﬁgures show that the
indiﬀerence fee is decreasing in valuation imprecision for both the buyer and the seller. It
is furthermore decreasing in the number of sellers. However, the ﬁgures suggest that the
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Fig. 14 – The players’ expected proﬁt for diﬀerent numbers of seller and valuation imprecision
α = 10%
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Fig. 15 – The players’ indiﬀerence fees as functions of valuation imprecision
indiﬀerence fee of the seller usually is lower than the buyer’s indiﬀerence fee. Within these
bounds the dealer can determine his fees such that all parties are in favour of the Dealer’s
Market.
When α = 0 or n =∞, then the dealer can not oﬀer a fee structure that Pareto dominates
the reverse auction. For α = 0 there is no valuation imprecision and thus all parties value
the good precisely. That is, the buyer’s and the seller’s reservation prices are identical.
This does not allow positive proﬁt from bargaining. As a result, valuation imprecision is
necessary for the Dealer’s Market to be Pareto eﬃcient. When n =∞, then a buyer’s and a
seller’s indiﬀerence fee is −α. In other words, their indiﬀerence fees are identical. The dealer
therefore can maintain no positive bid-ask spread. He therefore can not install a fee structure
that attracts a buyer and a seller to his market and at the same time allows him positive
earnings.
The inﬂuence of the dealer’s fees on the average price is illustrated in ﬁgures 16 (a) and
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Fig. 16 – Feasible bid-ask prices for a Pareto eﬃcient Dealer’s Market
n = 5 n = 10 n = 50 n =∞
fb,ind fs,ind fb,ind fs,ind fb,ind fs,ind fb,ind = fs,ind
α = 5% -1.29% -2.92% -2.82% -3.78% -4.51% -4.73% -5%
α = 10% -2.47% -5.82% -5.55% -7.56% -8.99% -9.45% -10%
α = 20% -4.43% -11.61% -10.70% -15.08% -17.87% -18.90% -20%
α = 25% -5.21% -14.48% -13.08% -18.82% -22.26% -23.62% -25%
α = 50% -6.55% -28.81% -22.22% -37.35% -43.28% -47.21% -50%
Table 3 – Buyer’s and seller’s market indiﬀerence
(b) for markets with n = 5 and n = 50 sellers, respectively. The blue area in both ﬁgures
represents valid bid-ask prices such that all parties are in preference of the Dealer’s Market.
That area is non-empty, so the dealer can determine a fee structure for the Pareto dominance
of the Dealer’s Market. It can be seen that the area for n = 50 sellers is smaller than that for
markets with n = 5 sellers. In fact, this area converges to zero for n→∞, as discussed in the
previous paragraph. This further can be observed in table 3. That table shows that a seller’s
and a buyer’s indiﬀerence fees are the same, when inﬁnitely many sellers are present. Thus,
the dealer can not price the good in a way such that the Dealer’s Market dominates a double
auction. Table 3 illustrates further exact values of the dealer’s price bounds. As can be seen
from ﬁgure 16 and the table, for valuation imprecision that exceeds zero, the dealer can buy
the good from the seller and sell it to the buyer for a higher price. The dealer’s earnings are
determined by a positive bid-ask spread. The next Theorem summarises these observations.
Theorem 5. Assume that the valuation imprecision 0 < α < 1 and that the number of sellers
97
is 0 < n <∞. Then the dealer can always determine fees fb and fs, such that (a) the dealer
has positive earnings per round-trip transaction and (b) buyer and seller prefer the Dealer’s
Market over a reverse auction. Then the Dealer’s Market Pareto dominates a reverse auction.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above theorem proves that the dealer can determine bid-ask prices such that all
players are in preference for his market. Then a buyer and a seller prefer the Dealer’s Market
over trading in a reverse auction. With this strategy, the dealer is able to maintain positive
earnings per round-trip transaction.
Consider now the reverse auction, where one initiating buyer and a certain number n of
bidding sellers are present. The dealer competes with this auction, where there is just one
buyer but a possibly high number of sellers. When the dealer acts as a market maker, then
he buys from every prospective seller and sells to every prospective buyer. When prospective
sellers outnumber prospective buyers, as in the reverse auction, then the dealer puts himself
at risk of building a large inventory. This is however not the case, as we will analyse in the
next proposition.
Proposition 19. On average nα+fs2α sellers accept the dealer’s oﬀer.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 19 calculates the expected number of sellers that accept the dealer’s oﬀer.
That number is an important decision parameter for the dealer. There are n prospective
sellers versus 1 prospective buyer. That is, the dealer faces the danger of high inventory levels
if he attracts too many sellers. Considering the inventory level, the dealer should choose his
seller fee fs such that sellers prefer the Dealer’s Market over bidding in the auction. At the
same time the number of sellers that accept the dealer’s oﬀer should be limited. Furthermore
the buyer fee fb should attract the buyer to the Dealer’s Market and maximise the probability
that he accepts the dealer’s oﬀer. While applying this strategy, the dealer’s inventory is held
to a minimum.
We give a numerical illustration of the above proposition. Figures 17 and 18 analyse the
proposed dealer’s fee strategy in detail. In these ﬁgures, the dealer applies the maximum
seller fee such that a seller is marginally in favour of the Dealer’s Market over bidding in the
auction. The buyer is charged the minimum fee, such that the dealer’s proﬁt remains positive.
Then the number of sellers that accept the dealer’s oﬀer is minimised and the probability of
a buyer to accept the dealer’s oﬀer is maximised. At the same time the dealer’s earnings
remain positive and all players are in favour of the Dealer’s Market. This strategy has two
positive eﬀects: the Dealer’s Market is Pareto dominating the double auction and the dealer’s
inventory is minimised.
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Fig. 17 – Average number of players that accept the dealer’s oﬀer
Figure 17 shows the expected number of sellers and buyers that accept the dealer’s oﬀer.
Valuation imprecision is drawn on the x-axis, whereas the average number of accepting buyers
or sellers is shown on the y-axis.
Figure 17 (a) shows the expected number of sellers that accept the dealer’s oﬀer for
n = 5, 10, 25, 50 and 100 sellers. That expected number is almost constant in valuation
imprecision. However, a higher valuation imprecision aﬀects that number slightly positive.
The main determinant is the number of sellers in the market as more potential sellers sell
more often to the dealer than fewer sellers. The expected number of sellers that accept the
dealer’s oﬀer ranges from approximately 1.05 (n = 5 sellers) to approximately 1.40 (n = 100
sellers). Although that value increase with the number of sellers, it is bounded in a range
approximately between 1 and 1.5.
The expected number of buyers that accept the dealer’s oﬀer (which is equivalent to the
probability that the buyer accepts the dealer’s oﬀer) is shown in ﬁgure 17 (b). For a ﬁxed
number of sellers, that number is relatively constant in valuation imprecision. The inﬂuence
of valuation imprecision is limited to a minimum, such that it almost cannot be observed in
the ﬁgure. The expected number of buyer’s that accept the dealer’s oﬀer is increasing in the
number of sellers n. Where the number is approximately 0.8 when there are n = 5 sellers,
it increases up to almost 1 when n = 100 sellers are present. That ﬁgure thus ranges from
approximately 0.8 up to 1.
Figure 18 (a) shows the expected number of sellers and buyers that accept the dealer’s
oﬀer when n = 10 sellers are present. It can be seen that both numbers are almost constant
in valuation imprecision α. This proposition is supported by ﬁgure 18 (b), where the quotient
of sellers and buyers that accept the dealer’s oﬀer is illustrated. When n = 5, then the ratio
is relatively stable at approximately 1.3 sellers per buyer. For n = 10, 25, 50 and 100 sellers,
99
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Valuation imprecision α
Av
er
ag
e
 
 
Average number of sellers that accept
Average number of buyers that accept
(a) Expected number of sellers versus buyers for
n = 10 sellers
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Valuation imprecision α
R
at
io
 s
el
le
rs
 v
er
su
s 
bu
ye
rs
 th
at
 a
cc
ep
t
 
 
n=5
n=10
n=25
n=50
n=100
(b) Ratio of sellers versus buyers
Fig. 18 – Properties of buyer and seller acceptance
the ratio is almost independent of imprecision and further stable as a function of n. The ratio
is approximately 1.4 sellers per buyer.
In summary, while the dealer applies an optimal fee structure, he can attract buyers and
sellers to his market. Furthermore, his oﬀer strategy is Pareto eﬃcient over the reverse auction
market. Applying optimal fee structure, the dealer’s proﬁt is positive. At last we ﬁnd that
his inventory level is bounded at a low level because the ratio of sellers per buyer that accept
his oﬀer is relatively stable at approximately 1.4 sellers per buyer.
From a buyer’s and a sellers’ perspective the Dealer’s Market is the dominant alternative
over the reverse auction, when the dealer is trustworthy and applies a moderate fee scheme.
To illustrate the above ﬁndings, the private bond placement example from section 2.5 is
further extended.
4.2 Example: Bond Placement by an Investment Banker
We continue the example from section 2.5 on page 90 and apply it to our theory. The
investors’ reserves prices are
(V1, V2, V3, V4, V5)= (2.5, 3, 4, 5, 5.5)mio.
As in section 2.5, the reserve value of the ﬁrm is 4.5% of the bond volume, that is e4.5mio.
Investors and the ﬁrm may now decide between negotiations within a double auction or
to consult an intermediary. Investors and the ﬁrm are aware of their common valuation
imprecision of 50%, as in section 2.5. Ex ante, each investor’s expected proﬁt from the double
auction is 2.24% according to proposition 2 on page 68. That proﬁt was calculated in table
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2 on page 83. According to proposition 5 on page 70, we calculate an expected ex ante proﬁt
of 15.99% for the ﬁrm when it initiates a double auction.
In order to compete with the double auction, the intermediary must choose his fees ade-
quately. These fees are calculated in table 3 on page 97. Accordingly, the intermediary needs
to charge fees −28.81% < fs < fb < −6.55% to investors and the ﬁrm. While he maintains
fees within these bounds, the ﬁrm and investors are ex ante in preference of the dealer.
In our example, the intermediary charges fees fs = −26% and fb = −16%. This means
that he oﬀers investors a coupon of volume e4mio(1 + fs) =e2.96mio. The ﬁrm is obliged
to pay e4mio(1 + fb) =e3.36mio at maturity. The ﬁrst investor accepts the intermediary’s
oﬀer, as it exceeds that investor’s reservation price. The ﬁrm accepts his oﬀer as well, because
it is below the ﬁrm’s reservation price.
In summary, the ﬁrst investor gains a coupon of volume e2.96mio, which represents a gain
of e0.46mio compared to her reserve value. The ﬁrm agrees to pay e3.36mio at maturity,
which is e1.14mio less than its maximum coupon volume. Finally, the intermediary generates
a gain of e0.40mio. Each party gains from the intermediaries strategy.
Compared to the example in section 2.5, the winning investor’s proﬁt is reduced from
e0.68mio in the double auction to e0.46mio from the intermediary’s strategy. However, the
investor is not aware of this fact. Ex ante, it is each investor’s best option to consult the
intermediary.
5 Conclusion
We have added imprecise valuation to a model of reverse auctions. In an auction, bidding
sellers and the initiating buyer are aware of their own valuation imprecision that results from
their inability of precise valuation. In case of a procurement auction, diﬀerent costs for the
procured good or service lead to diﬀerent reserve values. Due to valuation imprecision, each
bidding seller can not determine whether her valuation is high or low and how it compares
to the other sellers’ reservation prices. To achieve a positive proﬁt, each seller’s bid exceeds
that seller’s reserve value.
We proved when all sellers apply a multilateral optimal bidding strategy and they commit
to it, then the proﬁt of the seller-group is maximised. At the same time, that strategy
maximises the proﬁt of each seller. An increase in the seller-group’s size also increases the
group’s proﬁt. The optimal multilateral bidding strategy was proven to be unique.
A single seller proﬁts from breaking the commitment of the multilateral oﬀer strategy.
That is, when a seller knows that the other sellers play the optimal multilateral strategy,
then it is individually optimal to break that commitment and to apply an optimal unilateral
response strategy. While this strategy increases a seller’s individual proﬁt, it harms the other
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sellers.
There is a unique equilibrium bidding strategy. Its characterisation is that no seller can
proﬁt from applying a strategy that diﬀers from that equilibrium. Therefore it is a stable
strategy. In equilibrium all sellers pursue the same oﬀer strategy. However, it is not the most
eﬃcient strategy. In equilibrium, each seller’s proﬁt is lower than that under the multilateral
optimal bidding strategy. Furthermore, a greater number of sellers has negative eﬀect on
each seller’s proﬁt and on that of the seller-group. Both converge to zero for inﬁnitely many
sellers. While the equilibrium bidding strategy is stable, its consequences for the proﬁt of
the bidding sellers is negative. The sellers can increase their proﬁt by installing a mechanism
that ensures that all sellers commit to the multilateral optimal bidding strategy.
The sellers’ equilibrium bidding strategy is of beneﬁt for the buyer who initiates the
auction. In equilibrium, the average bid of a seller is lower. The average bid furthermore
decreases when more sellers bid in the auction. Consequently, the buyer’s proﬁt is positively
aﬀected by the sellers’ bidding equilibrium and the number of bidding sellers. When the
seller-group commits to their optimal bidding strategy, then the proﬁt of the buyer is lowest.
The model has testable implications. Consider the Industrial Revolution in the 18th and
early 19th century. Then, workers were not organised and the competition for jobs in the
labour force was high. As a result, each worker had to sell his time and labour for a lower
salary that his competitors. This process necessarily lead to extremely low wages. The rise
of labour unions and upcoming political support helped the labour force to ensure a better
coordination of their negotiations with an employer. Our model explains that an employer
was able to exploit the unorganised labour force. Further, our model implies that coordinated
negotiations with an employer are beneﬁcial for workers. In addition, the paper’s model may
be used to calculate a union’s optimal salary negotiation strategy.
A further application is the situation of crofters or producers of milk. Our model explains
that if they do not coordinate their price strategies, their proﬁt is lower than the proﬁt they
could achieve with coordinated pricing. The optimal price strategy can be calculated with
the formulas that the paper provides.
A market maker quotes bid and ask prices for the good or service. When the bid-ask
spread is positive, then his strategy is proﬁtable for him. We have shown that the market
maker can adjust his quotes such that the buyer and the sellers prefer the market maker’s
bid-ask prices over the reverse auction. Then the market maker is Pareto eﬃcient over the
reverse auction.
When there are n > 1 sellers and one buyer, then the dealer’s inventory needs to be
considered. This paper analysed the ratio of sellers per buyer that accept the dealer’s oﬀer.
When the dealer optimises that ratio, then the inventory level is suﬃciently bounded.
We presented an example to illustrate our theory. A ﬁrm that wants to issue a bond has
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the option to initiate a reverse auction, where interested investors bid the coupon payment
that they require the ﬁrm to pay. We showed that investors earn less when they do not
commit to their optimal bidding strategy. The ﬁrm that issues the bond gains more when
investors do not commit to a common bidding strategy. It was shown that an investment
banker that oﬀers intermediation services can successfully places the bond. His services are
beneﬁcial for all parties ex ante.
In our model, n ≥ 1 sellers bid in an auction that a buyer initiated. When the lowest
sellers’ oﬀer is below the buyer’s reservation price, then the auction is successful and the
good is traded at that price. Thus, ex post at the most one seller beneﬁts from that market
design. More generally, n ≥ 1 sellers oﬀer their goods to m ≥ 1 buyers. Consider for
instance the Amazon trading platform, where sellers disclose their oﬀer prices for a good.
Buyers sequentially arrive and buy that good at its lowest price, when a buyer’s reserve value
exceeds that lowest price. This is just one example of an extension of our model.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The cdf of min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) is given by
M(x) = P (min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) ≤ x) = 1−P (min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) > x)
= 1−P (Xi > x, i = 1, ..., n) = 1−P (X1 > x)n = 1−
(
x2 − x
x2 − x1
)n
.
The pdf is given by the ﬁrst derivative of M(x).
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof uses lemma 1, where the pdf of the minimum of the
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seller’s oﬀers min{S1, S2, ..., Sn} was established. The buyer’s deal success probability is
P(DB)(s) =
∫ s2
s1
1
∆sP(min{S1, S2, ..., Sn} ≤ x) dx
= 1∆s
∫ s2
ss1
1−
(
ss2 − x
s∆s
)n
dx
= 1∆s
(
(s2 − ss1)− 1
sn∆sn
[
− 1
n+ 1(ss2 − x)
n+1
]s2
ss1
)
= 1∆s
(
(s2 − ss1) + 1
sn∆sn(n+ 1)
(
(ss2 − s2)n+1 − (ss2 − ss1)n+1
))
= 1∆s
(
(s2 − ss1) + 1
sn∆sn(n+ 1)
(
(s2(s− 1))n+1 − (s∆s)n+1
))
= s2 − ss1∆s +
(s2(s− 1))n+1
sn∆sn+1(n+ 1) −
(s∆s)n+1
sn∆sn+1(n+ 1)
= s2 − ss1∆s +
s
n+ 1
(s2(s− 1)
s∆s
)n+1
− 1

The term
(
s2(s−1)
s∆s
)
is zero for s = 1 and one for s = s2/s1. Further,
0 ≤
(
s2(s− 1)
s∆s
)
≤ 1,
while the sellers’ oﬀer strategy is feasible, i.e. within the interval s ∈ [1, s2/s1]. Thus the
buyer’s deal probability converges either to zero (s ∈ [1, s2/s1), or is constant for s = s2/s1.
The factor s/(n + 1) converges to zero for n → ∞. As a result the buyer’s deal probability
converges to s2−ss1∆s for n→∞. In proposition 8 a more general proof for a seller’s proﬁt will
be shown. In order to avoid redundancy, we refer to that proof here. By allowing s′ = s, a
single seller’s deal probability under multilateral strategy is obtained. Considering n → ∞
shows that the seller’s deal probability converges to zero.
Proof of Proposition 2. Seemu¨ller (2013) established the expected proﬁt of a seller in a
bilateral monopoly. In a double auction the buyer’s proﬁt is not aﬀected by his oﬀer. He thus
has no motivation to adjust his oﬀer on the platform. The buyer’s behaviour thus is analogous
to the case of bilateral monopoly with a rational seller in Seemu¨ller (2013). Further, the deal
price in the double auction is given by the lowest oﬀer of the sellers. A single seller’s expected
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proﬁt is thus given by
E (PS) (s) =
1
s∆s
∫ ss2
ss1
1Deal (x− x/s)) dx
= s− 1
s2∆s
∫ ss2
ss1
P (x ≤ min (S2, S3, ..., Sn) , x ≤ B) x dx
= s− 1
s2∆s
∫ s2
ss1
(
ss2 − x
s∆s
)n−1 b2 − x
∆b x dx =:
(s− 1) (A(s2)− A(ss1))
sn+1 ∆sn+1 ,
where A is the primative of (ss2 − x)n−1 (b2−x) x. The probability that a certain seller’s oﬀer
is the lowest is obtained from lemma 1. Also note that the upper bound of the integral is s2.
That is, when a seller’s oﬀer exceeds s2, then the buyer’s reservation price will be lower than
that oﬀer with probability 1.
All sellers have the same oﬀer strategy. It follows that the distribution of the sellers’
oﬀers is identical. Thus ex ante the probability for a seller to make the lowest oﬀer is 1/n.
The sellers’ expectations on placing the lowest bid are homogeneous ex ante. Therefore the
expected proﬁt of all sellers is the sum of the expected proﬁt of a single seller.
Proof of Proposition 3. When the number of bidding sellers increases, then the lowest
reservation price in the group converges to the lowest valuation possible, which is s1. Assume
the lowest reservation price is above s1. Then, at some point, a seller with reservation price
below the currently lowest reservation price will join the seller-group. This argument is valid
for all valuations that exceed s1. Thus the sellers’ lowest reservation price converges to s1
for the number of sellers n → ∞. The buyer buys from the seller with the lowest oﬀer. All
sellers pursue multilateral oﬀer strategy s. Therefore the seller with the lowest reservation
price places the lowest oﬀer ss1. All other sellers do not sell their good. The seller with lowest
reservation price makes the proﬁt ss1 − s1, that is the diﬀerence between her oﬀer price and
her reservation price. The probability that the buyer’s valuation exceeds the seller’s oﬀer is
s2−ss1
∆s . As the buyer’s and the sellers’ valuations are independent, the expected proﬁt of the
seller-group is E (S) (s) = 1∆s(s2 − ss1)(ss1 − s1) = s1∆s(s2 − ss1)(s − 1). The optimal oﬀer
strategy s is found by solving the ﬁrst order condition.
∂E (S) (s)
∂s
= s1∆s(s2 − ss1 − s1(s− 1)) = 0
if and only if s = 1/s1 = 1/(1− α), which is a maximum of the sellers’ proﬁt.
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Proof of Theorem 1. We rearrange the formula for a seller’s expected proﬁt.
E (PS) (s) =
1
∆s
∫ s2
s1
1Deal (xs− x) dx
= s− 1∆s
∫ s2/s
s1
P (sx < min{sS2, ..., sSn}, xs < B) x dx
= s− 1∆s
∫ s2/s
s1
P (x < min{S2, ..., Sn}) s2 − sx∆s x dx
= s− 1∆s2
∫ s2/s
s1
P (x < min{S2, ..., Sn}) (s2 − sx) x dx.
The probability P (x < min{S2, ..., Sn}) in the term above is independent of s. To simplify
the notation, that probability will be referred to as P(x) within this proof. That is, we have
a formula for a seller’s expected proﬁt. That is,
E (PS) (s) =
s− 1
∆s2
∫ s2/s
s1
P(x)(s2 − sx) x dx
Feasible oﬀer strategies are deﬁned on the interval s ∈ [1, s2/s1]. A seller’s expected
proﬁt is zero for s ∈ {1, s2/s1} and positive otherwise. Furthermore the term for the seller’s
expected proﬁt is continuous. According to Rolle there is at least one proﬁt maximum on the
interval s ∈ (1, s2/s1). To prove that this maximum is unique, we take the ﬁrst derivative of
the seller’s proﬁt and show that its root is unique. By the Leibnitz formula, the ﬁrst derivative
of a seller’s expected proﬁt is
∂E (PS) (s)
∂s
= 1∆s2
(∫ s2/s
s1
P(x)(s2 − sx) x dx+ (s− 1)(−
∫ s2/s
s1
P(x)x2 dx)
)
= 1∆s2
(∫ s2/s
s1
P(x)x ((1− 2s)x+ s2) dx
)
.
The factor in the integrand that is dependent on the sellers’ oﬀer strategy is (1− 2s)x + s2.
It is a polynomial of ﬁrst order. The second factor is P(x)x. That term is positive and
independent of the oﬀer strategy s.
A necessary condition of the optimum is that ∂E(PS)(s)
∂s
is zero. As the factor P(x)x is
positive, it is necessary that the factor (1−2s)x+s2 is negative within the integration bounds
[s1, s2/s]. The root of that factor is x0 = s2/(2s−1). It is the upper integration bound, when
s = 1. For s = 1/s1, its root is given by the lower integration bound. Therefore s = 1/s1 is
an upper bound for the seller’s optimal oﬀer strategy.
The ﬁrst derivative of the sellers’ proﬁt is positive in the integration bounds [s1, x0] and
negative on the integration interval [x0, s2/s]. The ﬁrst factor of the integrand is independent
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of s. The second factor is decreasing in the sellers’ oﬀer strategy s. Furthermore, the root
x0 is decreasing in the sellers’ oﬀer strategy. As a result, the integral decreases in s on the
integration interval [s1, x0]. On the interval [x0, s2/s] the integral is zero for s ∈ {1, s2/s1}
and negative otherwise. Due to its continuity and Rolle, it has one extremal point, where it
reaches its minimum.
The above arguments show that the ﬁrst derivative of the sellers’ expected proﬁt is de-
creasing in the sellers’ oﬀer strategy s. That is, until the minimum on the ﬁrst derivative is
achieved. That minimum is lower than zero because the integral starts positive with s = 1
and by Rolle there must be a root because the seller’s expected proﬁt has a maximum. When
the ﬁrst derivative increases after the minimum, there can not be another root. For s = s2/s1,
the derivative is zero. If there were another root s∗, then is could not be zero for s = s2/s1,
because it is increasing on [s∗, s2/s1]. As a result, the root of the derivative of a seller’s
proﬁt is unique. Therefore there is exactly one oﬀer strategy that maximises a seller’s proﬁt
unilaterally.
Proof of Proposition 4. First it will be shown that E (PS) is strictly decreasing in the
number of sellers. Proposition 1 established the formula for expected proﬁt under multilateral
Level 1 rationality. We rearrange the formula and obtain
E (PS) (s) =
s− 1
sn+1∆sn
∫ s2
ss1
(ss2 − x)n−1 b2 − x∆b x dx =
s− 1
s2∆s
∫ s2
ss1
(
ss2 − x
s∆s
)n−1 b2 − x
∆b x dx.
The only remaining term that is dependent on n is
(
ss2−x
sn∆s
)n−1
. Note that ss1 < x < s2, which
allows to establish the inequality
0 <
(
ss2 − x
s∆s
)n−1
=
(
ss2 − x
ss2 − ss1
)n−1
< qn−1, where 0 < q < 1.
qn is strictly decreasing in n while 0 < q < 1. Therefore the only term that is dependent
on n is strictly decreasing in the number of sellers. Additionally, the integral is positive. In
summary, a seller’s expected proﬁt is decreasing in the number of bidding sellers. Analogous
arguments hold for a strictly increasing proﬁt as a function of valuation imprecision.
Proof of Proposition 5. This setting is a modiﬁcation of a result from Seemu¨ller (2013).
By allowing k = 0 and introducing n sellers, we calculate the formula for the buyer’s expected
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proﬁt. The pdf of the lowest sellers’ oﬀer thereby is obtained from lemma 1:
E(PB)(s) =
∫ s2
ss1
m(x)P(x ≤ B)E(PB|x ≤ B) dx
=
∫ s2
ss1
n(ss2 − x)n−1
sn∆sn
s2 − x
∆s
1
s2 − x
∫ s2
x
y − xdy dx
= n2sn∆sn+1
∫ s2
ss1
(ss2 − x)n−1(x− s2)2 dx
= n2sn∆sn+1 (B(s2)−B(ss1)) ,
where the function A is the primative of the integral, given by
B(x) = 2 s2 (s s2 − x)
n+1 (s− 1)
n+ 1 −
(s s2 − x)n+2
n+ 2 −
s22 (s s2 − x)n (s− 1)2
n
= (ss2 − x)n
(
2 s2 (s s2 − x) (s− 1)
n+ 1 −
(s s2 − x)2
n+ 2 −
s22 (s− 1)2
n
)
.
Proof of Proposition 6. In the limit of inﬁnitely many sellers, there is a seller with the
lowest oﬀer s1s. Then the buyer’s expected proﬁt is
E(B)(s) = 1/∆s
∫ s2
ss1
(x− ss1) dx
= 1/∆s
(
s22 − s2s21/2− ss1(s2 − ss1)
)
= (s2 − ss1)2/2/∆s.
Proof of Proposition 7. First it will be shown that the buyer’s expected proﬁt decreases
for an increasing oﬀer strategy s. Proposition 5 showed that the buyer’s expected proﬁt is
E(PB)(s) =
n
2sn∆sn+1 (B(s2)−B(ss1)) ,
where B(x) is the primary of the integrand (ss2 − x)n−1(s2 − x)2. The integrand is positive
and strictly decreasing (as a function of x) within the integration borders ss1 ≤ x ≤ s2.
Thus B(x) is strictly increasing and positive within these bounds. Therefore the diﬀerence
B(s2) − B(ss1) is strictly decreasing in s, while 1 ≤ s ≤ s2/s1 holds. Therefore the second
factor of the buyer’s proﬁt, that is B(s2)−B(ss1), is decreasing in the sellers’ oﬀer strategy.
The ﬁrst factor n2sn∆sn+1 =
1
sn
n
2∆sn+1 obviously is decreasing in s, while s is within the feasible
region. Combining both arguments shows that the buyer’s expected proﬁt is decreasing in
the sellers’ oﬀer strategy.
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It remains to be prove that the buyer’s expected proﬁt is increasing in the number of
sellers n. The proof will be lead verbally. When an additional seller bids in the auction,
then there is a positive probability that this seller places a bid that is lower than all previous
bids. If the previous lowest oﬀer exceeds the buyer’s reservation price, then the lowest bid
that an additional seller places directly increases the buyer’s proﬁt. When the previous lowest
bid exceeds the buyer’s reservation price, then there is a positive probability that the buyer
accepts to buy at the bid price that an additional seller places. Therefore an additional seller
always increases a buyer’s expected proﬁt.
Proof of Proposition 8. We calculate the probability that the seller with the oﬀer strategy
s1/s2 ≤ s′ ≤ s2/s1 wins the auction.
P(DS)(s, s′) = P(S ′ ≤ min(S1, S2, ..., Sn−1), S ′ ≤ B) = 1
s′∆s
∫ ss2
ss1
1Deal dx
= 1
s′∆s
∫ ss2
ss1
P (x ≤ min (S1, S2, ..., Sn−1) , x ≤ B) dx
= 1
s′∆s
∫ s2
ss1
(
ss2 − x
s∆s
)n−1 b2 − x
∆b dx+ 1{s
′<s}
1
s′∆s
∫ ss1
s′s1
b2 − x
∆b dx
= 1
s′sn−1∆sn+1
∫ s2
max(ss1,s′s1)
(ss2 − x)n−1 (s2 − x) dx+ 1{s′<s} 1
s′∆s2
∫ ss1
s′s1
s2 − x dx.
The primative of f(x) = (ss2 − x)n−1 (s2 − x) is given by
F (x) = (ss2 − x)
n (−ns2 − s2 + ss2 + nx)
n (n+ 1) .
This observation ends the proof for the case s1/s2 ≤ s′ ≤ s2/s1. The remaining cases are
obvious.
Proof of Proposition 9. Proposition 1 calculated the formula for the buyer’s deal proba-
bility when the sellers’ oﬀer strategy is multilateral. Assume ﬁrst s′ ≤ s. Then
x ≤ s′s1 s′s1 < x ≤ ss1 ss1 < x ≤ s2
P (x < smin{S1, S2, ..., Sn−1}) 1 1 < 1
P (x < s′Sn) 1 < 1 < 1
With analogous steps as in the proof of proposition 1 and using lemma 1 and the inde-
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pendence of the sellers’ oﬀers we obtain the desired result:
P(DB)(s, s′) = P (B ≥ smin{S1, S2, ..., Sn−1} ∪ B ≥ s′Sn)
= 1−P (B < smin{S1, S2, ..., Sn−1} ∩ B < s′Sn)
= 1− 1∆s
∫ s2
s1
P (x < smin{S1, S2, ..., Sn−1} ∩ x < s′Sn) dx
= 1− 1∆s
∫ s2
s1
P (x < smin{S1, S2, ..., Sn−1})P (x < s′Sn) dx
= 1− s
′s1 − s1
∆s −
1
∆s
∫ ss1
s′s1
P (x < s′Sn) dx
− 1∆s
∫ s2
ss1
P (x < smin{S1, S2, ..., Sn−1})P (x < s′Sn dx)
= 1− s1(s
′ − 1)
∆s −
1
∆s
∫ ss1
s′s1
s′s2 − x
s′∆s dx
− 1∆s
∫ s2
ss1
(
ss2 − x
s∆s
)n−1 s′s2 − x
s′∆s dx
= s2 − s1s
′
∆s −
1
∆s2s′
(
s′s2s1(s− s′)− s
2s21 − s′2s21
2
)
−
∫ s2
ss1 (ss2 − x)n−1 (s′s2 − x) dx
∆sn+1sn−1s′
= s2 − s1s
′
∆s −
s1(s− s′)
∆s2s′ (s
′s2 − s1(s+ s′)/2)− G(s2)−G(ss1)∆sn+1sn−1s′n(n+ 1) ,
where
G(x) := (s s2 − x)n (nx+ s s2 − s2 s′ − n s2 s′).
Now let s′ > s. Then
P (DB) (s, s′) = 1− 1∆s
∫ s2
s1
P (x < smin{S1, S2, ..., Sn−1})P (x < s′Sn) dx
= 1− ss1 − s1∆s −
∫ s′s1
ss1 P (x < smin{S1, S2, ..., Sn−1}) dx
∆s
− 1∆s
∫ s2
s′s1
P (x < smin{S1, S2, ..., Sn−1})P (x < s′Sn) dx
= s2 − s1s∆s −
∫ s′s1
ss1 (ss2 − x)n−1 dx
∆snsn−1 −
G(s2)−G(s′s1)
∆sn+1sn−1s′n(n+ 1)
= s2 − s1s∆s −
(ss2 − ss1)n − (ss2 − s′s1)n
∆snsn−1n −
G(s2)−G(s′s1)
∆sn+1sn−1s′n(n+ 1)
= s2 − s1s∆s −
s
n
+ (ss2 − s
′s1)n
∆snsn−1n −
G(s2)−G(s′s1)
∆sn+1sn−1s′n(n+ 1) .
The case s2/s1 < s′ is obvious.
Proof of Proposition 10. Let the sellers’ oﬀer strategy be s and one seller’s oﬀer strategy
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be s′. Then that seller’s expected proﬁt is
E (PS) (s, s′) =
1
s′∆s
∫ s′s2
s′s1
1Deal (x− x/s′) dx = s
′ − 1
s′2∆s
∫ s′s2
s′s1
P(Deal) x dx
= s
′ − 1
s′2∆s
∫ s′s2
s′s1
P (x ≤ min(S2, S2, ..., Sn), x ≤ B) x dx
= s
′ − 1
s′2∆s
(
1s′<s
∫ ss1
s′s1
b2 − x
∆b x dx+
∫ b2
max(s,s′)s1
(
ss2 − x
s∆s
)n−1 b2 − x
∆b x dx
)
= s
′ − 1
s′2∆s
(
1s′<s
∫ ss1
s′s1
b2 − x
∆b x dx+
1
sn−1∆sn
∫ s2
max(s,s′)s1
(ss2 − x)n−1 (b2 − x) x dx
)
= s
′ − 1
s′2∆s
(
1s′<s
2 s31 (s
′3 − s3) + 3 s21s2(s2 − s′2)
6∆s +
A(s2)− A(max(s, s′)s1)
sn−1∆sn
)
.
The primative A is deﬁned as in proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 11. Let m(x) be the pdf of smin{S1, S2, ..., Sn−1} and f(x) be the
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pdf of s′Sn. Then
E(PB)(s, s′) =
∫ ss2
ss1
∫ s′s2
s′s1
m(y)f(x)P(B > min(x, y))E(PB|B > min(x, y)) dxdy
=
∫ ss2
ss1
∫ s′s2
s′s1
m(y)f(x)1x≤yP(B > x)E(PB|B > x) dxdy
+
∫ ss2
ss1
∫ s′s2
s′s1
m(y)f(x)1x>yP(B > y)E(PB|B > y) dxdy
=
∫ s2
max(ss1,s′s1)
∫ y
s′s1
m(y)f(x)P(B > x)E(PB|B > x) dxdy
+
∫ s2
ss1
∫ s2
max(y,s′s1)
m(y)f(x)P(B > y)E(PB|B > y) dxdy
=
∫ s2
max(ss1,s′s1)
∫ y
s′s1
(n− 1)(ss2 − y)
n−2
(s∆s)n−1
1
s′∆s
s2 − x
∆s
s2 − x
2 dxdy
+
∫ s2
ss1
∫ s2
max(y,s′s1)
(n− 1)(ss2 − y)
n−2
(s∆s)n−1
1
s′∆s
s2 − y
∆s
s2 − y
2 dxdy
= n− 12∆sn+1sn−1s′
(∫ s2
max(ss1,s′s1)
∫ y
s′s1
(ss2 − y)n−2(s2 − x)2 dxdy
)
+ n− 12∆sn+1sn−1s′
(∫ s2
ss1
∫ s2
max(y,s′s1)
(ss2 − y)n−2(s2 − y)2 dxdy
)
= n− 16∆sn+1sn−1s′
(∫ s2
max(ss1,s′s1)
(ss2 − y)n−2
(
(s2 − s′s1)3 − (s2 − y)3
)
dy
)
+ n− 12∆sn+1sn−1s′
(∫ s2
ss1
(s2 −max(y, s′s1))(ss2 − y)n−2(s2 − y)2 dy
)
s′≤s= n− 16∆sn+1sn−1s′
∫ s2
ss1
(ss2 − y)n−2(s2 − s′s1)3 − (ss2 − y)n−2(s2 − y)3 dy
+ n− 12∆sn+1sn−1s′
∫ s2
ss1
(ss2 − y)n−2(s2 − y)3 dy
= (n− 1)(s2 − s
′s1)3
6∆sn+1sn−1s′
∫ s2
ss1
(ss2 − y)n−2 dy
− n− 16∆sn+1sn−1s′
∫ s2
ss1
(ss2 − y)n−2(s2 − y)3 dy
+ n− 12∆sn+1sn−1s′
∫ s2
ss1
(ss2 − y)n−2(s2 − y)3 dy
= (s2 − s
′s1)3
6∆sn+1sn−1s′
(
(s∆s)n−1 − (s2(s− 1))n−1
)
+ (n− 1)(H(s2)−H(ss1))3∆sn+1sn−1s′ .
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Now let s < s′ ≤ s2/s1. Following analogous steps as in the ﬁrst case we get
E(PB)(s, s′) =
n− 1
6∆sn+1sn−1s′
(∫ s2
s′s1
(ss2 − y)n−2
(
(s2 − s′s1)3 − (s2 − y)3
)
dy
)
+ n− 12∆sn+1sn−1s′
(∫ s′s2
ss1
(s2 − s′s1)(ss2 − y)n−2(s2 − y)2 dy
)
+ n− 12∆sn+1sn−1s′
(∫ s2
s′s1
(ss2 − y)n−2(s2 − y)3 dy
)
= (n− 1)(s2 − s
′s1)3
6∆sn+1sn−1s′
(∫ s2
s′s1
(ss2 − y)n−2 dy
)
− n− 16∆sn+1sn−1s′
(∫ s2
s′s1
(ss2 − y)n−2(s2 − y)3 dy
)
+ (n− 1)(s2 − s
′s1)
2∆sn+1sn−1s′
(∫ s′s1
ss1
(ss2 − y)n−2(s2 − y)2 dy
)
+ n− 12∆sn+1sn−1s′
(∫ s2
s′s1
(ss2 − y)n−2(s2 − y)3 dy
)
= (s2 − s
′s1)3
6∆sn+1sn−1s′
(
(ss2 − s′s1)n−1 − (s2(s− 1))n−1
)
+ (n− 1)(H(s2)−H(s
′s1))
3∆sn+1sn−1s′
+ (n− 1)(s2 − s
′s1)(I(s′s1)− I(ss1))
2∆sn+1sn−1s′ .
The primatives H and I are deﬁned as in the proposition.
Proof of Theorem 2. First it will be shown that the unilateral oﬀer strategy in its optimum
does not exceed the optimal multilateral strategy, i.e. s2opt ≤ s1opt. To do so, we rearrange the
formulas for the sellers’ expected proﬁt. First, the formula for the expected proﬁt of a seller
is calculated, when all sellers pursue multilateral oﬀer strategy s ∈ [1, s2/s1]. As all sellers
have the same expected proﬁt, we refer to an arbitrary seller as seller 1. Before the formula
is introduced, we deﬁne the event
A(s) := ”Seller 1 with oﬀer strategy s places winning bid”
Then the expected proﬁt of that seller is
E(PS1)(s) = P(A(s))E(Proﬁt of seller 1 with oﬀer strategy s|A(s))(s).
Note that the probability in the formula above deceases when the sellers increase their oﬀer
strategy s. In contrast, when a seller places the winning bid, then her expected proﬁt increases
when her oﬀer strategy s was higher.
Secondly, we rearrange the formula of a seller’s expected proﬁt, when that seller places
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her bid unilaterally with strategy s′ ∈ [1, s2/s1], while the other sellers pursue multilateral
oﬀer strategy s ∈ [1, s2/s1]. To simplify that formula, we deﬁne the event
B(s, s′) :=”The unilateral bidding seller with oﬀer strategy s′ places the winning bid.
The other sellers pursue multilateral oﬀer strategy s.”
Then the expected proﬁt of the unilaterally bidding seller is
E(PS)(s, s′) = P(B(s, s′))E(Proﬁt of seller with unilateral oﬀer strategy s′ |B(s, s′))(s, s′).
Note that the probability in the formula above deceases when the unilaterally bidding seller
increases her oﬀer strategy s′. In contrast, when that seller places the winning bid, then her
expected proﬁt increases when her oﬀer strategy s′ was higher.
When we assume that a seller placed the winning bid and then calculate her expected
proﬁt as a function of her oﬀer strategy, then this expectation is independent of the other
sellers’ oﬀer strategies. That is to say, that the other sellers’ oﬀer strategies only change the
probability that a player places the winning bid. Thus, the expectations in both formulas
above are equal. That is,
E(Proﬁt of seller with unilateral oﬀer strategy s′ |B(s, s′))(s, s′)
= E(Proﬁt of seller 1 with oﬀer strategy s′|A(s′))(s′).
When we analyse the probabilities in the formulas above, we conclude that
P(B(s, s′)) < P(A(s′)),
while s < s′. That is, when the unilaterally bidding seller places a higher average oﬀer than
the other sellers (s′ > s), then that seller’s probability to win the auction is lower than a
multilaterally bidding seller’s chance to do so.
When all sellers pursue optimal multilateral oﬀer strategy s1opt, then this strategy generates
the highest proﬁt for each seller. Now assume that a unilaterally bidding seller chooses an
oﬀer strategy that exceeds the multilateral strategy. That is s′ > s1opt. Then that seller’s
probability to win the auction is lower than the chance of a multilaterally bidding seller.
Further, her expected proﬁt when she wins the auction is lower than if she placed her bid
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with strategy s′ = s1opt. That is, when s′ > s1opt, then the unilaterally bidding seller’s proﬁt is
E(PS)(s1opt, s′) = P(B(s1opt, s′))E(Proﬁt of seller with unilateral oﬀer strategy s′ |B(s1opt, s′))(s1opt, s′)
= P(B(s1opt, s′))E(Proﬁt of seller 1 with oﬀer strategy s′|A(s′))(s′)
< P(A(s′))E(Proﬁt of seller 1 with oﬀer strategy s′|A(s′))(s′)
= E(PS1)(s′) < E(PS1)(s1opt).
The inequation shows that a unilateral bidding seller can not increase her proﬁt when she
has an oﬀer strategy that exceeds the optimal strategy s1opt that the other sellers pursue. In
summary, a unilaterally bidding seller has a lower expected proﬁt when her oﬀer strategy
exceeds that of the multilaterally bidding sellers. As a result, an optimal level 2 oﬀer strategy
must not exceed the optimal level 1 strategy. That is, s2opt ≤ s1opt.
Next, we show that the optimal level 2 strategy is unique. As the optimal strategy is
within (1, s1opt], the further analysis will exclusively consider that case. For s′ ≤ s, the level 2
bidding seller’s expected proﬁt is
E (PS) (s, s′) =
s′ − 1
s′2∆s
(
1s′<s
2 s31 (s
′3 − s3) + 3 s21s2(s2 − s
′2)
6∆s +
1
sn−1∆sn (ss2 − y)
n−1 (b2 − y) y(s2 − ss1)
)
= (s
′ − 1)s21
6 s′2∆s2
(
1s′<s
(
2 s1 (s
′3 − s3) + 3 s2(s2 − s′2)
)
+ 6
sn−1∆sn−1s21
(ss2 − y)n−1 (b2 − y) y(s2 − ss1)
)
= c1
(s′ − 1)
s′2
(
1s′<s
(
2 s1 (s
′3 − s3) + 3 s2(s2 − s′2)
)
+ c2
)
,
where c1 and c2 are positive constants as functions of the unilateral oﬀer strategy s′ given by
c1 := s21/∆s2/6
c2 :=
6
sn−1∆sn−1s21
(ss2 − y)n−1 (b2 − y) y(s2 − ss1).
The expected proﬁt for s′ = 1 is zero. The expected proﬁt for s′ = s is greater zero. This
case represents multilateral level 1 optimization strategy which is positive while s > 1.
The ﬁrst derivative of expected proﬁt in unilateral level 2 optimization is
∂E (PS) (s, s′)
∂s′
= c1
(
2 c2 − c2 s′ + 6 s2 s2 − 4 s3 s1 − 2 s1 s′3 + 4 s1 s′4 − 3 s2 s′3 − 3 s2 s2 s′ + 2 s3 s1 s′
)
s′3
= c1
(4 s1) s′4 + (−2 s1 − 3 s2) s′3 +
(
s1 s3 2− s2 s2 3− c2
)
s′ − (s1 s3 4− s2 s2 6− 2 c2)
s′3
.
The second derivative as a function of s′ is
115
∂2E (PS) (s, s′)
∂2s′
= c1
(4 s1) s′4 + (−s1 s3 4 + s2 s2 6 + 2 c2) s′ + (s1 s3 12− s2 s2 18− 6 c2)
s′4 .
The second derivatives is zero if and only if
0 = 2 s1 s′4 +
(
3 s2 s2 − 2 s3 s1 + c2
)
s′ − 9 s2 s2 + 6 s3 s1 − 3 c2
=: as′4 + bs′ + c,
where a := 2s1, b := 3 s2 s2 − 2 s3 s1 + c2 and c := −9 s2 s2 + 6 s3 s1 − 3 c2. As s2 > 0, a > 0.
Furthermore b > 0 because 3s2s2 − 2s3s1 > 3s2s1 − 2s3s1 = s1s2(3− 2s) > 0, while s < 3/2.
Assume c ≥ 0. Then as′4+bs′+c > 0 while s′ > 0. Then the second derivative has no positive
roots. Assume c < 0. Then as′4 + bs′ + c has exactly one positive root, because as′4 > 0 and
bs′ are positive and increasing in s′. In this case the second derivative therefore has exactly
one root. Therefore for s′ > 0 and thus all s′ in the feasible region 1 ≤ s′ < s, the second
derivative has at the most one root. Therefore there is exactly one maximum of the expected
proﬁt in 1 ≤ s′ ≤ s1opt.
Proof of Proposition 12. Theorem 2 showed that s2opt ≤ s1opt holds. The unilateral bidding
seller places a lower bid than the other sellers on average. This lower bid has positive eﬀect
on the buyer’s expected proﬁt. This eﬀect can be observed from buyer’s expected proﬁt as
a function of the bidding strategies, that was introduced in proposition 11. That function is
increasing when the oﬀer strategy decreases.
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume the sellers’ multilateral strategy is s = s2/s1. Then each
seller’s expected proﬁt is zero. Then a single seller may pursue some strategy s′ < s to gain
a positive expected proﬁt. Therefore at the level 3 optimum, the optimal sellers’ multilateral
strategy is lower than s2/s1. For the multilateral strategy s to be optimal level 3, i.e. no seller
beneﬁts by pursuing the unilateral strategy s′ ̸= s, it must hold that the multilateral strategy
s is the maximum in level 2 optimization. This means that ∂E(PS)(s,s′)
∂s′ (s, s) = 0 must hold.
Proposition 10 introduced the formula for the expected proﬁt of a seller with a unilateral
strategy s′, while the other sellers pursue strategy s. This formula was rewritten in the proof
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of theorem 2 and is of great value in this proof.
∂E(PS)(s, s′)
∂s′
(s, s) = 6 s
1−n y (s2 − s s1) (s s2 − y)n−1 (s2 − s1)1−n (s2 − y)
s2 s12
− (6 s s2 − 6 s
2 s1) (s− 1)
s2
− 12 s
1−n y (s2 − s s1) (s s2 − y)n−1 (s2 − s1)1−n (s2 − y) (s− 1)
s3 s12
= 6 y (s2 − s s1) (s s2 − y)
n−1 (s2 − y)
∆sn−1sn+1 s12
− 6s (s2 − s s1) (s− 1)
s2
− 12 y (s2 − s s1) (s s2 − y)
n−1 (s2 − y) (s− 1)
sn+2∆sn−1s12
,
is zero if
0 = y (s s2 − y)
n−1 (s2 − y)
∆sn−1sn+1 s12
− s (s− 1)
s2
− 2y (s s2 − y)
n−1 (s2 − y) (s− 1)
sn+2∆sn−1s12
⇐⇒ 0 = sy (s s2 − y)n−1 (s2 − y)− sn+1 (s− 1)∆sn−1s21 − 2y (s s2 − y)n−1 (s2 − y) (s− 1)
⇐⇒ 0 = y(s2 − y)(s s2 − y)n−1 (s− 2(s− 1))− sn+1 (s− 1)∆sn−1s21
⇐⇒ 0 = y(s2 − y)(s s2 − y)n−1 (2− s)− sn+1 (s− 1)∆sn−1s21.
To keep the notation clearer, the last term is deﬁned as f(s). Note that f(1) > 0. Assume the
derivative of f as a function of s is negative. Then there is at the most one s > 1, such that
f(s) = 0 can hold. This implies that the ﬁrst derivative of the expected proﬁt ∂E(PS)(s,s′)
∂s′ (s, s)
has at the most one root, which means that there is at the most one maximum. In theorem
2 it was shown that there is a maximum. Thus there is exactly one multilateral strategy s,
such that unilateral optimization s′ is not preferable compared to multilateral optimization.
117
If remains to be shown that f ′(s) < 0, while 1 ≤ s ≤ s2/s1.
∂f
∂s
= y(s2 − y)
(
s2(n− 1)(ss2 − y)n−2(s− 2)− (ss2 − y)n−1
)
−∆sn−1s21 ((n+ 1)sn(s− 1) + sn)
= y(s2 − y)(ss2 − y)n−2 (s2(n− 1)(s− 2)− (ss2 − y))−∆sn−1s21sn ((n+ 1)(s− 1) + 1)
≤ y(s2 − y)(ss2 − y)n−2 (s2(n− 1)(s− 2)− (ss2 − y))
− (s2 − y)(ss2 − y)n−2sn ((n+ 1)(s− 1) + 1)
= (s2 − y)(ss2 − y)n−2 (y (s2(n− 1)(s− 2)− (ss2 − y))− sn ((n+ 1)(s− 1) + 1))
= (s2 − y)(ss2 − y)n−2
(
s2nsy − 2s2ny − s2sy + 2s2y − ss2y + y2 − nsn+1 + nsn − sn+1
)
= (s2 − y)(ss2 − y)n−2 (ss2y(n− 2)− 2s2y(n− 1) + sn(−ns+ 1− s))
= (s2 − y)(ss2 − y)n−2 (s2y(sn− 2s− 2n+ 2) + sn(−ns+ 1− s))
= (s2 − y)(ss2 − y)n−2
s2y( n (s− 2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ 2 (1− s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
) + sn (−ns+ 1− s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
.
 < 0
The derivative is negative and therefore there is exactly one optimum level 3. It remains to be
shown that the level 3 optimisation leads to a Nash equilibrium. Assume all sellers optimise
their strategy multilateral level 1. Then each seller can optimise her oﬀer strategy, given the
multilateral strategy of the remaining sellers. Thus there is no equilibrium. This statement is
true unless unilateral optimisation of a single seller leads towards the same optimal strategy
as a multilateral oﬀer strategy. This is characterised by level 3 optimisation. In this case
no seller beneﬁts from applying a unilateral strategy unequal to the multilateral strategy.
Therefore level 3 optimisation is an equilibrium strategy.
At last, it will be shown that for the equilibrium strategy s3opt ≤ s2opt holds: Assume the
following proposition (p) holds: ”The optimal level 2 response strategy s2opt as a function of
the other sellers’ multilateral strategy s is increasing in the multilateral strategy”. Let now
s3opt > s
1
opt. Then the expected proﬁt of the seller with the unilateral strategy s2opt increases
by applying unilateral strategy. Thus this case is not possible, as the multilateral strategy
exceeds its optimal response strategy s2opt. Let s2opt < s3opt < s1opt. Then the optimal level 2
response strategy to the multilateral strategy s3opt is lower than the optimal response strategy
to s1opt. Therefore s3opt can not be a Nash equilibrium. At last, just the case s3opt ≤ s2opt
remains to be possible. Finally proposition (p) remains to be shown: Theorem 2 showed
E(PS)(s, 1) = 0 and E(PS)(s, s) ≥ 0 and E(PS)(s, s′) > 0 for s′ ∈ (1, s) (while s ̸= 1). It
further was shown that ∂2E(PS)(s,s′)
∂2s′ (s, s
′) < 0. Then just one maximum exists. If the expected
proﬁt’s ﬁrst derivative is furthermore decreasing in the multilateral strategy s, then the level
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2 optimum also decreases with s′ (and thus increases in s):
∂E(PS)(s, s′)
∂s′
= c1
s′3
(
s3(2s1s′ − 4s1)− s2(s2s′ + 6s2) + c
)
.
The addends (2s1s′− 4s1) and −(s2s′+6s2) dependent on s are both negative. The expected
proﬁt’s ﬁrst derivative is decreasing in s as all powers of s are positive while s is positive.
Thus proposition (p) and therefore the theorem holds.
Proof of Proposition 13. In theorem 3, the necessary condition
0 = y (s s2 − y)
n−1 (s2 − y)
∆sn−1sn+1 s12
− s (s− 1)
s2
− 2y (s s2 − y)
n−1 (s2 − y) (s− 1)
sn+2∆sn−1s12
was established for an oﬀer strategy s to be optimal level 3. The ﬁrst and third addend
converges to zero for n→∞. That is,
y (s s2 − y)n−1 (s2 − y)
∆sn−1sn+1 s12
− s (s− 1)
s2
− 2y (s s2 − y)
n−1 (s2 − y) (s− 1)
sn+2∆sn−1s12
n→∞→ −s (s− 1)
s2
.
The limit − s(s−1)
s2 is zero for s = 1. Therefore the optimal oﬀer strategy is s
3
opt = 1.
In proposition 1 the expected proﬁt of a seller under multilateral strategy s was calculated.
That proﬁt is
E (PS) (s) =
(s− 1) ( A(s2)− A(ss1) )
sn+1 ∆sn+1 .
This formula shows that the oﬀer strategy s = 1 generates a proﬁt of 0 for a seller.
Proof of Proposition 14. Proposition 13 showed that the optimal level 3 oﬀer strategy in
the limit is s3opt = 1. In proposition 2 the seller-group proﬁt under multilateral oﬀer strategy
was calculated. That formula is
E (S) (s) = n(s− 1) ( A(s2)− A(ss1) )
sn+1 ∆sn+1 .
That proﬁt is zero for s = s3opt = 1. Furthermore, the limit of a zero sequence is zero.
Therefore the sellers’ group proﬁt under optimal level 3 strategy is zero for a group size
n→∞.
Proof of Proposition 15. Proposition 13 shows the optimal level 3 strategy s3opt → 1 for
n→∞. According to proposition 6 the buyer’s proﬁt in the limit is
E(B)(s) = (s2 − ss1)
2
2s∆s
s=1= α.
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Proof of Proposition 16. Proposition 1 introduced the formula for the buyer’s deal proba-
bility. That formula was dependent on the sellers’ multilateral oﬀer strategy and the number
of sellers. Proposition 13 showed that in level 3 optimum and for inﬁnitely many sellers, the
optimal strategy is s3opt = 1. When we combine these statements we obtain
P(DB)(s) =
s2 − ss1
∆s +
s
n+ 1
(s2(s− 1)
s∆s
)n+1
− 1
 n→∞−→ s2 − 1 · s1∆s = 1.
The probability that the auction is successful converges to 1. That proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 17. The proof of proposition 17 is shown by Seemu¨ller (2013) in the
discussion of the Dealer’s Market.
Proof of Proposition 18. The proof of proposition 18 is shown by Seemu¨ller (2013) in the
discussion of the Dealer’s Market.
Proof of Proposition 19. According to proposition 17 each seller accepts the dealer’s oﬀer
with probability ps = (α+ fs)/(2α). Sellers determine their reservation prices independently.
Thus the expected number of acceptances is binomially distributed with the success parameter
pd. Expectation thus is npd = nα+fs2α .
Proof of Theorem 4. The dealer’s proﬁt per round-trip transaction is fb−fs > 0. Therefore
the dealer proﬁts from every round-trip transaction if fs < fb. The buyer prefers the Dealer’s
Market over the reverse auction, while fb < fb,ind. The seller prefers the Dealer’s Market over
the reverse auction, while fs > fs,ind. As a result the Dealer’s Market is Pareto eﬃcient under
the given conditions.
Proof of Theorem 5. The theorem is a summary of the analysis of this section. The proof
is delivered in the section’s argumentation above.
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On the Pareto Eﬃciency of an Intermediary
Over a Multiple Buyer and Seller Auction Market
Johannes Seemüller
Abstract
We introduce two markets where a single non-divisible good is traded. In the Buyers’
Market, buyers and sellers directly trade on a platform under full price information. Sec-
ondly, a dealer oﬀers his services in the Dealer’s Market under information asymmetry. Proﬁt
optimizing buyers and sellers may choose one of these markets to trade the good. We show
that both markets can generate a positive expected proﬁt for all traders, so they beneﬁt from
participating in these markets. Furthermore, under generally non-restrictive conditions, an
optimal dealer’s pricing strategy causes the market participants to prefer the Dealer’s Mar-
ket over the Buyers’ Market. In this case, the market under information asymmetry Pareto
dominates the market under full price information. This property is noteworthy, as numerous
authors such as Akerlof (1970) or Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) found information asymmetry a
factor that leads towards ineﬃcient market allocations.
Key words: Auction Market, Market Design, Intermediary, Full Information, Information Asymmetry, eBay, Amazon, Pareto
Eﬃcient Market, Imprecise Valuation, Underpricing. JEL Classiﬁcations: C72, D44, D47, D82
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1 Introduction
How markets allocate resources depends on the institutions that govern transactions and
a market’s design. There are, however, markets where the price system operates, but perfect
resource allocations are not obtained. The Nobel price committee recognized that a centralized
clearinghouse can improve market eﬃciency by implementing certain market procedures. In
particular, Roth and Shapley, who have been awarded the 2012 Nobel price for economic
sciences1, have illuminated how markets operate. Their research was involved in designing
institutions that help markets function better. They built the groundwork that has led to the
emergence of the branch of economics known as market design.
In this paper, we study a market where buyers and sellers directly trade on a platform
that is similar to Amazon and the buy-it-now option of eBay. Sellers disclose their prices for
an homogeneous good or service. Buyers arrive one after another and decide to buy at the
lowest price. The eﬃciency of this platform is analysed and compared to a dealer’s market
design. On the platform full price information is available, whereas a dealer operates under
information asymmetry. We introduce conditions when the Dealer’s Market is preferable for
all parties.
Empirical studies of online trading platforms are performed for instance by Roth and Ock-
enfels (2002). Wang et al. (2004) in particular study buy-it-now oﬀers and present statistics
on their popularity. Accordingly, eBay introduced its buy-it-now service in 2000, which has
been adopted subsequentially by 45% of eBay’s U.S. auctions by the end of its ﬁrst year.
These buy-it-now auctions accounted for 29% of gross merchandise sales on eBay in 2003.
The empirical work of Park and Bradlow (2003) further shows that the buy-it-now feature is
an important element in auction design.
The beneﬁts of eBay’s buy-it-now option have been discussed in recent literature. Mathews
(2003) shows that the buy-it-now option is beneﬁcial to bidders who want to buy their product
in a shorter span of time than others. That impatience does not reﬂect the limited cognitive
resources that most consumers appear to apply in making decisions, as Ratchford (1982) and
Mehta et al. (2003) note.
Studies have empirically and experimentally analysed the inﬂuence of transaction costs
on online auctions. For instance, List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) found in a ﬁeld experiment
that cognitive costs inﬂuence a bidder’s strategic behaviour.
Seemüller (2013b) introduces a model on bilateral trade, where bargainers value the traded
good or service imprecisely. In that model, individuals may behave rationally or naively and
it further allows for diﬀerent negotiation skills of the traders. Seemüller (2013a) generalizes
his paper on markets with an arbitrary number of sellers who trade with a single buyer. He
1See in Nobelprize.org (2012) for reference
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shows that a dealer under information asymmetry can improve the eﬃciency of these markets.
The present paper is a further generalisation of his trading model and allows for an arbitrary
number of buyers who buy from the same number of sellers. Where Seemüller focuses on
optimal oﬀer strategies in the referred papers, the present paper’s analysis concentrates on
the platform’s eﬃciency.
In our analysis, we compare a market under full price information and a market under
information asymmetry. Within our framework of proﬁt maximizing individuals, we add
imprecise valuation. Each individual has a certain reservation price for the good. These
reservation prices are random and identically and independently distributed. Based on her
reservation price, each seller assigns an oﬀer price to the good, such that this seller’s expected
proﬁt is maximized. As a result, a seller’s oﬀer price is also random. Buyers arrive one after
another. Each buyer accepts to buy the good or service at the present lowest price, if that
price does not exceed his reservation price.
Both analysed markets are wealth increasing for all traders. However, we show under
which conditions the market under information asymmetry is preferable to the market under
full price information.
Section 2 introduces the framework of the market under full price information (the Buyers’
Market) and analyses its properties in detail. Section 3 discusses the dealer’s pricing strategy
under information asymmetry in the Dealer’s Market. Furthermore, it analyses the traders’
proﬁt in this market. The market preferences of the traders are discussed in section 4. Section
5 concludes.
2 The Buyers’ Market
We model a platform market similar to buy-it-now oﬀers on eBay, where a single indivisible
good is traded. Several owners (sellers) of the good disclose their oﬀer prices on the platform.
Potential buyers can observe the sellers’ oﬀers and decide whether to buy at each seller’s oﬀer
or not. Denote P1 as the lowest available sellers’ oﬀer. In our model, a buyer buys a good
at that lowest price P1, when that buyer’s reserve price exceeds P1. The good then is traded
at that price2. When a subsequent buyer enters the market, then that buyer observes the
remaining sellers’ oﬀers. Similar to the prior buyer, the good is sold at the lowest available
price, when that price does not exceed the present buyer’s reserve value. This procedure
continues until no further buyer arrives. When a deal is successful, then a buyer’s proﬁt is
determined by the diﬀerence between the deal price and that buyer’s reserve value. A seller’s
proﬁt is given by the deal price.
2The event that a buyer’s reserve price and a seller’s oﬀer are equal is a zero set. It thus has probability
zero. Therefore the events (a) a buyer’s reserve price exceeds a seller’s oﬀer; and (b) a seller’s oﬀer exceeds
the buyer’s reserve price; add up to a probability of 1.
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In our model the parties suﬀer from valuation imprecision. Their reservation prices thus are
not identical. We model imprecision as independent uniformly distributed random variables.
When there are n sellers, then the i-th seller’s reservation price is given by VSi . If there are m
buyers, then the j-th buyer’s reservation price is given by VBj . Due to the lack of a valuation
benchmark, neither party knows whether he underestimates or overestimates the value of the
asset. They just know that their valuation is uniformly and symmetrically distributed around
some average valuation V > 0.
In order for a seller to expect a positive proﬁt trade, her oﬀer must be lower than her
reservation price. Otherwise her expected proﬁt is zero, or even negative if her oﬀer exceeds
her reservation price. In our model, each seller’s oﬀer strategy is to adjust her reservation
price by a certain factor s > 1. Then her oﬀer is sVS. With this strategy, each seller can
determine her oﬀer sVs such that it maximizes her expected proﬁt. This oﬀer strategy is a
special case of Chatterjee’s model Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983).
When there is one buyer and one seller in the auction, then the model simpliﬁes to a
two-player double auction. In this auction, optimal oﬀer strategies are studied by Seemüller
(2013b). Optimal strategies in the one buyer and n seller case are further studied by Seemüller
(2013a).
We distinguish two types of the Buyers’ Market: Level 1 can be regarded as the initializing
of the trading platform. Each player knows that he suﬀers from valuation imprecision and
knows that the other players know, knows that they do and so forth. The players furthermore
know the imprecision’s distribution, know that the others know, etcetera. Thus there is
mutual full information in the sense of Aumann (1976). The players, however, are not aware
whether they over- or undervalue the good because they have no respective benchmark. When,
for instance a seller values the good at 160 and knows the imprecision’s distribution, she still
cannot determine neither over- nor undervaluation. This can be regarded as the initializing
of the platform as there are no reference oﬀers present from which over- or undervaluation
can be derived.
Although the sellers’ reservation prices are not identical, their expected proﬁt is the same
ex ante. Proﬁt is further dependent on each seller’s individual oﬀer strategy: Assume there
are 2 sellers. The ﬁrst seller places an oﬀer twice her reservation price. The second seller
places an oﬀer that is 10% higher than her reservation price. Then it is likely that the oﬀer of
seller two is lower than seller one’s. That is, each seller’s oﬀer strategy inﬂuences individual
and other sellers’ deal probability and expected proﬁt. Underlying rational sellers, they apply
a homogeneous equilibrium oﬀer strategy as can be derived from Chatterjee Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983).
The Buyers’ Market level 2 is in post initialization phase, where sellers can observe oﬀers
from previous sellers. Post initialization thus allows sellers to compare their individual reser-
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vation price to their peers’ prices. This a seller to install a proﬁt optimizing oﬀer strategy, that
is conditioned on the other sellers’ oﬀers. As a result, oﬀer strategies are non-homogeneous
in the level 2 post initialization phase because a newly arriving seller conditions her oﬀer
strategy on the previous sellers’ strategies.
This paper studies the level 1 initializing phase. That focus allows us to make use of the
sellers’ homogeneous oﬀer strategy.
In our model, the sellers’ oﬀers OS and the buyers’ reservation prices VB have the same
uniform distribution. In mathematical terms, this is represented by the equation VB d= OS d=
unif [s1, s2]V = unif [1− α, 1 + α]V, with valuation imprecision α ∈ (0, 1) and some average
valuation V > 0. Further we assume that the number of arriving buyers and oﬀering sellers
is identical. That framework allows for analytical solutions in decently sized markets.
Let us start with an analysis of the Buyers’ Market’s properties.
2.1 The Buyers’ Market Properties
In this section we analyse major properties of the Buyers’ Market. We start with a lemma
which will prove worthwhile for numerous proofs throughout the paper.
Lemma 1. Let X1, X2, ..., Xn be iid random variables, with X1 d= unif [x1, x2]. Then the cdf
of min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) is given by M(x) = 1−
(
x2−x
x2−x1
)n
. The pdf of min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) is
given by m(x) = n (x2−x)n−1(x2−x1)n .
Proof: See the Appendix.
If needed, the notation of the functions M and m is expanded in an intuitive way. Then
we may for instance write M(x, x1, x2, n) instead of M(x). This lemma is a key ingredient
for the calculation of expected prices and deal probabilities in the Buyers’ Market. Before we
calculate these, the next proposition introduces the cumulative distribution function of the
above minimum, given the prior deal history.
Proposition 1. Let X1, X2, ..., Xn, Y1, Y2, ..., Yi and Z1, Z2, ..., Zj be iid random variables,
with X1 d= unif [x1, x2]. Conditioned on Yk ≥ min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) ≥ Zl for all k = 1, ..., i and
l = 1, ..., j, the cdf of min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) is
Fi,j(x) =
∑n−1+i
k=1
∑j
l=1
(
n−1+i
k
)(
j
l
)
xn−1+i−kxj−l1 (−1)k+j−l 1k+l+1(xk+l+1 − xk+l+11 )∑n−1+i
k=1
∑j
l=1
(
n−1+i
k
)(
j
l
)
xn−1+i−kxj−l1 (−1)k+j−l 1k+l+1(xk+l+12 − xk+l+11 )
The corresponding pdf is
fi,j(x) =
(x− y)n−1+i(y − x1)j dy∑n−1+i
k=1
∑j
l=1
(
n−1+i
k
)(
j
l
)
xn−1+i−kxj−l1 (−1)k+j−l 1k+l+1(xk+l+12 − xk+l+11 ).
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Proof: See the Appendix.
The above proposition calculates the minimum of the n sellers’ oﬀers. Compared to lemma
1, that proposition is conditioned on the event that prior buyers accepted and declined sellers’
oﬀers. Explicitly, in proposition 1 j buyers traded on the market and i buyers did not ﬁnd a
suitable oﬀer.
Next, we analyse the probability that the k−th arriving buyer ﬁnds a suitable oﬀer. Then
that buyer’s deal is successful. We calculate the probability of the complementary event, that
is, that the k−th deal is unsuccessful pd(k). In other words, the number pd(k) represents the
probability that all sellers’ oﬀers exceed the k-th buyer’s reservation price.
We ﬁrst calculate the probability pd(1) that the ﬁrst deal is unsuccessful.
Proposition 2. The probability that the ﬁrst deal is unsuccessful is given by
pd(1) =
1
n+ 1 .
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above formula shows that the probability that the ﬁrst deal is unsuccessful is inde-
pendent of valuation imprecision α. In fact, it is only dependent of the number of sellers n in
the marketplace. When there are inﬁnitely many sellers, then the probability that the ﬁrst
buyer rejects to trade is zero. When the market has the minimum possible size (i.e. n = 1),
then trade success probability is 0.5. That is, the ﬁrst buyer has probability of at least 0.5
that he ﬁnds a suitable oﬀer. An higher number of sellers increases that probability. With an
increase in the number of sellers, the ﬁrst buyer’s deal success probability converges to 1.
In the next propositions, we calculate the probability that the second buyer rejects trade.
Proposition 3. The probability that the second deal is unsuccessful is given by
pd(2) = (2n+ 3)/((n+ 1)(n+ 2)) .
Proof: See the Appendix.
As in proposition 2, we observe that the deal probability is dependent on market size,
whereas the imprecision’s distribution does not aﬀect it. Furthermore, for inﬁnitely many
sellers, the probability that the second buyer rejects trade is zero. That is, that buyer ﬁnds
a suitable oﬀer with probability 1.
It becomes increasingly time intensive to calculate the probability that the k-th buyer
rejects trade when k increases. This can be seen from the proof of proposition 3. To calculate
the probability pd(k), 2k−1 diﬀerent integrals, each with up to 2k−1 integrands, need to be
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calculated. This can in particular be observed in the proof of proposition 3, where we calculate
the probability that the third buyer rejects trade.
Proposition 4. The probability that the third deal is unsuccessful is given by
pd(3) =
3n2 + 12n+ 10
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)(n+ 3) .
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above proposition shows that the probability that the third arriving buyer ﬁnds a
suitable oﬀer is increasing in the number of oﬀering sellers. That probability further converges
to 1 for inﬁnitely many sellers.
As mentioned prior to proposition 4 and as can in particular be observed in the proof of
that proposition, the calculations of the deal reject probabilities is of increasing complexity.
The next proposition lists the probabilities that the k−th buyer rejects trade. The calculations
of these formulas are omitted in this paper to save on space. Note that in order to calculate
the probability that the 13th buyer rejects trade, it is necessary to calculate 213−1 = 4, 096
diﬀerent integrals, each with up to 4, 096 integrands. That is, approx. 16 million integrals
have to be calculated. Despite the number and length of the integrals, each is (apart from
time and eﬀort) straightforward to solve. Up to this date, general formulas apart from the list
below, can not be obtained with standard computers within reasonable computation time.
Proposition 5. The probability that the 4th, 5th, ..., 13th buyer rejects trade is
pd(4)
(
n+ 4
n
)
4! = 4n3 + 30n2 + 66n+ 39
pd(5)
(
n+ 5
n
)
5! = 5n4 + 60n3 + 245n2 + 385n+ 176
pd(6)
(
n+ 6
n
)
6! = 6n5 + 105n4 + 680n3 + 1, 980n2 + 2, 455n+ 905
pd(7)
(
n+ 7
n
)
7! = 7n6 + 168n5 + 1, 575n4 + 7, 245n3 + 16, 709n2 + 17, 213n+ 5, 244
pd(8)
(
n+ 8
n
)
8! = 8n7 + 252n6 + 3, 220n5 + 21, 350n4 + 77, 728n3
+ 150, 066n2 + 132, 664n+ 34, 111
pd(9)
(
n+ 9
n
)
9! = 9n8 + 360n7 + 6, 006n6 + 54, 054n5 + 283, 017n4 + 863, 648n3
+ 1, 444, 754n2 + 1, 122, 771n+ 250, 425
pd(10)
(
n+ 10
n
)
10! = 10n9 + 495n8 + 10, 440n7 + 122, 220n6 + 866, 287n5 + 3, 798, 446n4
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+ 10, 066, 846n3 + 14, 955, 830n2 + 10, 419, 777n+ 2, 129, 527
pd(11)
(
n+ 11
n
)
11! = 11n10 + 660n9 + 17, 160n8 + 253, 107n7 + 2, 327, 413n6
+ 13, 789, 050n5 + 52, 535, 054n4 + 123, 712, 231n3
+ 167, 594, 909n2 + 102, 992, 233n+ 26, 263, 013
pd(12)
(
n+ 12
n
)
12! = 12n11 + 858n10 + 26, 950n9 + 488, 567n8 + 5, 645, 402n7
+ 43, 314, 695n6 + 222, 582, 744n5 + 755, 718, 615n4 + 1, 606, 727, 220n3
+ 2, 047, 731, 583n2 + 1, 016, 664, 378n+ 543, 306, 757
pd(13)
(
n+ 13
n
)
13! = 13n12 + 1, 092n11 + 40, 755n10 + 890, 180n9 + 12, 611, 931n8
+ 121, 362, 534n7 + 806, 312, 138n6 + 3, 691, 200, 773n5
+ 11, 308, 692, 054n4 + 22, 562, 585, 539n3
+ 24, 689, 032, 812n2 + 17, 959, 414, 927n
Proof: A computer was programmed to automatically calculate these probabilities.
The last four propositions calculated probabilities that the 1st, 2nd, ..., 13th buyer refuses
to buy at the sellers’ lowest oﬀer. These probabilities are increasing, because a buyer who
enters the market has a positive chance that the oﬀer he receives is higher than that of
previous buyers. As a result, the probability that a buyer who enters the market later refuses
to trade is higher when that buyer enters the market comparably late.
When the market size increases, that is, when more sellers present their oﬀers on the
platform, then there are more oﬀers that are comparably low. Therefore the probability that
the k−th buyer who enters the market rejects to trade decreases when more sellers place
oﬀers for the good. That is, then the probability that a particular buyer ﬁnds a suitable oﬀer
increases with the number of oﬀering sellers.
The next two propositions calculate average prices of successful deals.
Proposition 6. The expected price for the ﬁrst successful deal is
E(Pr1) = s1 +
1
n+ 1∆s
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 7. Let k ∈ N with k ≤ n. Then the expected price of the k−th successful deal is
E(Prk) =
n+ 1− k
n+ 1 s1 +
k
n+ 1s2
131
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 6 calculates the price of the ﬁrst successful deal. That price is dependent on
the lowest possible deal, the spread between the highest and the lowest oﬀer and the number
of sellers in the market. The ﬁrst two criteria are dependent on valuation imprecision α.
When α increases, then the lowest possible oﬀer decreases and the spread between that oﬀer
and the best oﬀer increases. An increase in valuation imprecision therefore reduces the ﬁrst
deal price. With regards to deal price, an increase in valuation imprecision therefore is a good
property for the ﬁrst buyer and aﬀects a seller’s expected price negatively. More sellers in
the market also reduce the price of the ﬁrst successful deal. The ﬁrst buyer therefore proﬁts
from an increasing number of sellers in the market. In contrast, the price the seller with the
lowest oﬀer achieves, is aﬀected negatively when more sellers are in the market place.
The inﬂuence of valuation imprecision and the number of seller on the price of the ﬁrst
successful deal are also true for prices of subsequent deals, as proposition 7 shows: More
sellers in the market always reduce the deal price. When we calculate the price of the k-th
successful deal, then proposition 7 shows that these prices are increasing in k. That is, the
prices of later deals exceed the prices of deals that are closed earlier. The intuition behind
the formula is, that a buyer who arrives earlier, gets better oﬀers than a buyer that arrives
later, when the best oﬀers are gone. When k < (n + 1)/2, then the price of the k-th deal is
lower than average valuation. Then valuation imprecision inﬂuences the deal price positively.
When k > (n+1)/2, then the price of the k−the deal exceeds average valuation and a higher
valuation imprecision increases the price of that deal. When k = (n+ 1)/2, then the price is
the average valuation and it is not inﬂuenced by valuation imprecision. In summary, prices
below average valuation are reduced by increasing valuation imprecision, whereas prices that
exceed average valuation, are increased by higher valuation imprecision.
Next, we calculate the expected proﬁt of a buyer that has knowledge of the last successful
deal price and the number of remaining sellers.
Proposition 8. Assume the prior buyer’s deal was successful and priced at xk and there are
m remaining oﬀers from sellers. Then the buyer who enters the market next, has expected
proﬁt of
E(P )(xk,m) =
(s2 − xk)2
2∆s
m
m+ 2 .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 8 allows to calculate the expected proﬁt of buyers that enter the market at a
certain stage: When there are m remaining oﬀers from sellers and the last deal was successful
and priced at xk, then the proposition introduces a formula to calculate the proﬁt of a buyer
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who enters the market in this stage. That proﬁt is dependent on the number of remaining
oﬀers m. When more oﬀers are available, then a buyer’s proﬁt exceeds that when there are
less oﬀers. When the previous successful deal was prices at xk, then all remaining oﬀers
exceed that price. Therefore that price inﬂuences expected proﬁt of a subsequent buyer.
That buyer’s price is at least as high as xk. When xk is comparatively high, then a buyer’s
expected proﬁt shrinks. In contrast, a lower previous price allows for a higher expected proﬁt
for subsequent buyers. When xk < V (xk > V ), then an increase in valuation imprecision
has positive (negative) eﬀect on a buyer’s expected proﬁt. That is, when the last successful
deal was priced below average valuation, then valuation imprecision has positive eﬀect of
subsequent buyers, whereas a previous price above average has negative eﬀect for subsequent
buyers’ expected proﬁts.
When the present lowest oﬀer is common knowledge, then a buyer’s expected proﬁt before
he determines his reserve price is calculated in the next proposition.
Proposition 9. Assume the present lowest oﬀer is x. On entering the market, a buyer’s
expected proﬁt then is
E(P )(x) = (s2 − x)
2
2∆s .
Proof: See the Appendix.
The proposition allows the calculation of a buyer’s expected proﬁt before that buyer assigns
a reserve price, but after he knows the present lowest oﬀer. When the price of that oﬀer is
known to be x, then a buyer’s expected proﬁt is E(P )(x)= (s2−x)22∆s . That is, expected proﬁt is
higher, when the present lowest oﬀer is low. Intuitively, then a buyer has a higher chance that
his reserve price exceeds the lowest oﬀer, which increases a buyer’s expected proﬁt. When
the present lowest oﬀer x < V (x > V ), then valuation imprecision has positive (negative)
eﬀect on a buyer’s expected proﬁt. That is, when the lowest available oﬀer is below average
valuation, then valuation imprecision has positive eﬀect on a buyer’s proﬁt, whereas an oﬀer
above average has negative eﬀect for a buyers’ expected proﬁt.
Propositions 2 - 5 are illustrated in ﬁgure 1 (a). It calculates deal failure probabilities as
a function of the number of sellers. It can be seen in the ﬁgure that the probability that the
k+1−th deal is unsuccessful exceeds the probability that the k−th deal is unsuccessful. That
is, a buyer entering the market gets oﬀers at least as good as subsequent buyers. Furthermore,
a buyer’s deal is successful with positive probability, such that subsequent buyer’s deal failure
probability increases. When the number of sellers increases, then the price of the k − th
lowest oﬀer drops, according to proposition 7. Therefore, the k− th buyer has higher chances
to ﬁnd an oﬀer that exceeds his valuation, when more sellers present their oﬀers. This can
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Fig. 1 – Summary of deal failure probabilities as a function of market size
be observed in the ﬁgure, as all deal failure probabilities decrease in the number of sellers.
Deal failure probabilities are drawn for the 1st, 2nd, ..., 13th buyer who enters the market.
Propositions 2 - 5 presented formulas to calculate these probabilities.
Figure 1 (b) shows the average probability that a deal is unsuccessful as a function of
market size (i.e. the fraction of unsuccessful deals in a market of size three would be given by
(pd(1)+pd(2)+pd(3))/3). It can be seen that this probability is a strictly decreasing function.
Average deal failure probability is 0.5 for market size 1 (i.e. when there is one buyer and one
seller present) and reaches down to 0.3871 for market size 13. However, it is not clear whether
average deal failure probability converges to zero or some value greater zero for big markets.
A convergence to zero would imply that on average each deal is successful, when the number
of market participants approaches inﬁnity. Then each individual would proﬁt from entering
the market with probability 1. When the average deal failure probability converges to some
value v greater than zero, then on average, each v − th deal is unsuccessful.
The average rate of unsuccessful deals, in a market with n buyers and n sellers is calculated
by the term (pd(1)+pd(2)+ ...+pd(n))/n. therefore it is necessary to calculate all probabilities
pd(1), pd(2), ..., pd(n). As discussed in proposition 4, these calculations are time sensitive for
big markets. It is therefore wise to shift to a quicker technique to analyse the behaviour of
the rate of unsuccessful deals for big markets.
We ran Monte Carlo simulations for markets of size greater 13. Due to the Law of Large
Numbers, the average of these simulations converges to the actual ratio of unsuccessful deals.
Each simulation represents the average of 100.000 sample markets for each market size and
therefore consists of a decent sample size such that the simulation’s results are suﬃciently
close to the actual rate of unsuccessful deals.
The red line in ﬁgure 2 is the analytic solution for the ratio of unsuccessful deals, as shown
in ﬁgure 1 (b). Its derivation and properties were discussed thoroughly. The blue lines show
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Monte Carlo simulations of the average rate of unsuccessful deals for markets that have a size
that exceed 13. When we combine the analytical calculations with the Monte Carlo solutions,
it can be summarized that the rate of unsuccessful deals is a strictly decreasing function in
the market size that converges to a value greater 0.36.
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Fig. 3 – Simulated distribution of unsuccessful deals for diﬀerent market sizes
Figure 3 analyses the simulation of deal failures in more detail. It shows the distribution
of unsuccessful deals in markets with sizes 5, 10, 25, 50, 100 and 250. It can be seen that dis-
tributions are approximately symmetrically distributed. Furthermore with increasing market
size, deal failures seem to be close to a normal distribution.
In order to compare the distributions for diﬀerent market sizes, we normalized the distri-
butions of unsuccessful deals in ﬁgure 4. On the x−axis deal failure rates are drawn. It can
be seen that the mean values of deal failures are strictly decreasing in market size. That is in
accordance with ﬁgure 2, that illustrated that deal failure rates are decreasing in market size.
A second property, that can be seen from ﬁgure 4, is a strict decrease in variance with
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Market Size 10 25 50 100 250
Mean of deal failure 39.2834% 37.7727% 37.3151% 37.0565% 36.8897%
Variance of deal failure 1.6532% 0.6381% 0.3149% 0.1586% 0.0625%
Table 1 – Key properties of the simulated deal failure distribution
increasing market size. This statement is supported by the intuition that in markets with size
10, there are some samples where 0 or 10 deal successes occur. When there are more market
participants, then there are fewer samples where such extremes can be observed. Observations
tend to be gathered around the average value of deal failures in bigger markets. This fact
suggests that average deal failure rate does not only converge, it moreover is increasingly
likely that this rate is actually observed in an arbitrary sample of a Buyers’ Market.
Market Size 1 2 3 4 5 6
Average deal failure (in %) 50 45.83 43.61 42.25 41.33 40.67
Market Size 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Average deal failure (in %) 40.18 39.80 39.49 39.24 39.04 38.86 38.71
Table 2 – Average deal failure probability
Decreasing variances in deal failure probabilities is supported by the calculation of deal
failure variances for diﬀerent market sizes, which are noted in table 1. The table shows that
deal failure variance decreases with increasing market size. Furthermore this decrease is a
reciprocal function in market size. That means for instance, that doubling market size has the
136
eﬀect that variance decreases by the factor 0.5. Despite convergence to a certain deal failure
rate above 36%, we conclude that variance shrinks reciprocal in market size. Therefore the
probability that a Buyers’ Market in fact possesses the average deal failure rate converges
to 1 for big markets. In summary, ﬁgure 4 shows that (although number of simulations per
market size is constantly 100.000) the Monte Carlo simulations are closer together, the bigger
the market. This simulation’s behaviour also is explained by shrinking variance for bigger
markets.
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Fig. 5 – Average prices of the ﬁrst 10 deals as a function of market size.
The average price of the k−th deal was calculated in proposition 7. Figure 5 illustrates
the behaviour of the prices of the ﬁrst 10 deals as a function of the number of sellers. When
there are more sellers in the market, then there are more oﬀers. These oﬀers are uniformly
distributed on the interval [1− α, 1 + α]V . Thus, when there are more sellers, then there are
more comparatively low oﬀers. As a result, deal prices diminish. This eﬀect can be observed
in ﬁgure 5. On the x−axis the number of sellers is drawn and the y−axis shows the expected
deal price3. The ﬁgure shows that the deal price of the 1st, 2nd, ..., 10th deal is decreasing in
the number of sellers. In the limit of inﬁnitely many sellers, the price of each deal converges
to 1− α, which is the lowest possible oﬀer.
The next two paragraphs will discuss expected proﬁts of the market participants. Let us
start with the expected proﬁt of a seller.
2.2 The Sellers’ Proﬁt
The proﬁt of a seller is given by her oﬀer if the seller’s oﬀer leads to a successful deal.
Otherwise the seller’s proﬁt is zero. A seller has no benchmark to compare her oﬀer to.
3Without loss of abstraction, we set V = 1 in that ﬁgure.
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Therefore she is not aware whether her oﬀer is above or below average and how it compares
to other sellers’ oﬀers.
A seller’s expected proﬁt is given by the product of that seller’s probability that the deal
is successful and her reservation price. To determine deal probability, a seller assumes that
she is an average seller with an average oﬀer, as she has no benchmark to compare her oﬀer
to. That is, her deal probability is the average probability of the seller with the lowest, second
lowest, third lowest, ..., n-th lowest oﬀer.
We sort the sellers such that the ﬁrst seller’s oﬀer S1 is the lowest oﬀer and the oﬀer of
the k-th seller is the k-th lowest oﬀer. In order to calculate the proﬁt of an average seller, the
expected proﬁt of the k-th seller for k = 1, ..., n needs to be calculated.
We start with the calculation of the expected proﬁt of the seller with the lowest oﬀer as
a function of the number of buyers. Without loss of abstraction, we set average valuation
V = 1 in the following sections.
Proposition 10. The expected proﬁt of the seller with the lowest oﬀer is
E(PS1) = 1−
n+ 2 + nα
(n+ 1)(n+ 2) .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 10 shows that the proﬁt of the seller with the lowest oﬀer depends on the
number of buyers and the valuation imprecision α. That proﬁt is decreasing in α. That is,
a higher valuation imprecision has negative eﬀect on the ﬁrst seller’s proﬁt. More buyers are
beneﬁcial for the seller. When there are more buyers, then the probability that one buyer’s
reservation price exceeds the seller’s oﬀer increases. As a consequence the probability of a
successful deal for the seller and her expected proﬁt increase. For inﬁnitely many buyers, her
expected proﬁt converges to 1 (i.e. V ).
The next two propositions calculate the expected proﬁts of the sellers with the second and
third lowest oﬀers.
Proposition 11. The expected proﬁt of the seller with the second lowest oﬀer is
E(PS2) =
n−1∑
k=1
1
k2(k + 1)
(
s2 − 2∆s
k + 2
)
−
n−1∑
k=1
1
kn(n+ 1)
(
s2 − 2∆s
n+ 2
)
+
n−1∑
k=1
1
k(k + 1)2
(
s2 − ∆s
k + 2
)
−
n−1∑
k=1
1
k(k + 1)(n+ 1)
(
s2 − ∆s
n+ 2
)
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
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Proposition 12. The expected proﬁt of the seller with the third lowest oﬀer is
E(PS3)
=
n−2∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=k+1
2
l − k
(
1
(l − 1)l(l + 1)
[
2s2 − 6∆s
l + 2
] (1
k
− 1
l
)
+ 1
l(l + 1)
[
s2 − 2∆s
l + 2
](
1
k(k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1) +
1
k(l − k + 1) −
1
(l + 1)(l − k + 1)
)
+ 1
l + 1
[
s2 − ∆s
l + 2
] (
1
k(k + 1)(l − k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1)(l + 2) −
1
(l + 1)(l + 2)(l − k + 1)
))
−
n−2∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=k+1
2
l − k
(
1
(n− 1)n(n+ 1)
[
2s2 − 6∆s
n+ 2
] (1
k
− 1
l
)
+ 1
n(n+ 1)
[
s2 − 2∆s
n+ 2
](
1
k(k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1) +
1
k(l − k + 1) −
1
(l + 1)(l − k + 1)
)
+ 1
n+ 1
[
s2 − ∆s
n+ 2
] (
1
k(k + 1)(l − k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1)(l + 2) −
1
(l + 1)(l + 2)(l − k + 1)
))
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above two propositions calculate formulas for the proﬁt of the sellers with the second
and third lowest oﬀers. These proﬁts are increasing in the number of buyers and decreasing
in valuation imprecision. That is, more buyers increase the probability that a buyer’s oﬀer
exceeds these sellers’ oﬀers. The increased deal probability has positive eﬀect on a seller’s
proﬁt. Both sellers have expected proﬁt of 1 for n → ∞ buyers. That is, in the limit each
seller’s oﬀer is successful eventually.
Figure 6 (a) shows the expected proﬁts of the ﬁrst three sellers as a function of the number
of buyers, as calculated in propositions 10 - 12. The y−axis shows their expected proﬁts
and the number of buyers is drawn on the x−axis. For this example, we used a valuation
imprecision α = 10%4.
The ﬁgure shows that each seller’s expected proﬁt is increasing in the number of buyers.
The proﬁt of the seller with the lowest oﬀer exceeds that of the seller with the second lowest
oﬀer and her proﬁt exceeds that of the seller with the third lowest oﬀer. This is intuitive
because the second oﬀer can be successful only after the lowest oﬀer is sold. The same
relation holds between the second and the third lowest oﬀer.
Figure 6 (a) further shows that the seller’s expected proﬁts converge to 1 for the number
of buyers n →∞. That is, for a high number of buyers, each seller’s proﬁt approaches 1 up
to an arbitrarily small distance.
4Note that the sellers’ expected proﬁt are negatively aﬀected by increasing valuation imprecision. However,
this eﬀect is comparably small in contrast to the eﬀect that the market size has on the sellers’ expected proﬁts.
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In this section we calculated expected proﬁts of the ﬁrst sellers with the ﬁrst three lowest
oﬀers. To calculate the expected proﬁt of an average seller in a market with size n, the
formulas for the proﬁts of all sellers need to be calculated.
The formulas the of the proﬁts for the ﬁrst, second and thirds sellers, as seen in propositions
10 - 12, develop increasingly long terms. Their length further increases exponentially for the
expected proﬁt of the seller with the k−th lowest oﬀer, with 3 < k ≤ n. Thus it is not eﬃcient
to calculate these proﬁts analytically. A more eﬃcient method is a Monte Carlo simulation
to calculate all sellers’ proﬁts and an average seller’s proﬁt.
In our Monte Carlo simulation we ran 50,000 samples per market size n = 1, ..., 200 and
used valuation imprecision α ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75}. That is 50 million samples, which
allows for a suﬃciently high signiﬁcance of the simulation.
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Fig. 6 – Sellers’ proﬁts as a function of market size
Figure 6 (b) shows the Monte Carlo simulation’s results. The x−axis shows the market
size and on the y−axis an average seller’s proﬁt is drawn. The average proﬁt increases for each
valuation imprecision and they are all bounded. Valuation imprecision has negative eﬀect on
an average seller’s expected proﬁt.
Valuation imprecision α 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75
Average seller’s proﬁt (n = 1) 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.41 0.37
Average seller’s proﬁt (n = 200) 0.62 0.61 0.57 0.51 0.46
Table 3 – An average seller’s proﬁt for small and big markets as a function of valuation
imprecision
The eﬀect of the market size and valuation imprecision on an average sellers proﬁt are
summarized in table 3. It can be seen that bigger markets increase a seller’s proﬁt for each
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valuation imprecision. Independent of the market size, valuation imprecision inﬂuences a
seller’s expected proﬁt negatively.
The next section calculates the proﬁt of a buyer.
2.3 The Buyers’ Proﬁt
In this section, a buyer’s proﬁt is analysed. When the ﬁrst buyer enters the market, then
that buyer can buy at the lowest price of all sellers’ oﬀers. A buyer that enters the market
in a later stage therefore has a lower range of available oﬀers and the lowest oﬀer is at least
as high as the oﬀer for the ﬁrst buyer. When a buyer enters the market in a later stage, then
that buyer’s expected proﬁt is lower than that of a prior buyer.
We calculate the expected proﬁt of the ﬁrst, second and third buyers in this section.
Expected proﬁts of subsequent buyers will be calculated with a Monte Carlo simulation. Let
us start with the proﬁt of the ﬁrst buyer.
Proposition 13. The expected proﬁt of the ﬁrst buyer as a function of the number of sellers
n is
E(PB1) = α
n
n+ 2 .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 13 calculates the expected proﬁt of the ﬁrst buyer that enters the market.
It is dependent on the valuation imprecision and the number of available oﬀers from sellers.
Both parameters have a positive inﬂuence on the ﬁrst buyer’s proﬁt.
When valuation imprecision increases, then expected proﬁt also rises. In fact, the ﬁrst
buyer’s expected proﬁt is linear as a function of valuation imprecision α. When there is no
valuation imprecision, then the ﬁrst buyer’s expected proﬁt is zero. Expected proﬁt of the
ﬁrst buyer exceeds that of subsequent buyers. When there is no valuation imprecision, then
all buyers therefore have zero proﬁt in the Buyers’ Market.
The number of sellers n also has positive eﬀect on the ﬁrst buyer’s expected proﬁt. Intu-
itively, more sellers make more oﬀers the buyer can choose from. This increases the chance
of particularly good oﬀers for the buyer and his proﬁt increases.
In the limit of inﬁnitely many sellers, the ﬁrst buyer’s expected proﬁt is the valuation
imprecision α. That buyer’s expected proﬁt therefore is bounded by valuation imprecision.
The next 2 propositions calculate the expected proﬁts of the second and third buyers.
Proposition 14. The expected proﬁt of the second buyer as a function of the number of
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sellers n is
E(PB2) = α
n3 + 2n2 − n
(n+ 3)(n+ 1)(n+ 1) .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 15. The expected proﬁt of the third buyer as a function of the number of sellers
n is
E(PB3) = α
n5 + 4n4 + 2n3 − 12n2 + 7n+ 6
(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)(n+ 3)(n+ 4) .
Proof: See the Appendix.
The expected proﬁt of the second and third buyers are both increasing in valuation im-
precision α and the number of sellers n. The expected proﬁt of the second buyer exceeds that
of the third buyer because the probability that the second buyer accepts the lowest oﬀer is
greater zero. Then the third buyer is left with oﬀers that are higher than those of the second
buyer. Both expected proﬁts converge to α for n→∞. That is, in the limit it is insigniﬁcant
when a buyer enters the market. Expected proﬁt further is a linear function in valuation
imprecision. That is, an increase in imprecision has positive eﬀect on the buyers’ expected
proﬁts. Additionally, doubling valuation imprecision has the eﬀect that expected proﬁt also
is doubled.
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Fig. 7 – Buyers’ proﬁts as a function of market size
Figure 7 (a) shows the expected proﬁts of the ﬁrst three buyers. On the x-axis the number
of sellers are drawn. The y-axis illustrates expected proﬁts. The ﬁrst buyers’ proﬁt exceeds
the second buyer’s proﬁt, which exceeds the third buyer’s proﬁt. Buyers that arrive later
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thus have lower expected proﬁt. This is true for any number of sellers. When the market
size increases, then each buyer’s proﬁt converges to α. The maximum valuation imprecision
therefore is an upper bound for a buyer’s expected proﬁt, independent of the time of a buyer’s
market entry.
The calculations of the second and third buyers’ expected proﬁts in propositions 14 and
15 developed progressively extensive terms. It is therefore more productive to shift to quicker
techniques for the analysis of the k-th buyers’ expected proﬁt, with k > 3. We performed
Monte Carlo simulations to analyse expected proﬁts for buyers 4, 5, ... up to the number of
sellers n. An average buyer is not aware whether he enters the market comparatively early or
late. Therefore the expected proﬁt of the average buyer is the mean proﬁt of the ﬁrst, second,
third, ..., n−th buyer.
That simulated proﬁt of an average buyer is illustrated in ﬁgure 7 (b). The x-axis shows
the number of buyers and sellers. The simulated expected average proﬁt of a buyer is drawn
on the y-axis. That proﬁt is increasing in the market size. A greater market size implies that
there are more sellers. That is, there are more comparatively low oﬀers. On the other hand,
there are more buyers in a greater market. Buyers who arrive late might get high remaining
oﬀers. The eﬀect of more low oﬀers is stronger as can be observed in the ﬁgure; the average
buyer beneﬁts from a bigger market size. An average buyer’s proﬁt furthermore converges
to approximately 0.43α. That is, when the market becomes inﬁnitely large, then an average
buyer’s proﬁt is approximately 0.43α.
An average buyer’s proﬁt therefore is a linear function in valuation imprecision α. When
α is increased by a certain factor, then average proﬁt also is increases by that exact factor.
Doubling imprecision thus doubles a buyer’s expected proﬁt. Therefore valuation imprecision
is beneﬁcial for buyer’s and higher valuation imprecision leads to higher expected proﬁts.
When there is no imprecision, that is, when each party values the good precisely, then a
buyer’s expected proﬁt from trade is zero.
Let us next introduce a dealer and analyse his pricing strategy.
3 The Dealer’s Market
On Dealer’s Market, there is a dealer present. The dealer has past experience regarding
the good and therefore knows its average value. He therefore has precise valuation. He acts
as market maker and charges a bid-ask spread: The dealer oﬀers to sell the good at a buyer’s
reservation price multiplied by 1− fB and oﬀers to buy the good at a seller’s oﬀer multiplied
by 1− fS.
Proposition 16. When fS > fB, then the dealer proﬁts on average from his pricing strategy.
Proof: See the Appendix.
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Buyers and sellers each get diﬀerent prices, dependent on their price expectations. The
dealer thus needs to be experienced in order to ﬁnd out the player’s true price expectations.
Otherwise the bargainers may lie to the dealer about their true price expectations.
The dealer pursues the strategy to install an environment under information asymmetry.
On Dealer’s Market buyers and sellers do not interact. They solely communicate with the
dealer and choose whether to accept his oﬀer, or not. Otherwise they might complain about
the dealer’s pricing strategy, because each player gets a diﬀerent price, dependent on a player’s
valuation. In this sense there is information asymmetry on Dealer’s Market. Asymmetric
information is important to the success of dealer’s strategy. This means that buyer and seller
should either consult the dealer or choose trade on the Buyers’ Market. Otherwise buyer and
seller ﬁrst bargain on the Buyers’ Market. In case they are unsuccessful, they may consult the
dealer in the next step. While this sequential strategy is beneﬁcial for buyer and seller, the
dealer is left with a lemons problem: Buyers with low reservation price and sellers with high
reservation price. Thus the dealer suﬀers from adverse selection. Installing a beneﬁcial fee
strategy consequently becomes more complicated under full information as dealer’s strategy
may collapse otherwise.
The next propositions calculate a buyer’s and seller’s expected proﬁt in Dealer’s Market.
Let us start with a buyer’s proﬁt.
Proposition 17. When fB > 0, then a buyer’s expected proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market is
positive. Then it is given by E (PB) = fB
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 17 shows that the buyer has a positive expected proﬁt from participating in
Dealer’s Market if the condition fB > 0 is met. The higher the dealer chooses the discount
fB, the more attractive Dealer’s Market becomes to the buyer.
We continue with the calculation of a seller’s proﬁt.
Proposition 18. When fS < 1, then a seller’s expected proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market is
positive. When that condition is met, a seller’s proﬁt is
E (PS) = 1− fS.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above proposition shows that dealer’s pricing strategy fS inﬂuences a seller’s expected
proﬁt in Dealer’s Market. That pricing strategy aﬀects a seller’s expected proﬁt negatively.
That is, a higher discount fS reduces a seller’s proﬁt, whereas a lower discount increase that
proﬁt.
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In summary, buyers proﬁt from high dealer’s discounts, whereas sellers prefer lower dis-
counts.
In the next section, we analyse the relative attractiveness of the Buyers’ Market and the
Dealer’s Market.
4 The Downside of Full Information
This section compares the attractiveness of the Buyers’ and the Dealer’s Market. Condi-
tions that allow the Dealer’s Market to Pareto dominate the Buyers’ Market will be estab-
lished. We start with a buyer’s market preferences.
Proposition 19. When a buyer has a choice between a proﬁt of x and participation in the
Dealer’s Market, then the buyer prefers the Dealer’s Market, when fB > x.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above proposition calculates a criterion that allows the Dealer’s Market to Pareto
dominate an opportunity, where a buyer gets a ﬁxed proﬁt x. That is, when the dealer’s
discount fB exceeds a buyer’ alternative, then the buyer prefers the Dealer’s Market over
that alternative.
A buyer’s preference of the Dealer’s Market over the Buyers’ Market is analysed in the
next proposition.
Proposition 20. Independent of market size, a buyer’s expected proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market
exceeds expected proﬁt on the Buyers’ Market, when fB > 0.43α.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 20 shows that, when fB > 0.43α, then the Dealer’s Market is more preferable
than the Buyers’ Market for a buyer. That is, when the dealer’s discount on a buyer’s
valuation fB is suﬃciently high, then a buyer is in preference for the dealer’s oﬀer compared
to the Buyers’ Market.
The necessary dealer’s discount increases with a higher valuation imprecision. When the
buyer values the good less precise, then the dealer needs to reduce his oﬀer in order to attract
that buyer to his market.
The inequation fB > 0.43α holds for any market size because it considers the limit for
market size n → ∞. For a smaller market size, fB may be below that lower bound. That
is, then the dealer’s discount may be smaller. The exact lower bound for dealer’s discount
can be seen in ﬁgure 7 (b). For markets of size 1, the lower bound is fB > α/3, according
to proposition 13. The lower bound for the dealer’s discount is therefore increasing in the
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market size. This fact implies that a dealer needs to give higher discounts when more buyers
and sellers are present.
Next, we focus on a seller’s preferences.
Proposition 21. When a seller has a choice between a proﬁt of proﬁt x and participation in
the Dealer’s Market, then the seller prefers the Dealer’s Market, when fS < 1− x.
Proof: See the Appendix.
When a seller can choose between a proﬁt of x on a market and selling the good in the
Dealer’s Market, then a seller prefers the latter market, when fS < 1 − x holds. That is,
the dealer’s discount on a seller’s oﬀer must not exceed 1− x. When the dealer’s discount is
to high, then the seller may not be satisﬁed with that oﬀer and thus prefer the market with
proﬁt x.
Section 2.2 analysed a seller’s proﬁt in the Buyers’ Market as a function of valuation
imprecision α and market size n. That proﬁt is illustrated in ﬁgure 6 (b) and table 3. When
we deﬁne that proﬁt to be x, then proposition 21 allows us to calculate, when a seller prefers
the Dealer’s Market over the Buyers’ Market.
Valuation imprecision α 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75
Lower bound for fB,min 0.022 0.043 0.108 0.215 0.323
Upper bound for fS,max 0.38 0.39 0.43 0.49 0.54
Table 4 – Bounds for dealer’s fee such that Dealer’s Market is Pareto eﬃcient
Table 4 shows the maximum (minimum) dealer’s discount such a seller (buyer) is in prefer-
ence of the Dealer’s Market. It can be seen that higher valuation imprecision leads to a higher
dealer’s discount that allows him to attract market participants to trade in the Dealer’s Mar-
ket. Independent of valuation imprecision and market size, the discount for a buyer may be
lower than a seller’s discount. Therefore the dealer can choose buyer’s and seller’s discounts
such that both players are in favour for his market. At the same time, the dealer furthermore
generates positive expected earnings.
Feasible dealer’s discounts are illustrated in ﬁgure 8. In this ﬁgure, the x-axis shows the
market size. The dealer’s discount is illustrated on the y-axis. The blue area shows feasible
dealer’s discount strategies. The lower bound in that area represents the lower bound for the
discount a buyer demands. The discount for a buyer’s oﬀer therefore needs to exceed that
bound. The upper bound of the blue area represents the maximum discount a seller allows.
The discount that a dealer applies to a seller’s oﬀer thus must be lower than that bound. For
each market size, the dealer may choose discounts for a buyer fB and the seller fS. When the
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(b) Valuation imprecision α = 25%
Fig. 8 – Simulated feasible dealer’s discounts for Pareto dominance of the Dealer’s Market
over the Buyers’ Market
dealer pays attention to the condition fB < fS, then his expected proﬁt is positive according
to proposition 16. In the ﬁgure, the blue area is non-empty. Therefore the dealer may choose
discounts that attract buyer’s and seller’s to the Dealer’s Market and generate a positive gain
at the same time.
Figure 8 (a) draws feasible discounts for valuation imprecision α = 10%. When the market
is smaller, then the dealer has a greater variety of discount strategies. In fact, for market size
1, he may choose 0.033 < fB < fS < 0.517. When the market size is arbitrarily big, then the
dealer’s discount strategy restricts to approximately 0.043 < fB < fS < 0.39.
Figure 8 (b) draws feasible discounts for valuation imprecision α = 25%. When the market
is smaller, then the dealer has a greater variety of discount strategies. In fact, for market size
1, he may choose 0.083 < fB < fS < 0.542. When the market size is arbitrarily big, then the
dealer’s discount strategy restricts to approximately 0.108 < fB < fS < 0.54.
When valuation imprecision increases, then the dealer may choose more extreme discounts,
as can be seen from this example.
From feasible dealer’s discounts, feasible deal prices can be calculated. These are illus-
trated in ﬁgure 9. In that ﬁgure, the x-axis shows the market size. The dealer’s feasible prices
are illustrated on the y-axis. The blue area shows feasible deal prices as a function of the
Buyers’ Market size. That is, while prices are within the blue area, buyers and sellers prefer
the Dealer’s Market over the Buyers’ Market.
The lower bound in that blue area represents the highest discount that a seller accepts.
When prices are lower, then sellers are not in favour for the Dealer’s Market. While prices
exceed that lower bound, sellers favour the Dealer’s Market over the Buyers’ Market.
The upper bound of the blue area represents the maximum price that a buyer is willing
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Fig. 9 – Simulated feasible deal prices for Pareto dominance of the Dealer’s Market over the
Buyers’ Market
to accept. When the dealer’s oﬀer exceeds that bound, then buyers are in favour for the
Buyers’ Market. In order to attract buyers, the dealer oﬀers the good for a price within the
blue area. Then buyers accept and the dealer’s oﬀer dominates their expected proﬁt in the
Buyers’ Market.
When the dealer discounts a seller’s oﬀer higher than that of a buyer, then the dealer
expects a positive gain from his strategy.
Figure 9 (a) draws feasible discounts for valuation imprecision α = 10%. When the
market is smaller, then the dealer has a greater set of possible discount strategies. In fact, for
market size 1, he may choose discounts on the interval [0.483, 0.967]. When the market size
is arbitrarily big, then the dealer’s discount strategy restricts to approximately [0.61, 0.957].
Figure 8 (b) draws feasible discounts for valuation imprecision α = 25%. When the market
is smaller, then the dealer has a greater set of discount strategies. In fact, for market size 1,
he may choose discounts on the interval [0.458, 0.917]. When the market size is arbitrarily
big, then the dealer’s discount strategy restricts to approximately [0.46, 0.892].
When valuation imprecision increases, then dealer’s discounts may increase, as can be seen
from this example.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented a detailed analysis of a realistic auction market, the Buyers’ Market.
In this market, sellers reveal their oﬀer prices for a good and the buyers arrive one after
another. Each buyer buys the good if the present lowest oﬀer does not exceed that buyer’s
reservation price. Buyers and sellers therefore have full price information on this market.
The Amazon market platform and buy-it-now auctions on eBay are examples, where such a
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market design is installed.
The deal success rate in the Buyers’ Market increases with market size. That is, when
there are more buyers and sellers, then a higher fraction of deals is successful. In minimal
markets with one buyer and one seller, every second deal is unsuccessful. The success rate
however converges to 0.64 for big markets. The variance of the success rate decreases in the
market size. That is, if the market size increases, it becomes more certain that a particular
market actually possesses the deal success rate of 0.64. Therefore, we conclude that the
platform becomes more attractive, when more individuals use it for their transactions.
Furthermore, it was shown that a greater number of sellers generate a higher proﬁt for
each buyer. This follows from the fact, that when there are more sellers, the price of the
lowest oﬀer decreases. This reduction of the lowest oﬀer represents more proﬁt for a buyer.
In case of one buyer and one seller, the average buyer’s proﬁt is one third of the valuation
imprecision (i.e. 13α). That proﬁt converges up to 0.43α for big markets. Thus, an average
buyer’s proﬁt is linearly dependent on the valuation imprecision α. Therefore, a doubling of
the valuation imprecision doubles a buyer’s proﬁt. A buyer therefore proﬁts from valuation
imprecision and has a proﬁt of zero when the traders value the good precisely.
When there is an equal number of buyers and sellers, then an average seller’s proﬁt is
increasing in the number of traders. For a comparably low valuation imprecision of 5%, an
increase in the market size from 1 to 200 increases a seller’s proﬁt from 0.49 to 0.62 (as
a proportion of the average valuation). A comparably high valuation imprecision of 75%
generates a seller’s proﬁt of 0.37 for markets with only one buyer and one seller. This proﬁt
increases up to 0.46 for big markets with a size of 200 buyers and sellers. In summary, an
average seller’s proﬁt is increasing in the market size and decreasing in valuation imprecision.
In the Dealer’s Market, a dealer buys the good from a seller and then sells it to a buyer.
He oﬀers to buy the good at a discount from the seller and oﬀers it to the buyer at a price
that is lower than that buyer’s reservation price. It is critical that the dealer hides his price
quotes to a trader from other traders, as each trader gets a diﬀerent price oﬀer. That is, the
dealer needs to maintain information asymmetry between all buyers and sellers.
The dealer can set his pricing strategy in a way that the buyer and the seller expect
positive proﬁt from the dealer’s oﬀer. In addition, his strategy allows him a positive gain
on average. Therefore the dealer may set pricing strategies such that all parties proﬁt from
participation in the Dealer’s Market.
A buyer’s and a seller’s proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market can exceed their expected proﬁt on
the Buyers’ Market. In other words, when the dealer sets his discount strategy adequately,
then buyers and sellers prefer the Dealer’s Market over the Buyers’ Market. These discounts
can be set non-restrictively for any valuation imprecision and market size. At the same time,
his discount strategy allows the dealer a positive gain. Then the Dealer’s Market Pareto
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dominates the Buyers’ Market. That is, the market under information asymmetry Pareto
dominates the market under full price information.
Our research suggests that the above results hold for further generalisations of the Buy-
ers’ and Dealer’s Market. Simulations show that valuation imprecision may be normally
distributed (instead of uniformly) with the same implications on the deal success rate. We
believe that symmetrically distributed valuation imprecision is a suﬃcient condition for most
of the established characteristics of the Buyers’ Market. Furthermore, the properties of the
Buyers’ Market with an unequal number of buyers and sellers may be an interesting ﬁeld
for further research. In this case, the dealer’s inventory additionally demands attention. Al-
though some of these topics have been touched in this paper, a detailed study of the mentioned
market abstractions may be worthwhile.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The cdf of min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) is given by
M(x) = P (min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) ≤ x) = 1−P (min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) > x)
= 1−P (Xi > x, i = 1, ..., n) = 1−P (X1 > x)n = 1−
(
x2 − x
x2 − x1
)n
.
The pdf is given by the ﬁrst derivative of M(x).
Proof of Proposition 1: We calculate
Fi,j(x) =
P (min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) < x|Yk ≥ min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) ≥ Zl∀k = 1, ..., i l = 1, ..., j)
P (Yk ≥ min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) ≥ Zl∀k = 1, ..., i l = 1, ..., j)
=
∫ x
x1 m(y)P (Y > y)
iP (Y < y)j dy∫ x2
x1 m(y)P (Y > y)
iP (Y < y)j dy
=
n
(x−x1)n
∫ x
x1(x− y)n−1(x− y)i(y − x1)j dy
n
(x−x1)n
∫ x2
x1 (x− y)n−1(x− y)i(y − x1)j dy
=
∫ x
x1(x− y)n−1+i(y − x1)j dy∫ x2
x1 (x− y)n−1+i(y − x1)j dy
=
∑n−1+i
k=1
∑j
l=1
(
n−1+i
k
)(
j
l
)
xn−1+i−kxj−l1 (−1)k+j−l
∫ x
x1 y
k+l dy∑n−1+i
k=1
∑j
l=1
(
n−1+i
k
)(
j
l
)
xn−1+i−kxj−l1 (−1)k+j−l
∫ x2
x1 y
k+l dy
=
∑n−1+i
k=1
∑j
l=1
(
n−1+i
k
)(
j
l
)
xn−1+i−kxj−l1 (−1)k+j−l 1k+l+1(xk+l+1 − xk+l+11 )∑n−1+i
k=1
∑j
l=1
(
n−1+i
k
)(
j
l
)
xn−1+i−kxj−l1 (−1)k+j−l 1k+l+1(xk+l+12 − xk+l+11 )
The density is the ﬁrst derivative of the distribution function. Using the First Fundamental
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Theorem of Calculus and the Binomial Theorem we derive the density.
fi,j(x) =
∂Fi,j(x)
∂x
= (x− y)
n−1+i(y − x1)j dy∫ x2
x1 (x− y)n−1+i(y − x1)j dy
= (x− y)
n−1+i(y − x1)j dy∑n−1+i
k=1
∑j
l=1
(
n−1+i
k
)(
j
l
)
xn−1+i−kxj−l1 (−1)k+j−l 1k+l+1(xk+l+12 − xk+l+11 )
.
Proof of Proposition 2: We use lemma 1 to obtain ﬁrst deal’s unsuccess probability.
pd(1) = P (B > min(S1, ..., Sn)) =
1
∆b
∫ b2
b1
P (x > min(S1, ..., Sn)) dx
= 1∆b
∫ b2
s1
(
s2 − x
s2 − s1
)n
dx = 1∆bn+1
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x)n dx = ∆s
n+1
∆bn+1 (n+ 1) =
1
n+ 1 .
Proof of Proposition 3: Before we prove the proposition’s statement, we introduce the
notation for a binary vector v ∈ [0, 1]k. It describes concrete deal success and unsuccess
structures, e.g. v = (1, 0, 0) means that the ﬁrst deal is successful, whereas deal two and
three are unsuccessful. The unsuccess probability of the second deal pd(2) is thus represented
by the sum pd(2) = P((1, 0)) +P((0, 0)), that is the sum of the independent probabilities of
the two events ‘Fist deal successful, second deal unsuccessful’ and ‘First deal unsuccessful,
second deal unsuccessful.‘ We calculate P((1, 0)) and P((0, 0)) separately:
P((0, 0)) =
∫ s2
s1
m(x1, s1, n)P(B < x1)P(B < x1) dx1 =
∫ s2
s1
n
(s2 − x1)n−1
∆sn
(
x1 − s1
∆s
)2
dx1
= n∆sn+2
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)n−1(x1 − s1)2 dx1 = n∆s
n(2s22 − 4s1s2 + 2s21)
n(n+ 1)(n+ 2)∆sn+2 =
2
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
P((1, 0)) =
∫ s2
s1
m(x1, s1, n)P(B > x1)
∫ s2
x1
m(x2, x1, n− 1)P(B < x2) dx2dx1
=
∫ s2
s1
n
(s2 − x1)n−1
∆sn
s2 − x1
∆s
∫ s2
x1
(n− 1) (s2 − x2)
n−2
(s2 − x1)(n−1)
x2 − s1
∆s dx2dx1
= n(n− 1)∆sn+2
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)
∫ s2
x1
(s2 − x2)n−2(x2 − s1) dx2dx1
= n(n− 1)
n(n+ 1)∆sn+2
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)(s2 − x1)(n−1)(s2 + nx1 − ns1 − x1)dx1
= n(n− 1) ∆s
n+1(2s2n− 2ns1 + s2− s1)
n(n− 1)(n+ 1)(n+ 2)∆sn+2 =
2n+ 1
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
The probability’s sum is given by pd(2) = 2n+3(n+1)(n+2) .
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Proof of Proposition 4: As in the proof of proposition 3, we use the notation pd(3) =
P((0, 0, 0))+P((0, 1, 0))+P((1, 0, 0))+P((1, 1, 0)) and calculate each probability separately:
P((0, 0, 0)) =
∫ s2
s1
m(x1, s1, n)P(B < x1)3 dx1 =
∫ s2
s1
n
(s2 − x1)n−1
∆sn
(
x1 − s1
∆s
)3
dx1
= n∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)n−1 (x1 − s1)3 dx1
= n∆sn+3
(s2 − s1 )n (−18 s2 2s1 + 6 s2 3 − 6 s1 3 + 18 s2 s1 2)
(n+ 3) (n+ 2) (n+ 1)n =
6
(n+ 3) (n+ 2) (n+ 1)
P((0, 1, 0)) =
∫ s2
s1
m(x1, s1, n)P(B < x1)P(B > x1)
∫ s2
x1
m(x2, x1, n− 1)P(B < x1) dx2dx1
=
∫ s2
s1
n
(s2 − x1)n−1
∆sn
x1 − s1
∆s
s2 − x1
∆s
∫ s2
x1
(n− 1)(s2 − x2)
n−2
(s2 − x1)n−1
x2 − s1
∆s dx2dx1
= n(n− 1)∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(x1 − s1)(s2 − x1)
∫ s2
x1
(s2 − x2)n−2(x2 − s1) dx2dx1
= n(n− 1)
n(n− 1)∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(x1 − s1)(s2 − x1)n(s2 + nx1 − ns1 − x1) dx1
= n(n− 1)
n(n− 1)∆sn+3
∆sn+1∆s2 (3n+ 1)
(n+ 3) (n+ 2) (n+ 1) =
3n+ 1
(n+ 3) (n+ 2) (n+ 1)
P((1, 0, 0)) =
∫ s2
s1
m(x1, s1, n)P(B > x1)
∫ s2
x1
m(x2, x1, n− 1)P(B < x2)2 dx2 dx1
=
∫ s2
s1
n
(s2 − x1)n−1
∆sn
s2 − x1
∆s
∫ s2
x1
(n− 1)(s2 − x2)
n−2
(s2 − x1)n−1
(
x2 − s1
∆s
)2
dx2 dx1
= n(n− 1)∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)
∫ s2
x1
(s2 − x2)n−2(x2 − s1)2 dx2 dx1
= n(n− 1)∆sn+3
6∆sn+3
(n− 1)n(n+ 2)(n+ 3) =
6(n+ 1)
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)(n+ 3)
P((1, 1, 0)) =
∫ s2
s1
m(x1, s1, n)P(B > x1)
∫ s2
x1
m(x2, x1, n− 1)P(B > x2)∫ s2
x2
m(x3, x2, n− 2)P(B < x3) dx3 dx2 dx1
=
∫ s2
s1
n
(s2 − x1)n−1
∆sn
s2 − x1
∆s
∫ s2
s1
(n− 1)(s2 − x2)
n−2
(s2 − x1)n−1
s2 − x2
∆s∫ s2
s1
(n− 2)(s2 − x3)
n−3
(s2 − x2)n−2
x3 − s1
∆s dx3 dx2 dx1
= n(n− 1)(n− 2)∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x2)
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x3)n−3(x3 − s1) dx3 dx2 dx1
= n(n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 1)(n− 2))∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x2)n−1(nx2 − ns1 + s1 + s2 − 2x2) dx2 dx1
= n(n− 1)(n− 2)(n+ 1)n(n− 1)(n− 2)∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)n+1
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(2s2n+ s1 + n2x1 − n2s1 − s2 − 2nx1) dx1
= n(n− 1)(n− 2)∆s
n+33(n2 + n− 1)
(n+ 3)(n+ 2)(n+ 1)n(n− 1)(n− 2)∆sn+3 =
3(n2 + n− 1)
(n+ 3)(n+ 2)(n+ 1)
Proof of Proposition 6: We calculate the expected price of the ﬁrst successful deal, using
lemma 1.
E(Pr1) =
∫ s2
s1
m(s)s ds = n∆sn
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − s)n−1s ds
= n∆sn
(
1
n
∆sns1 +
1
n(n+ 1)∆sn+1
)
= s1 +
1
n+ 1∆s.
Proof of Proposition 7: Let n oﬀers be uniformly distributed on [x, s2]. Then the expected
price of the lowest oﬀer is
E(min(X1, X2, ..., Xn)) =
∫ s2
x
m(s, x, s2)s ds =
n
(s2 − x)n
∫ s2
x
(s2 − s)n−1s ds
= n
n+ 1x+
1
n+ 1s2.
The pdf required here is obtained from lemma 1. Then the integral is calculated along the
lines of the proof of proposition 6. Note that when we set x = s1, we get exactly the formula
that was established in proposition 6. The expected price of the ﬁrst deal is
E(Pr1) =
n
n+ 1s1 +
1
n+ 1s2.
The second deal is the minimum of n − 1 independent random variables that are uniformly
distributed on [E(Pr1), s2]. By the formula we calculated above, the second deal therefore
has expected price
E(Pr2) =
n
n+ 1E(P1) +
1
n+ 1s2 =
n
n+ 1
(
n
n+ 1s1 +
1
n+ 1s2
)
+ 1
n+ 1s2
= n− 1
n+ 1s1 +
2
n+ 1s2.
Iteratively calculating the next deal prices, the k − th deal price is
E(Prk) =
n+ 1− k
n+ 1 s1 +
k
n+ 1s2.
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Proof of Proposition 8: Assume the k − th successful deal was priced at xk. Then the
m remaining oﬀers are independently uniformly distributed on the interval [xk, s2]. When a
buyer enters that market, then that buyer’s proﬁt is
E(P )(xk,m) =
∫ s2
xk
∫ s2
s
m(s, xk, s2)
1
∆s(b− s) dbds
= m∆s(s2 − xk)m
∫ s2
xk
(s2 − x)m−1
∫ s2
s
(b− s) dbds
= m∆s(s2 − xk)m
∫ s2
xk
(s2 − s)m−1 (s2 − s)
2
2 ds
= m2∆s(s2 − xk)m
∫ s2
xk
(s2 − s)m+1 ds
= m(s2 − xk)
m+2
2∆s(s2 − xk)m(m+ 2) =
(s2 − xk)2
2∆s
m
m+ 2 .
Proof of Proposition 9: We calculate a buyer’s expected proﬁt, when the lowest present
oﬀer is x.
E(P )(x) =
∫ s2
s1
1Deal(b− x) db =
∫ s2
x
b− x db
= s
2
2 − x2 − 2x(s2 − x)
2 =
(s2 − x)2
2∆s .
Proof of Proposition 10: The proﬁt of the seller with the lowest oﬀer is
E(PS1) =
1
2α
∫ s2
s1
P (∃ Buyer with VB > x)x dx
= 12α
∫ s2
s1
(1−P (∀ Buyers have VB ≤ x))x dx = 12α
∫ s2
s1
x− x
(
x− s1
∆s
)n
dx
= 12α
(
1
2(s
2
2 − s21)−
[
1
n+ 1
(x− s1)n+1
∆sn x
]s2
s1
+
∫ s2
s1
1
n+ 1
(x− s1)n+1
∆sn dx
)
= 12α
(
4α
2 −
1
n+ 1
∆sn+1
∆sn s2 +
1
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
∆sn+2
∆sn
)
= 12α
(
2α− 1
n+ 1∆ss2 +
1
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)∆s
2
)
= 1− 1
n+ 1s2 +
1
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)∆s
= 1− n+ 2 + nα(n+ 1)(n+ 2) .
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Proof of Proposition 11: When a seller’s oﬀer is uniformly distributed on the interval
[s1, x], then the probability that the k-th buyer buys that oﬀer is
P(k − th buyer buys oﬀer) = 1
x− s1
∫ x
s1
P(VB < y for k − 1 buyers)P(VB > y) dy
= 1
x− s1
∫ x
s1
(
y − s1
∆s
)k−1 s2 − y
∆s dy
= 1(x− s1)∆sk
∫ x
s1
(y − s1)k−1(s2 − y) dy
= 1(x− s1)∆sk
(
1
k
(x− s1)k(s2 − x) + 1
k(k + 1)(x− s1)
k+1
)
= 1
k∆sk (x− s1)
k−1(s2 − x) + 1
k(k + 1)∆sk (x− s1)
k.
To simplify later calculations, we evaluate the following integral for some m ∈ N.
∫ s2
s1
x(x− s1)m(s2 − x) dx = − 1
m+ 1
∫ s2
s1
(x− s1)m+1(s2 − 2x) dx
= − 1
m+ 1
([ 1
m+ 2(x− s1)
m+2(s2 − 2x)
]s2
s1
− 1
m+ 2
∫ s2
s1
(x− s1)m+2(−2) dx
)
= − 1(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
(
(s2 − s1)m+2(s2 − 2s2) + 2
m+ 3(s2 − s1)
m+3
)
= s2∆s
m+2
(m+ 1)(m+ 2) −
2∆sm+3
(m+ 1)(m+ 2)(m+ 3) =
∆sm+2
(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
(
s2 − 2∆s
m+ 3
)
.
Next, we calculate the expected proﬁt of the seller with the second lowest oﬀer.
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E(PS2)
= 1∆s
n−1∑
k=1
∫ s2
s1
(P(k − th buyer buys ﬁrst oﬀer)P(One of n− k buyers buys second oﬀer))x dx
= 1∆s
n−1∑
k=1
∫ s2
s1
((
1
k∆sk (x− s1)
k−1(s2 − x) + 1
k(k + 1)∆sk (x− s1)
k
)(
1− (x− s1)
n−k
∆sn−k
))
x dx
= 1∆s
n−1∑
k=1
∫ s2
s1
(
(x− s1)k−1(s2 − x)
k∆sk −
(x− s1)n−1(s2 − x)
k∆sn +
(x− s1)k
k(k + 1)∆sk −
(x− s1)n
k(k + 1)∆sn
)
x dx
=
n−1∑
k=1
1
k∆sk+1
∫ s2
s1
x(x− s1)k−1(s2 − x) dx−
n−1∑
k=1
1
k∆sn+1
∫ s2
s1
x(x− s1)n−1(s2 − x) dx
+
n−1∑
k=1
1
k(k + 1)∆sk+1
∫ s2
s1
x(x− s1)k dx−
n−1∑
k=1
1
k(k + 1)∆sn+1
∫ s2
s1
x(x− s1)n dx
=
n−1∑
k=1
1
k∆sk+1
∆sk+1
k(k + 1)
(
s2 − 2∆s
k + 2
)
−
n−1∑
k=1
1
k∆sn+1
∆sn+1
n(n+ 1)
(
s2 − 2∆s
n+ 2
)
+
n−1∑
k=1
1
k(k + 1)∆sk+1
∆sk+1
k + 1
(
s2 − ∆s
k + 2
)
−
n−1∑
k=1
1
k(k + 1)∆sn+1
∆sn+1
n+ 1
(
s2 − ∆s
n+ 2
)
.
Proof of Proposition 12: When the third lowest oﬀer is x ∈ [1 − α, 1 + α], then for 1 ≤
k < l ≤ n, we can calculate the probability
P(The k−th and l−th buyers buy the ﬁrst and second lowest oﬀer|Third lowest oﬀer is x)
= 2(x− s1)2
∫ x
s1
P(k − 1 buyers have VB < y and one VB > y)
1
x− y
∫ x
y
P(l − k − 1 buyers have VB < z and one VB > z) dz dy
= 2(x− s1)2
∫ x
s1
(y − s1)k−1
∆sk−1
s2 − y
∆s
∫ x
y
(z − s1)l−k−1
∆sl−k−1
s2 − z
∆s dz dy
= 2(x− s1)2∆sl
∫ x
s1
(y − s1)k−1(s2 − y)
∫ x
y
(z − s1)l−k−1(s2 − z) dz dy
= 2(x− s1)2∆sl
∫ x
s1
(y − s1)k−1(s2 − y) 1
l − k
([
(z − s1)l−k(s2 − z)
]x
y
−
∫ x
y
(z − s1)l−k(−1) dz
)
dy
= 2(x− s1)2∆sl(l − k)
∫ x
s1
(y − s1)k−1(s2 − y)
(
(x− s1)l−k(s2 − x)− (y − s1)l−k(s2 − y)
+ 1
l − k + 1
(
(x− s1)l−k+1 − (y − s1)l−k+1
))
dy
= 2(x− s1)2∆sl(l − k)
(
(x− s1)l−k(s2 − x)
∫ x
s1
(y − s1)k−1(s2 − y) dy −
∫ x
s1
(y − s1)l−1(s2 − y)2 dy
+(x− s1)
l−k+1
l − k + 1
∫ x
s1
(y − s1)k−1(s2 − y) dy − 1
l − k + 1
∫ x
s1
(y − s1)l(s2 − y) dy
)
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= 2(x− s1)2∆sl(l − k)
(
(x− s1)l−k(s2 − x)
(
1
k
(x− s1)k(s2 − x) + 1
k(k + 1)(x− s1)
k+1
)
− (x− s1)
l(s2 − x)2
l
− 2(x− s1)
l+1(s2 − x)
l(l + 1) −
2(x− s1)l+2
l(l + 1)(l + 2)
+ (x− s1)
l−k+1
l − k + 1
(
1
k
(x− s1)k(s2 − x) + 1
k(k + 1)(x− s1)
k+1
)
− 1
l − k + 1
(
1
l + 1(x− s1)
l+1(s2 − x) + 1(l + 1)(l + 2)(x− s1)
l+2
))
= 2(x− s1)2∆sl(l − k)
(
1
k
(x− s1)l(s2 − x)2 + 1
k(k + 1)(x− s1)
l+1(s2 − x)
− (x− s1)
l(s2 − x)2
l
− 2(x− s1)
l+1(s2 − x)
l(l + 1) −
2(x− s1)l+2
l(l + 1)(l + 2)
+ 1
k(l − k + 1)(x− s1)
l+1(s2 − x) + 1
k(k + 1)(l − k + 1)(x− s1)
l+2
− 1(l + 1)(l − k + 1)(x− s1)
l+1(s2 − x) + 1(l + 1)(l + 2)(l − k + 1)(x− s1)
l+2
)
= 2∆sl(l − k)
(
(x− s1)l−2(s2 − x)2
(1
k
− 1
l
)
+ (x− s1)l−1(s2 − x)
(
1
k(k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1) +
1
k(l − k + 1) −
1
(l + 1)(l − k + 1)
)
+ (x− s1)l
(
1
k(k + 1)(l − k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1)(l + 2) −
1
(l + 1)(l + 2)(l − k + 1)
))
In addition note that for m ∈ N
∫ s2
s1
(x− s1)mx(s2 − x)2 = ∆s
m+3
(m+ 1)(m+ 2)(m+ 3)
[
2ss − 6∆s
m+ 4
]
We calculate the expected proﬁt of the seller with the third lowest oﬀer as follows
E(PS3)
= 1∆s
n−2∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=k+1
∫ s2
s1
(P (Exactly the k−th and l−th buyers buy the ﬁrst and second lowest oﬀers)
P (One deal at x after the second deal))x dx
= 2∆s
n−2∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=k+1
1
∆sl(l − k)
∫ s2
s1
x
(
1− (x− s1)
n−l
∆sn−l
)(
(x− s1)l−2(s2 − x)2
(1
k
− 1
l
)
+ (x− s1)l−1(s2 − x)
(
1
k(k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1) +
1
k(l − k + 1) −
1
(l + 1)(l − k + 1)
)
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+ (x− s1)l
(
1
k(k + 1)(l − k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1)(l + 2) −
1
(l + 1)(l + 2)(l − k + 1)
))
dx
= 2∆s
n−2∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=k+1
1
∆sl(l − k)
∫ s2
s1
(
x(x− s1)l−2(s2 − x)2
(1
k
− 1
l
)
+ x(x− s1)l−1(s2 − x)
(
1
k(k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1) +
1
k(l − k + 1) −
1
(l + 1)(l − k + 1)
)
+ x(x− s1)l
(
1
k(k + 1)(l − k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1)(l + 2) −
1
(l + 1)(l + 2)(l − k + 1)
))
dx
− 2∆s
n−2∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=k+1
1
∆sn(l − k)
∫ s2
s1
(
x(x− s1)n−2(s2 − x)2
(1
k
− 1
l
)
+ x(x− s1)n−1(s2 − x)
(
1
k(k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1) +
1
k(l − k + 1) −
1
(l + 1)(l − k + 1)
)
+ x(x− s1)n
(
1
k(k + 1)(l − k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1)(l + 2) −
1
(l + 1)(l + 2)(l − k + 1)
))
dx
= 2∆s
n−2∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=k+1
1
∆sl(l − k)
(
∆sl+1
(l − 1)l(l + 1)
[
2s2 − 6∆s
l + 2
] (1
k
− 1
l
)
+ ∆s
l+1
(l(l + 1))
[
s2 − 2∆s
l + 2
](
1
k(k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1) +
1
k(l − k + 1) −
1
(l + 1)(l − k + 1)
)
+ ∆s
l+1
(l + 1)
[
s2 − ∆s
l + 2
] (
1
k(k + 1)(l − k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1)(l + 2) −
1
(l + 1)(l + 2)(l − k + 1)
))
− 2∆s
n−2∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=k+1
1
∆sn(l − k)
(
∆sn+1
(n− 1)n(n+ 1)
[
2s2 − 6∆s
n+ 2
] (1
k
− 1
l
)
+ ∆s
n+1
(n(n+ 1))
[
s2 − 2∆s
n+ 2
](
1
k(k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1) +
1
k(l − k + 1) −
1
(l + 1)(l − k + 1)
)
+ ∆s
n+1
(n+ 1)
[
s2 − ∆s
n+ 2
] (
1
k(k + 1)(l − k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1)(l + 2) −
1
(l + 1)(l + 2)(l − k + 1)
))
=
n−2∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=k+1
2
l − k
(
1
(l − 1)l(l + 1)
[
2s2 − 6∆s
l + 2
] (1
k
− 1
l
)
+ 1
l(l + 1)
[
s2 − 2∆s
l + 2
](
1
k(k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1) +
1
k(l − k + 1) −
1
(l + 1)(l − k + 1)
)
+ 1
l + 1
[
s2 − ∆s
l + 2
] (
1
k(k + 1)(l − k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1)(l + 2) −
1
(l + 1)(l + 2)(l − k + 1)
))
−
n−2∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=k+1
2
l − k
(
1
(n− 1)n(n+ 1)
[
2s2 − 6∆s
n+ 2
] (1
k
− 1
l
)
+ 1
n(n+ 1)
[
s2 − 2∆s
n+ 2
](
1
k(k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1) +
1
k(l − k + 1) −
1
(l + 1)(l − k + 1)
)
+ 1
n+ 1
[
s2 − ∆s
n+ 2
] (
1
k(k + 1)(l − k + 1) −
2
l(l + 1)(l + 2) −
1
(l + 1)(l + 2)(l − k + 1)
))
.
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Proof of Proposition 13: We calculate the proﬁt of the ﬁrst buyer.
E(PB1) =
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
b1
1b>sm(s)
1
∆b(b− s) dbds =
∫ s2
s1
∫ b2
s
n
(s2 − s)n−1
(s2 − s1)n
1
∆b(b− s) dbds
= n∆bn+1
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − s)n−1
∫ b2
s
(b− s) dbds = n∆bn+1
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − s)n−1 b
2
2 − s2 − 2s(b2 − s)
2 ds
= n∆bn+1
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − s)n−1 b
2
2 + s2 − 2sb2
2 ds =
n
∆bn+1
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − s)n−1 (b2 − s)
2
2 ds
= n2∆bn+1
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − s)n+1 ds = n2∆bn+1 (−
1
n+ 2[(s2 − s)
n+2]s2s1
= n2∆bn+1
1
n+ 2∆b
n+2 = ∆b2
n
n+ 2 = α
n
n+ 2
Proof of Proposition 14: We calculate the expected proﬁt of the second buyer. The func-
tions introduced in lemma 1 and propositions 7 and 9 are used for the calculations.
E(PB2) =
∫ s2
s1
m(n, s1, s2, x1) [P(B < x1)E(P )(x1) +P(B > x1)E(P )(x1, n− 1) dx1]
= n∆sn
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)n−1
[
x1 − s1
∆s
(s2 − x1)2
2∆s +
s2 − x1
∆s
(s2 − x1)2
2∆s
n− 1
n+ 1 dx1
]
= n2∆sn+2
[∫ s2
s1
(x1 − s1)(s2 − x1)n+1 dx1 + n− 1
n+ 1
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)n+2 dx1
]
= n2∆sn+2
[
1
n+ 2
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)n+2 dx1 + (n− 1)∆s
n+3
(n+ 1)(n+ 3)
]
= n∆s2(n+ 3)
[ 1
n+ 2 +
n− 1
n+ 1
]
= α n
3 + 2n2 − n
(n+ 3)(n+ 1)(n+ 1) .
Proof of Proposition 15: We calculate the expected proﬁt of the second buyer. The func-
tions introduced in lemma 1 and propositions 7 and 9 are used for the calculations. We
continue to use the notation from the proof of proposition 2 and calculate the third buyer’s
expected proﬁt as the sum of the prior bargaining process. Then
E(PB3) = E(PB3) [(0, 0)] + E(PB3) [(0, 1)] + E(PB3) [(1, 0)] + E(PB3) [(1, 1)]
We calculate each of these expected proﬁts separately:
E(PB3) [(0, 0)] =
∫ s2
s1
m(x)P(B < x)2E(P )(x) dx = n∆sn
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x)n−1 (x− s1)
2
∆s2
(s2 − x)2
2∆s dx
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= n2∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x)n+1(x− s1)2 dx = n2(n+ 2)∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x)n+2(x− s1) dx
= n2(n+ 2)(n+ 3)∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x)n+3 dx = n2(n+ 2)(n+ 3)(n+ 4)∆s
E(PB3) [(1, 0)] =
∫ s2
s1
m(x1, n)P(B > x1)
∫ s2
x1
m(x2, n− 1)P(B < x1)E(P )(x2, n− 2) dx2dx1
= n∆sn
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)n−1 s2 − x1∆s
n− 1
(s2 − x1)n−1∫ s2
x1
(s2 − x2)n−2x2 − s1∆s
(s2 − x2)2
2∆s
n− 1
n+ 1 dx2dx1
= n(n− 1)
2
2(n+ 1)∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)
∫ s2
x1
(s2 − x2)n(x2 − s1) dx2dx1
= n(n− 1)
2
2(n+ 1)∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1) 1(n+ 1)(n+ 2)(s2 − x1)
n+2 dx1
= n(n− 1)
2
2(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)n+3 dx1
= n(n− 1)
2
2(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)(n+ 4)∆sn+3∆s
n+4 = α n(n− 1)
2
(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)(n+ 4)
E(PB3) [(0, 1)] =
∫ s2
s1
m(x1, n)P(B > x1)P(B < x1)E(P )(x1, n− 1)dx1
= n∆sn
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)n−1 s2 − x1∆s
x1 − s1
∆s
(s2 − x1)2
2∆s
n− 1
n+ 1 dx1
= n(n− 1)2(n+ 1)∆sn+1
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)n+2(x1 − s1) dx1 = n(n− 1)2(n+ 1)(n+ 3)(n+ 4)∆s
= α n(n− 1)(n+ 1)(n+ 3)(n+ 4)
E(PB3) [(1, 1)] =
∫ s2
s1
m(x1, n)P(B > x1)
∫ s2
x1
m(x2, n− 1)P(B > x1)E(P )(x2, n− 2) dx2dx1
= n∆sn
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)n−1 s2 − x1∆s
n− 1
(s2 − x1)n−1∫ s2
x1
(s2 − x2)n−2 s2 − x2∆s
(s2 − x2)2
2∆s
n− 2
n
dx2dx1
= n(n− 1)(n− 2)2n∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)
∫ s2
x1
(s2 − x2)n+1 dx2dx1
= n(n− 1)(n− 2)2n(n+ 2)∆sn+3
∫ s2
s1
(s2 − x1)n+3dx1 = n(n− 1)(n− 2)2n(n+ 2)(n+ 4)∆sn+3∆s
n+4
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= α(n− 1)(n− 2)(n+ 2)(n+ 4)
We calculate the sum of these four terms.
E(PB3) = E(PB3) [(0, 0)] + E(PB3) [(0, 1)] + E(PB3) [(1, 0)] + E(PB3) [(1, 1)]
= αn
5 + 4n4 + 2n3 − 12n2 + 7n+ 6
(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)(n+ 3)(n+ 4) .
Proof of proposition 16: On each round-trip transaction, the dealer has income (1−fB)VB
and has expenses (1−fS)OS. Then his gain from a round-trip transaction is PD = (1−fB)VB−
(1−fS)OS. Taking the expectation of the gain gives E(PD) = (1−fB)− (1−fS) = −fB+fS,
which is greater zero if and only of fS > fB.
Proof of Proposition 17: A buyer’s proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market is the diﬀerence between
his reservation price VB and the dealer’ oﬀer, that is (1− fB)VB. We calculate that proﬁt.
E (PB) = E (VB − (1− fB)VB) = fB.
A buyer’s proﬁt therefore is greater zero if and only if fB > 0.
Proof of Proposition 18: A seller’s proﬁt is given by
E (PS) = (1− fS)E(OS) = 1− fS.
That proﬁt is greater zero if and only if fS < 1.
Proof of Proposition 19: According to proposition 17, a buyer’s proﬁt in the Dealer’s Mar-
ket is fB. That proﬁt exceeds proﬁt of x, when fB > x.
Proof of Proposition 20: Proposition 19 calculated a conditions for the dominance of the
Dealer’s Market. A buyer’s proﬁt on the Buyers’ Market is bounded by 0.43α, as shown in
section 2.3. When we combine these statements, then a buyer prefers the Dealer’s Market
over the Buyers’ Market when fB > 0.43α.
Proof of Proposition 21: Proposition 18 calculates a seller’s proﬁt in the Dealer’s Market.
That proﬁt needs to exceed proﬁt of x, that is
1− fS > x⇐⇒ fS < 1− x.
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On a Firm’s Choice of Debt:
Pareto Eﬃciency of Bond Financing over Bank Loans
Johannes Seemüller
Abstract
This paper focuses on two diﬀerent forms of debt ﬁnancing and thereby analyses Bank
loans and the public placement of bonds by an investment banker. Under reasonable condi-
tions, bond ﬁnancing using the services of an investment banker, who operates under informa-
tion asymmetry, Pareto dominates ﬁnancing with bank loans, where a ﬁrm opens its books to
creditors and provides full information. The ﬁrm’s management and the bank often have dif-
ferent valuations of the ﬁrm. We model a Bayesian updating of the management’s estimation
on their valuation precision based on the loan negotiation process. At times loan negotia-
tions are unsuccessful, resulting in a loss of negotiation costs. Upon successful ﬂoatation,
an investment banker receives a fee as a percentage of the bond proceeds. Bond transaction
costs are incurred exclusively upon successful ﬁnancing, as opposed to bank loan negotiation
costs, which are incurred even when the ﬁnancing is declined. We show that if the investment
banker is able to maintain information asymmetry between investors and the issuing ﬁrm,
bond ﬁnancing is optimal.
Key words: Bank Loans, Bond Financing, Investment Banking, Bond Underwriting, Imprecise Valuation, Asymmetric
Information, Full Information, Negotiation Costs. JEL Classiﬁcations: C11, G10, G14, G38
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1 Introduction
When external sources for capital are considered, a ﬁrm may sell equity or borrow.
Seemüller (2013) focuses on the choice between raising venture capital and an IPO. In this
paper we focus on borrowing capital.
Debt can be separated into private and public debt. The former dominates the public debt
market in size. Within the private debt market, ﬁrms may choose among diﬀerent alternatives,
such as bank loans and traditional private placements. Some ﬁrms borrow mainly from
ﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks and their providers of debt. Others prefer to publicly
or privately issue bonds. In 2009, international syndicated lending amounted to $1.8 trillion
and ﬁrms borrowed another $1.5 trillion in international bond markets1. As debt is by far
the major source of capital, it is worth asking how ﬁrms prefer one sort of debt over another.
Quantitative analysis on the form of debt ﬁrms prefer has been undertaken. Recently,
Arena (2010) examined possible determinants of a ﬁrm’s choice between diﬀerent forms of
debt ﬁnancing. He analysed the most comprehensive sample of U.S. corporate debt issues.
His study focuses primarily on the connection between a ﬁrm’s credit rating and its debt
choice. Arena ﬁnds that ﬁrms with a high credit quality prefer public bond oﬀerings, whereas
small ﬁrms with good credit quality are more likely to issue traditional private debt. Firms
with moderate credit quality prefer bank loans. In fact, Arena ﬁnds that poor quality ﬁrms
preferentially issue 144A debt. That is, 144A debt allows private placements only to trade to
and from qualiﬁed institutional investors. Arena’s ﬁndings challenge the conventional view of
ﬁrms with poor quality credit rating to choose non-bank traditional private placements, as for
instance proposed by Mihov (2003). Fenn (2000) and Arena (2010) further suggest that after
1990, 144A bonds may have sequentially replaced traditional private placements of low-quality
high risk debt. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms that issue 144A debt usually have higher information
asymmetry and lower credit quality than ﬁrms issuing traditional non-bank private debt.
Houston and James (2012) investigate the relation between a ﬁrm’s growth opportunities
and its mix of private and public debt claims by the analysis of a panel data set of 250 pub-
licly listed U.S. ﬁrms. Besides investigating on ﬁnancial characteristics as potential factors
inﬂuencing a ﬁrm’s debt choice, further determinants were analysed. More recently, Lin et al.
(2012) correlated the ownership structure of a ﬁrm with its choice between bank debt and
public debt. They examined the relation between a borrowing ﬁrm’s ownership structure and
its choice of debt. They use a data set on corporate ownership, control and debt structure of
almost 10,000 global ﬁrms from 2001 to 2010. Their results are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that ﬁrms controlled by large shareholders with excess control rights prefer public debt
ﬁnancing over bank debt.
1See Lin et al. (2012)
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In addition to statistical explanations, various corporate theories provide a variety of
explanations on a ﬁrm’s choice of debt. Bank debt potentially has the ability to soften costs
of information asymmetry compared to traditional private debt. When banks maintain long
term relationships with borrowing ﬁrms, they may accumulate additional and soft information
about these ﬁrms. Banks further have signiﬁcant comparative advantages in monitoring
eﬃciency because they can get access to private information as insiders, as for instance Fama
(1985) and Diamond (1984) have shown. Houston and James (1996) prove that the fragmented
ownership structure of public debt and the resulting free rider problems weaken an individual
bondholder’s incentives to engage in costly monitoring. Assuming bondholders were willing to
monitor, it would be ineﬃcient as it would involve unnecessary and thus redundant duplication
of monitoring costs and eﬀorts. In summary, banks are more eﬃcient in monitoring than the
sum of private investors. Contrary, Lin (2012) ﬁnds that banks may be more likely to impose
strong and intensive monitoring on borrowing ﬁrms. Anticipating strict monitoring by banks,
ﬁrms might prefer bond ﬁnancing over bank debt as a way of avoiding scrutiny from bank
monitoring. This explanation has been suggested by Houston and James (1996) as well as
Denis and Mihov (2003) among others.
This paper presents a theoretical approach to this ﬁeld and concentrates on two major
observations. When estimating a ﬁrm’s value, potential creditors and a ﬁrm’s management
suﬀer from valuation imprecision, as each party arrives at a diﬀerent ﬁrm value. As valuation
always is a subjective matter to some extent, valuation imprecision occurs even if both parties
can check a ﬁrm’s accounts and thus full information is available. Secondly, when a creditor
and a ﬁrm negotiate about the terms for debt ﬁnancing, both parties inevitably suﬀer costs
from negotiations and from checking the ﬁrm’s accounts. Hence, there is a risk involved that
loan negotiations are unsuccessful. In this case, costs invested in negotiations are lost on
both sides. When an intermediary is hired to place a ﬁrm’s bonds, he may oﬀer them to
interested investors. Again, a ﬁrm’s management and investors have a certain valuation of
the ﬁrm. Contrary to the option of checking the ﬁrm’s accounts, an investor merely is able to
estimate the ﬁrms value. By pursuing a ﬁrm’s management to decrease their valuation and
the investor to increase her valuation, chances for successful bond placement increase. When
an intermediary’s fee structure is reasonable, all parties can proﬁt from his bond placement
services.
Section 2 of this paper presents our model in detail. Section 3 focuses on private loan
ﬁnancing. In section 4 intermediation and public placement of bonds is discussed. Section 5
compares those diﬀerent forms of debt ﬁnancing. Finally, section 6 concludes.
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2 The Model
Arrow Debreu prices2 are the prices of time and state contingent claims which promise
one unit of a speciﬁc good in a speciﬁc uncertain state at a speciﬁc date in the future. Such
claims were introduced by Arrow and Debreu in their work on general equilibrium theory
under uncertainty, to allow agents to trade state and time contingent claims separately. Then
the general equilibrium problem with uncertainty can be reduced to a conventional game
without uncertainty. In ﬁnite state ﬁnancial models, Arrow-Debreu claims can be viewed as
atomic building blocks of more complex multiple state and multiple time dependent ﬁnancial
framework. In fact, Arrow-Debreu prices of time and state contingent claims determine a
unique arbitrage-free price system.
Let a ﬁrm invest K at the beginning of a one-period model to produce uncertain output
with a payoﬀ that is dependent on investment K and the uncertain future. Then expected
value of the ﬁrm at the end of the period can be interpreted as a function
V : R≥ → R : K 7→ V (K).
Expected present value of the ﬁrm, dependent on K and future uncertain cash-ﬂows can be
determined using Arrow Debreu prices. In this context the obligation of the ﬁrm to pay back
the amount K can further be priced with Arrow-Debreu state contingent prices.
Assume each of n agents cannot precisely value a ﬁrm, but approximate it. In the pro-
cess, each agent makes a certain deviation from the ﬁrm’s Arrow Debreu value V . We
model these deviations independent and uniformly distributed on [1− α, 1 + α], with 0 <
α < 1. The parameter α represents maximum imprecision of the evaluating parties. Fol-
lowing the model, maximum valuation is Vmax =(1 + α)V (K) and minimum valuation is
Vmin = (1− α)V (K). Obviously average valuation is exactly the Arrow-Debreu value. Let
for instance Xi d= unif [1− α, 1 + α] be valuation imprecision of player i. Then that player’s
valuation is Vi = XiV (K).
We assume that the company’s management decides on optimal investment level K∗ such
that expected company value is maximized. In order to raise necessary capital K∗, manage-
ment follows two options: (a) Loan negotiations with banks or (b) consulting an investment
banker to sell bonds of volume K∗. In case (a) management opens the ﬁrm’s books for po-
tential investors such that the ﬁrm’s accounts are fully observed. In this case there is full
information available. Deviations in valuation therefore are caused by valuation imprecision
of management and potential investors. On the contrary in case (b), when management uses
the services of an investment banker, books are not opened for investors. The investment
2See Debreu (1959) and Arrow (1964) for reference.
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banker acts as an intermediary and makes certain oﬀers to potential investors. Investors can
merely approximate the ﬁrm’s value. Then deviations in valuation on the buy side are caused
by information asymmetry. We assume that a ﬁrm’s management and an investor can agree
on terms of ﬁnancing if management’s valuation of the ﬁrm is lower than or equal to that of
the investor3.
3 Loan Financing
In case of loan ﬁnancing, management approaches banks, one potential lender after an-
other. A potential lender checks the company’s books and thereafter negotiates with man-
agement the loan’s terms. If management values the company not higher than a potential
creditor, the parties agree on terms for raising investment level K∗. We assume that manage-
ment negotiates with potential creditors one after another until the ﬁrst satisfying ﬁnancing
rate is achieved. Furthermore we assume that searching for a creditor, due diligence and ne-
gotiations generates a certain cost for management cM per potential creditor. In our model,
each player’s valuation is uniformly distributed on
[1− α, 1 + α]V (K∗)= [(1− α)V (K∗), (1 + α)V (K∗)]=: [vd, vu].
Denote management’s valuation by VM and potential lender k’s valuation by VIk . Probability
that management values the company higher than lender k is thus ex ante given by 0.5,
independently for each lender. When a negotiation is successful, then the "ﬁnancing charge"
that lender k oﬀers is drawn from a known random variable, which is uniformly distributed
on [r, r], with 0 ≤ r < r < ∞. We use the term ﬁnancing charge to account for the loan
interest and all other cost imposed by debt covenants.
Management acts fully rational and thus pursues an optimal negotiation strategy. This in-
cludes that, given a certain negotiation history, management can determine future negotiation
success more precisely. Assume that management has already lead one successful negotiation
and is oﬀered ﬁnancing charge r to ﬁnance investment K∗. Then management has to decide
to either accept this oﬀer or to approach another potential lender. The latter case costs at
least the amount cM , as at least one more potential lender needs to be approached. How-
ever, there is a chance that further negotiations lead to a better ﬁnancing charge r∗ and
thus to decreased ﬁnancing costs r∗K∗. Savings due to better ﬁnancing conditions add up
to rK∗ − r∗K∗ = (r − r∗)K∗. On the other hand, that additional negotiation costs the ﬁrm
the amount cM . Therefore after each negotiation management faces the decision whether to
3The probability that a ﬁrm’s management’s and an investor’s valuation are equal is a zero set. The
probability of this event thus is zero. With no loss of generality, we may also say that the parties can agree
on terms of ﬁnancing, when an investor’s valuation exceeds that of a ﬁrm’s management.
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close the negotiation process or to conduct further negotiations with a potential creditor. A
crucial ingredient for this decision is negotiation history.
The ﬁrst lemma is needed on the way to calculate expected cost until deal settlement.
Lemma 1. Let X1, X2, ..., Xn be iid random variables, with X1 d= unif [x1, x2]. Then the cdf
of min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) is given by M(x) = 1−
(
x2−x
x2−x1
)n
. The pdf of min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) is
given by m(x) = n (x2−x)n−1(x2−x1)n .
Proof: See the Appendix.
If needed, the notation of the functions M and m is expanded in an intuitive way. Then
we may for instance write M(x, x1, x2, n) instead of M(x). The lemma is a key ingredient
to next proposition’s proof. The proposition introduces a formula for the updated density of
valuation imprecision that management calculates during the negotiation process.
Proposition 1. When n prior negotiations were successful and m were unsuccessful, then the
posterior density of a ﬁrm’s management’s valuation imprecision is calculated by the formula
fm,n(x) =
(b− x)n (x− a)m∑n
k=0
∑m
l=0
(
n
k
)(
m
l
)
(−1)k+m−lam−lbn−k 1
k+l+1(bk+l+1 − ak+l+1)
.
For simpliﬁcation we use the notation a := 1− α and b := 1 + α.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 introduces the formula of the updated posterior density of their valuation
imprecision that management calculates at each stage in the negotiation process. The formula
is dependent on the number of prior successful negotiations m and unsuccessful negotiations
n. At the beginning of the negotiation process (that is represented by m = n = 0), manage-
ment believes that their imprecision is uniformly distributed on the interval [1 − α, 1 + α].
This is represented by density function f0,0 = 0.5/α, which is the density function of a random
variable that is uniformly distributed on [1− α, 1 + α]. In negotiation process, management
knows that m prior negotiations were successful and n prior negotiations were unsuccessful.
Management then can optimally update their valuation imprecision density to fm,n. When
more prior negotiations were successful than unsuccessful, then the probability that manage-
ment undervalues the ﬁrm is above average. That is represented by a shift of management’s
updated density to the left. On the contrary, when more prior negotiations were unsuccess-
ful than successful, then the probability that management has a valuation above average
increases. As a result, the updated density function shifts to the right.
In negotiation process, management decides to accept the best oﬀer from previous suc-
cessful negotiations or to continue negotiating. The decision management faces is dependent
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on several factors. As discussed above, prior negotiations and their successes changes the
updated density function of valuation imprecision. Negotiation history therefore inﬂuences
management’s decision, whether to accept a given oﬀer or not. Further deciding factors are
the ﬁnancing charge r, the distribution of oﬀers, the volume of the loan K∗ and the cost per
negotiation cM :
In fact, in any stage of the negotiation process, management calculates their updated
density of valuation imprecision. From that function, management can derive the posterior
probability that the next negotiation is successful. Negotiation history thus is a crucial
decision factor. Proposition 1 presents the formula for these calculations.
Assume management has a certain ﬁnancing oﬀer at rate r. When r is above average, then
further negotiations lead to better ﬁnancing charges with a probability that exceeds 0.5. A
ﬁnancing oﬀer r below average implies a lower probability to achieve a better oﬀer in further
negotiations.
When the ﬁrm wants to raise the amountK∗, then a reduction in ﬁnancing charges reduces
the cost of capital. Now assume that credit volume is below K∗. Then the eﬀect of reduced
capital costs looses strength. When the loan size is above K∗, then a change in the ﬁnancing
rate reduces costs of capital more. The loan size K∗ therefore is a factor that management
takes into consideration for its optimal negotiation strategy.
Now consider cost per negotiation cM . If that cost is high, then negotiations will be
continued when chances to improve ﬁnancing conditions are promising. Underlie small, or
even zero negotiation cost. This favours further negotiations, even when the probability for
improved ﬁnancing conditions is low.
We summarize that negotiation history, best available ﬁnancing charge r, loan size K∗ and
cost per negotiation cM are factors that a ﬁrm’s management considers to implement optimal
negotiation strategy. The theorem formalizes the verbal argumentation above.
Theorem 1. Assume n ≥ 1 prior negotiations were successful and m ≥ 0 were unsuccessful.
Let 0 ≤ cM be a ﬁrm’s cost per negotiation and ﬁnancing charge be uniformly distributed on
the interval [r, r], with 0 ≤ r < r < ∞. Let the current best ﬁnancing charge be r ∈ [r, r].
Then the ﬁrm’s management closes the negotiation process and accepts charge r if r < r∗.
The indiﬀerence charge r∗ is deﬁned by
r∗ := r +
√
2∆rcrel
P
,
where P > 0 is the probability that the next negotiation is successful.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Theorem 1 gives management a decision rule for accepting the current loan conditions or
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to conduct further negotiations. That decision rule uses all available information from prior
negotiations.
When the actual cost of debt capital rK∗ exceeds management’s expectations, then the
management seeks alternative sources of debt capital. When the actual ﬁnancing charge r is
higher than the indiﬀerence cost of debt capital r∗, then a ﬁrm’s management should conduct
further negotiations. If r is below that charge, management should settle the ﬁnancing deal at
rate r. When the loan cost equals management’s expected cost of capital, then management
is indiﬀerent. As shown in the proof theorem 1, for a continuous distribution density function,
the probability of this event is zero.
In addition, theorem 1 shows that when loan negotiation cost are zero, the optimal ﬁ-
nancing charge is r +
√
2∆rcrel
P
= r. Therefore when search and negotiation costs are zero,
management stops the search until the best loan conditions are oﬀered. In the remainder of
this section this issue is discussed in more detail.
The analysis of management’s negotiation strategy provides a decision rule on continu-
ing loan search and negotiations. The next 2 propositions set conditions under which the
management will accept a successfully negotiated oﬀer.
Proposition 2. When relative search and negotiation cost cM/K∗ exceeds the bound (r−r)/3,
then a ﬁrm’s management deterministically accepts the ﬁrst successfully negotiated oﬀer. The
expected ﬁnancing charge is (r − r)/2 in this "shortest negotiation process".
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 3. When relative search and negotiation cost cM/K∗ exceeds the bound (r − r)/12,
then a ﬁrm’s management accepts the oﬀer of the ﬁrst successfully negotiated oﬀer with prob-
ability of at least 0.5.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above propositions 2 and 3 set conditions under which management accepts the
oﬀer of the ﬁrst successfully negotiated oﬀer. Proposition 2 states when management always
accepts the ﬁrst ﬁnancing oﬀer, whereas proposition 3 gives a condition for an acceptance
with probability of at least 0.5.
Proposition 2 sets conditions when a ﬁrm’s management accepts the ﬁrst successfully
negotiated ﬁnancing oﬀer with certainty, whereas proposition 3 gives a condition for accepting
that oﬀer on average. Here, by on average we mean that the probability exceeds 0.5. Obviously
the condition of accepting the ﬁrst oﬀer deterministically is stronger than to accept it on
average. The intuition behind this proposition is that the lower bound of (r−r)/12 is smaller
than the lower bound (r − r)/3. Under the ﬁrst bound the shortest negotiating process is
chosen on average while under the second bound it is chosen deterministically.
171
For the 2 propositions we need the following parameters: (1) Search and negotiation cost as
a proportion of loan size crel = c/K∗, and (2) the spread ∆ between best and worst ﬁnancing
charges. That is, ∆ = r− r. When relative negotiation costs are higher than one third of the
spread of ﬁnancing charges, that is crel ≥ ∆/3, then proposition 2 states that management
always closes the negotiation process after the ﬁrst successfully negotiated oﬀer. That is, when
the negotiation cost are higher, then a ﬁrm’s management ends negotiations sooner. When the
loan size increases, management is willing to conduct more loan negotiations. This proposition
also implies that a higher spread in ﬁnancing charges encourages management to conduct
additional negotiations. When ﬁnancing charges vary by a spread of larger diﬀerence in best
and worse ﬁnancing charges, then this increases chances to improve ﬁnancing conditions by
continuing negotiations.
For example, let us consider relative negotiation cost that exceeds the bounds of the ﬁ-
nancing spread. Assume relative negotiation costs are higher than 1/12 of ﬁnancing spread,
i.e. crel ≥ ∆/12. Then proposition 3 states that management on average closes the nego-
tiation process after the ﬁrst successfully negotiated oﬀer. When the ﬁnancing oﬀer of that
negotiation exceeds the upper bound set in theorem 1, then negotiations are continued. The
inequality crel ≥ ∆/12 has the same implications regarding changes in model parameters as
proposition 2. The above argumentation provides us with a lower bound for relative nego-
tiation cost such that management on average accepts the ﬁrst successfully negotiated oﬀer.
That cost is ex ante 1/12 of the spread between best and worst outcome of a successful nego-
tiation. For instance, when the spread is 12%, then a negotiation cost of 1% of loan size (or
higher) causes a ﬁrm’s management to accept the ﬁrst oﬀer on average. When that relative
cost is 1/3 of the spread or higher, then management accepts the ﬁrst successfully negotiated
oﬀer with probability 1. In our example, management deterministically accepts the ﬁrst oﬀer
when the relative negotiation cost exceeds the lower bound crel = c/K∗ ≥ 4%. In other words,
the ﬁrst oﬀer is accepted deterministically when the cost per negotiation is higher than 4%
of debt capital K∗.
In summary, under the above 2 propositions, the ﬁrst successfully negotiated oﬀer will
accepted with probability of at least 0.5, or deterministically. We have acceptance with
probability of at least 0.5 when ∆/12 ≤ crel < ∆/3 and ﬁrst oﬀer acceptance with probability
1, while crel ≥ ∆/3.
The next proposition provides a general formula that combines the probability for the
shortest negotiation process and a lower bound for the relative negotiation cost.
Proposition 4. A ﬁrm’s management optimally chooses the shortest negotiation process
with at least probability p ∈ [0, 1], when relative negotiation cost crel exceed the lower bound
p2(r−r)/3. That is, when relative negotiation cost and spread in ﬁnancing charges are known,
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then the probability4 that it is optimal to stop the negotiation process after the ﬁrst successfully
negotiated oﬀer is at least p∗ =
√
3crel
∆r .
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above proposition calculates lower bounds for the relative negotiation cost such that
management optimally chooses the shortest negotiation process with at least probability p ∈
[0, 1]. The proposition is in accordance with the formulas from propositions 2 and 3 when we
allow p = 1 and p = 0.5, respectively.
The formula from the proposition may further by rearranged. As a result, we get a bound
for the probability that management ﬁnds the shortest negotiation process most preferable
as a function of ﬁnancing spread and relative negotiation cost. This bound is, p∗ =
√
3crel
∆r .
As a result, assume that relative negotiation cost and the spread in ﬁnancing conditions are
known. Then a lower bound for the probability that a ﬁrm’s management chooses shortest
negotiation process can be calculated. This probability is given by the formula above. It can
be seen that an increase in relative negotiation cost and a decrease in the ﬁnancing spread
have positive eﬀect on the probability that management closes loan negotiations after the ﬁrst
successful negotiation.
The lower bound for relative negotiation cost is a linear function in the spread of ﬁnancing
conditions. That is, when this spread is zero (then each lender oﬀers the same conditions
deterministically) then that lower bound is zero. As a result, a ﬁrm’s management always
optimally chooses the shortest negotiation process. Intuitively, when the spread in ﬁnancing
conditions is zero, then the ﬁrst oﬀer is the best that can be achieved. Further negotiations
thus can not result in a more favourable ﬁnancing charge.
When the spread in ﬁnancing conditions doubles, then relative negotiation costs also may
double, while the probability that management optimally chooses the shortest negotiation
process remains constant.
In the next proposition we discuss the inﬂuence of zero negotiation costs on the negotiation
process.
Proposition 5. If and only if negotiation cost is zero, management negotiates indeﬁnitely.
When negotiation costs are greater than zero, there is a deterministic end to the negotiation
process.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that only when negotiations are not costless, then management even-
tually accepts an oﬀer and closes the deal. Intuitively, proposition 5 means that for every
4Note that this formula may exceed a maximum probability of 1. Rigorously, the term p∗ = min(
√
3crel
∆r , 1)
is correct.
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positive negotiation cost, there is a ﬁnancing oﬀer, which should optimally be accepted. That
is, then additional negotiation costs are no longer justiﬁed by potential gains by further ne-
gotiations. Theorem 1 provides a formula for calculating the acceptable optimal loan cost,
given a ﬁnancing charge.
When there are no negotiation costs, then there is a chance that the management ﬁnds a
better ﬁnancing oﬀer in the future by continuing negotiations. Therefore it is not optimal for
the management to end the negotiation process.
The next proposition calculates the average cost for a shortest negotiation process.
Proposition 6. Assume the ﬁrm follows the shortest negotiation process and stops negotia-
tions after N ∈ N unsuccessful negotiations. When negotiation cost are cM , then the ﬁrm’s
expected negotiation costs are
E(C) = cM
(
ln(N) + γ +O
( 1
N2
))
,
where γ ≈ 0.5772 is the Euler Mascheroni constant.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 6 allows to calculate the expected costs for loan negotiations that the ﬁrm
incurs. These costs are dependent on the cost per negotiation. When this cost is higher,
then the total costs also rise. Expected negotiation costs in particular is a linear function in
cost per negotiation. That is, when that cost is zero, then the negotiation process is costless.
Further, doubling cost per negotiation doubles expected cost for the negotiation process.
Its cost furthermore depends on the number of unsuccessful negotiations that the man-
agement allows until the negotiation process is unsuccessfully stopped. That is, when the
management allows a high number of unsuccessful negotiations, then the total costs for the
negotiation process increase.
Let us now analyse the implication of our model from a ﬁnanciers perspective. In partic-
ular, we investigate the eﬀect of expected deal settlement cost on providers of debt capital.
Lemma 2. Given a negotiation cost of cI for the bank and negotiations cost of crel ≥ ∆/3
for a ﬁrm, then on average a bank spends 2cI to close a debt contract.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 analyses individual bank negotiations with a credit applicant. The bank receives
an acceptable loan application with p = 1/2 (our modelling is robust for values 0 < p < 1)
and then makes a ﬁnancing oﬀer to that applicant. If the ﬁrm’s relative negotiation costs are
greater than ∆/3, then the ﬁrm accepts the debt contract. Therefore successful debt contracts
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are geometrically distributed with p = 1/2. The mean of this distribution is 2. That is, a bank
on average negotiates with 2 applicants before it successfully closes a deal. Therefore a bank’s
negotiation costs are 2cI . This cost is derived based on the ﬁrm’s management accepting the
ﬁrst bank loan contract. When crel < ∆/3 threshold, then the ﬁrm’s management may reject
a few loan oﬀers. In that case, the bank’s negotiation costs would be greater than 2cI .
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Fig. 1 – Lower bound for relative negotiation cost to cause shortest negotiation process
We analyse the interdependence of the probability that management chooses the short-
est negotiation process, a ﬁrm’s management’s relative negotiation cost and the spread in
ﬁnancing charges. A formula for the lower bound of relative negotiation cost as a function
of probability and ﬁnancing spread was established in proposition 4. Figure 1 illustrates this
formula.
In ﬁgure 1 (a), the x-axis illustrates probability. On the y-axis, the lower bound for
relative negotiation cost is drawn. Each of the three lines shows the lower bound for relative
negotiation cost, such that the shortest negotiation process is the best negotiation strategy,
as a function of the probability for this event. The three lines represent ﬁnancing spread of
0.05 in blue (that is, ∆r = r − r = 0.05), a spread of 0.1 (in red) and 0.2 (in black).
When the probability is zero on the x-axis, that is, the shortest negotiation process is
chosen with a probability that exceeds zero, then any relative negotiation cost is suﬃcient
for this event. When we observe probability of 1, then a relative negotiation cost of ∆r/3
is necessary to have shortest negotiation process with that probability. This can be seen
from the ﬁgure, where these values are 1.67% (when ∆r = 0.05), 3.33% (when ∆r = 0.1)
and 6.67% (when ∆r = 0.2). When we observe for instance p = 0.5, then the lower bound
for relative negotiation cost is ∆r/12. This can also been observed from the ﬁgure. The
bound for relative negotiation cost is linear in ﬁnancing spread. Furthermore, that bound is
increasing in ﬁnancing spread. This means that, given a certain bound for the probability, a
175
ﬁrm’s management is less likely to conduct shortest negotiation process when the ﬁnancing
spread increases.
Figure 1 (b) shows the lower bound for relative negotiation costs as a function of ﬁnancing
spread, such that a ﬁrm’s management chooses the shortest negotiation process at least with
a given probability. On the x-axis, the ﬁnancing spread is drawn. The y-axis shows the
lower bound for relative negotiation cost. The three lines determine lower bounds for relative
negotiation cost, such that the shortest negotiation process is chosen at least with a given
probability. The black line in this ﬁgure shows conditions, when the shortest negotiation
process is optimal with probability 1. The red (blue) line illustrates this condition for a
probability that is at least 0.75 (0.5).
When the spread in ﬁnancing charges increases, then management is more likely to con-
duct more negotiations. That is, then the opportunity to obtain better ﬁnancing conditions
by further negotiations increases. When we decrease the certainty of the event that a ﬁrm’s
management ﬁnds the shortest negotiation process optimal, then the conditions may be weak-
ened. This can be observed in the ﬁgure, as the black (red) line always is above the red (blue)
line.
In our model each party suﬀers from a valuation imprecision. However, the distribution
of the valuation imprecision is known by both parties. Let us continue with a numerical
simulation, where the maximum valuation imprecision is α = 10%. However, our analysis is
robust enough that it holds for any valuation imprecision 0 < α < 1.
Figure 2 (a) and (b) is drawn for two diﬀerent negotiation processes. Management’s
updated estimation of their valuation imprecision in each negotiation process A and B is
graphed in ﬁgure 2.
The graphs in ﬁgure 2 are distribution functions for management’s Bayesian updated
estimation of valuation imprecision during bank loan negotiations5.
Figure 2 (a) is based on a relatively less successful sample negotiation process A. In this
process the ﬁrst ﬁve negotiations are unsuccessful (indicated by (j, 0), j = 0, 1, ..., 5). This is
followed by four successful negotiations, where management receives ﬁnancing oﬀers (indicated
by (5, i), i = 1, 2, 3, 4). At the beginning of the negotiations (when there is no negotiation
history) management estimates a uniform distribution of imprecision. This is indicated by
a horizontal line at negotiation history (0, 0) (i.e. a constant distribution function). During
the negotiations, management’s loan application is denied 5 times. In that case, management
updates its imprecision estimation and concludes that it is likely that it has initially overvalued
the ﬁrm. This process is indicated by the dashed functions drawn between (0, 0) and (5, 0).
5If the value of α is diﬀerent than 0.1, then the scale of the graphs changes. However, the proportions
of the curve do not change. That is, the shape of management’s updated estimation of their imprecision is
independent of maximal valuation imprecision α.
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Fig. 2 – Management’s Bayesian updated estimation of valuation imprecision during bank
loan negotiations
In these dashed functions, the updated distribution mass shifts to the right of the curve. In
subsequent negotiations, 4 bank loan applications of this ﬁrm are approved. This shifts the
ﬁrm’s updated Bayesian distribution function toward the mean valuation. This is indicated
by (5, 4) and the process is drawn by the dotted functions between (5, 4) and (5, 0).
When the negotiation process starts, the probability of receiving a loan approval is ex
ante 50%. However, at (5, 4), calculating the probability of a loan approval from the evolved
density function, results to a Bayesian loan approval probability of 37.7%.
Figure 2 (b) graphs a relatively more successful negotiation process B. In that process the
ﬁrm receives four loan approvals (indicated by (0, i) , where i = 0, 1, ..., 4). These four loan
approvals are followed by two loan rejections (indicated by (j, 5), where j = 1, 2). At the
beginning of the negotiation process (point (0, 0)), the management has a uniform valuation
imprecision on the interval [1−α, 1+α]. This is indicated by the uniform distribution function
f ≡ 5. Note that a diﬀerent α than 0.1 generates a diﬀerent uniform distribution, that the
integral over the interval [1− α, 1 + α] is equal 1. As the negotiation process continues, after
(0, 4), where four loan applications are approved and none rejected, the management updates
its distribution of its Bayesian distribution. They are conﬁdent that their estimation has more
mass below average valuation. This can be seen by the distribution function with negotiation
history (0, 4) that has most mass left to 1. Updated distribution functions of the negotiation
process (0, i), i = 1, ...3 are plotted in dashed lines between distribution functions (0, 0) and
(0, 4). Management can be more optimistic for future negotiation success. In sample process
B however, the ﬁrm’s management’s loan application is rejected in the next two negotiations
(indicated by negotiation history (2, 4)). That process is graphed by the dotted distribution
function (1, 4) between the distribution functions (0, 4) and (2, 4). After 4 loan approvals and
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2 rejections, management updates their estimation on valuation imprecision. It calculates
that their valuation distribution has high mass close to, but below average valuation. In fact,
for the next negotiation, management’s updated Bayesian success probability is 77.3%.
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Fig. 3 – Indiﬀerence ﬁnancing charge as a function of negotiation history and cost
Figure 3 shows indiﬀerence ﬁnancing charges r∗ as a function of negotiation history and
cost. Tables 1 and 2 summarize key properties of negotiation processes A and B, respectively.
For the above calculations r d= unif [5%, 10%]. In both ﬁgures the x-axis illustrates the
number of unsuccessful negotiations and negotiation successes are drawn on the y-axis. The
colour indicates indiﬀerence ﬁnancing charges for diﬀerent combinations of successful and
unsuccessful negotiations.
In ﬁgure 3 (a) the sample negotiation process A is illustrated. In this ﬁgure, the underlying
indiﬀerence ﬁnancing charges for a relative negotiation cost crel = cM/K∗ = 0.001 are shown.
The ﬁgure shows that r∗ is roughly between 5.5% and 8.0%. Also r∗ is increasing in the
number of unsuccessful negotiations. This result is not surprising, as an increasing number
of unsuccessful negotiations suggests that a ﬁrm’s management’s valuation is comparatively
high and therefore ex ante, the probability of future negotiation success decreases. Thus, the
probability that negotiation costs are wasted is increasing. As a result, management is willing
to accept higher ﬁnancing charges.
An increasing number of negotiation successes on the contrary indicates ex ante that
further negotiations are more likely to be successful as well, leading to a decreasing level of
acceptable ﬁnancing charges.
The black line in ﬁgure 3 (a) shows example negotiation process A. That process further
can be followed in table 1. In ﬁgure 3 (a) the negotiation process starts at (0, 0), which means
that there are no previous successful or unsuccessful negotiations. In negotiation process
A, the ﬁrst 5 negotiations are unsuccessful. During that negotiation process, management’s
updated indiﬀerence ﬁnancing charge rises from 5.70% to 7.00%, as can be seen in the ﬁgure
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on the black line from (0, 0) to (5, 0). This means that at the initiation of negotiations,
management would have found 5.70% an acceptable oﬀer. As the ﬁrst, second, third, fourth
and ﬁfth negotiations fail, management estimates their valuation higher compared to the
average of further ﬁnanciers’ valuations. That higher valuation on management’s side leads to
a diminishing probability for negotiation success. Therefore management is willing to accept
a higher ﬁnancing charge for the loan. In the example, the 6th negotiation is successful. That
is represented by the point (5, 1) on the plane in ﬁgure 3 (a). As a result, management’s
indiﬀerence charge decreases to 6.27%. That is, when for instance an investor’s oﬀer is 8%,
then management continues negotiations, because that oﬀer exceeds management’s upper
bound.
Negotiation # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Success n n n n n y y y y
Oﬀer rate - - - - - 8.0% 6.1% 6.0% 5.5%
Best oﬀer - - - - - 8.0% 6.1% 6.0% 5.5%
Indiﬀerence rate 6.00% 6.27% 6.53% 6.77% 7.00% 6.27% 6.00% 5.85% 5.76%
Further Negotiations y y y y y y y y n
Table 1 – Properties of negotiation process A (crel = 0.1%)
It can be seen from table 1 that the ﬁrm’s management leads 3 more negotiations, which are
all successful in negotiation process A. During these successful negotiations, the management’s
indiﬀerence charge decreases from 6.27% to 6.00% (represented by the point (5, 2)), to 5.85%
(represented by the point (5, 3)), to 5.76% at the point (5, 4). When for instance the second
successful negotiation’s oﬀer is 6.1%, then this oﬀer is more favourable than the previous best
oﬀer. However, that oﬀer exceeds the current management’s indiﬀerence charge of 6.00%. The
investor’s oﬀer after the next successful negotiation is 6%. In the previous step, management
would have accepted that oﬀer. Due to a further negotiation success, management is more
optimistic regarding future negotiations. In fact, management’s updated indiﬀerence charge
is 5.85% and therefore the current oﬀer is declined and further negotiations are conduced.
That next negotiation is successful and the investor oﬀers 5.5%. That investor’s oﬀer is below
management’s updated indiﬀerence charge, which is 5.76%. Therefore the ﬁrm’s management
accepts that oﬀer.
In summary, management conducted 9 negotiations. Thus the ﬁrm’s negotiation costs
sum up to 9 · crel = 9 · 0.001K∗ = 0.009K∗, which is 0.8% of credit volume.
Underlying high negotiation costs, management accepts higher ﬁnancing charges. That
is, the number of negotiations should be reduced due to increased costs. The actual inﬂuence
of comparatively high negotiation costs are illustrated in ﬁgure 3 (b). In this example, we
follow negotiation process B with negotiation cost per negotiation that amounts to 1% of loan
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volume.
Negotiation # 1 2 3 4 5 6
Success y y y y n n
Oﬀer rate 9.0% 9.3% 8.4% 8.6% - -
Best oﬀer 9.0% 9.0% 8.4% 8.4% 8.4% 8.4 %
Indiﬀerence rate 8.52% 8.24% 8.09% 8.00% 8.35% 8.68%
Further Negotiations y y y y y n
Table 2 – Properties of negotiation process B (crel = 1%)
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Fig. 4 – Properties of negotiation process as a function of relative negotiation cost crel
The ﬁgure shows that when the number of unsuccessful negotiations exceeds the number of
successful negotiations, then management should accept the best available oﬀer and conduct
no further negotiations deterministically. In the plane of maximal 10 (un)successful negoti-
ations, minimum indiﬀerence charge is just below 8%. That indiﬀerence charge signiﬁcantly
exceeds that from ﬁgure 3 (a), where negotiation costs were lower. When relative negotiation
cost is 1%, then indiﬀerence charge of 10% is reached whenever there are more unsuccessful
than successful negotiations. In that case management accepts any given oﬀer.
We follow negotiation process B, that is indicated by the red line in ﬁgure 3 (b) and
summarised in table 2. Negotiations start at the point (0, 0), that indicates that no previous
negotiations have been lead. The ﬁrst negotiation is successful. As a result of this success,
management’s updated indiﬀerence charge is 8.52%. Management however gets oﬀered 9%.
That coupon exceeds management’s indiﬀerence charge. Therefore it is optimal for the man-
agement to conduct a further negotiation. That next negotiation is successful in our example
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and it is optimal that further negotiations are conducted until 4 negotiations were successful.
That process is represented by the red line from (0, 0) the point (0, 4) in ﬁgure 3 (b). Due to
these successful negotiations, management updates their indiﬀerence charge to 8.00%. In our
example, the present best oﬀer is a charge of 8.40%. If that was the oﬀer of the ﬁrst successful
negotiation, management would have accepted it. However, in the negotiation process, man-
agement updated their assumptions about the success probability of further negotiations.
In fact, they estimate relatively well success probability and thus management decline the
present oﬀer of 8.40%. In our example the next negotiation fails, represented by a move to
the point (1, 4) in ﬁgure 3 (b). Consequently management’s updated indiﬀerence charge rises
to 8.35%, which still exceeds the present best oﬀer. Therefore it is optimal for the manage-
ment to conduct further negotiations. In the example the next negotiation is unsuccessful
and management increases their updated indiﬀerence charge to 8.68%, that is represented by
the point (2, 4). At this point of the negotiation process, the indiﬀerence interest charge of
8.68% exceeds the best oﬀer of 8.35%. Therefore it is optimal to close the negotiation process
and accept the best oﬀer, which is 8.35%.
In this negotiation process 6 negotiations were conduced. Therefore the ﬁrm’s negotiation
costs sum up to 6 · 0.01K∗ = 0.06K∗, which amounts to 6% of the loan size.
Probabilities are an important factor to this negotiation model because negotiation success
and ﬁnancing charges are random. That is, the negotiation process, its length and ﬁnancing
conditions depend on numerous interacting random factors. The remainder of this section
analyses properties of the negotiation process and expected ﬁnancing conditions. We have
proven that when crel ≥ ∆/3, then a ﬁrm’s management deterministically closes the negotia-
tion process after the ﬁrst successful negotiation. This was shown in proposition 2. Financing
charges then are the average between the most favourable and the worst possible oﬀer. While
relative negotiation costs are within the bounds ∆/12 ≤ crel < ∆/3, proposition 3 states
that management closes the negotiation process after the ﬁrst negotiation with a probability
that exceeds 0.5. Proposition 4 further provided a lower bound for relative negotiation cost
as a function of probability such that the shortest negotiation process is preferred. However,
while that probability is below 1, ex post management may ﬁnd it optimal to continue nego-
tiations. When crel = 0, then the ﬁrm’s management always continues negotiating because
the next negotiation always oﬀers positive expectation on better ﬁnancing conditions for free,
according to proposition 5.
Next, we analyse how often management negotiates on average until a ﬁnancing agreement
is met. Furthermore, the average ﬁnancing charge as a function of relative negotiation cost
will be analysed. The number of negotiations, average ﬁnancing conditions and costs per
negotiation ﬁnally lead to the total costs associated with loan ﬁnancing.
The further analysis is based on a Monte-Carlo simulation. 250,000 random negotiation
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Fig. 5 – Properties of negotiation process as a function of relative negotiation cost crel
processes were ran and their average properties are presented. Due to the Law of Large
Numbers, that is a decent size to draw suﬃciently exact conclusions on analytical mean
values.
Figures 4 and 5 show major properties of the negotiation process as a function of ne-
gotiation costs. As in the above examples, the distribution of ﬁnancing charges is r d=
unif [5%, 10%]. On the x-axis of each ﬁgure, relative negotiation costs crel = cM/K∗ are
drawn. We concentrate on negotiation cost that exceed zero because in the latter case, a ﬁrm
deterministically gets oﬀered best ﬁnancing conditions for zero cost.
When relative negotiation cost is above or equal to ∆r/3, then it is optimal for a ﬁrm’s
management to always accept the ﬁrst oﬀer. In this example, ∆r/3 = 5/3% ≈ 1.67%. This
statement can be observed in ﬁgure 4, when the management behaves accordingly and accepts
the ﬁrst successfully negotiated oﬀer when negotiation cost exceeds 1.67% of loan size.
In ﬁgure 4 (a), average number of successful negotiations until negotiation process is
terminated is shown. For low negotiation costs, management continues negotiations even when
they received an oﬀer. The number of rejected oﬀers decreases with increasing negotiation
costs. From negotiation costs of approx. 1% of loan size, management accepts most oﬀers.
Management deterministically accepts the ﬁrst oﬀer when negotiation costs exceed of 1.67%
of loan size.
The number of negotiations of an average negotiation process is decreasing in negotiation
costs, as can be seen in 4 (b). In fact the number of negotiations per negotiation process
converges to approximately 3.576 for high negotiation costs. That is, there are approximately
2.57 unsuccessful negotiations until deal settlement, even when management accepts the ﬁrst
successfully negotiated oﬀer. The explanation is that when management values the company
6Apply proposition 6 with N = 20.
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comparably high, then the negotiation success probability diminishes to a greater extent than
the success probability increases as a result of undervaluation.
Figure 5 (a) shows average ﬁnancing charges for the loan. While negotiation costs are
low, management negotiates more and as a result, the ﬁnancing charges are relatively low at
approx. 5.5%. This is almost the minimum charge, which is 5%. When management decides
on fewer negotiations when the negotiation costs increase, then the ﬁnancing charges rise.
When management accepts the ﬁrst oﬀer deterministically, then ﬁnancing charges are exactly
average at 7.5%.
Financing costs are analysed in ﬁgure 5 (b). The red line shows costs for the negotiation
process. Total cost, which is the sum of negotiation costs and ﬁnancing charges are illustrated
by the black line. Obviously both costs are increasing in negotiation costs. Their increase is
approximately linear.
In proposition 4 we calculated a lower bound for the probability that the shortest negoti-
ation process is the most eﬃcient negotiation strategy. This lower bound is a function of the
spread in ﬁnancing charges and relative negotiation cost. Figure 6 shows this lower bound as
a function of relative negotiation cost and for diﬀerent spreads in ﬁnancing charges.
For the simulation of the actual probability 100,000 sample negotiation processes were
run for each relative negotiation cost. For the simulation, one needs the probability of a
negotiation success when no prior negotiation was successful and m were unsuccessful. That
probability can be calculated from proposition 1 and is given by 2/(m+ 3).
In ﬁgure 6 (a) a spread of 5% in ﬁnancing charges is illustrated and in ﬁgure 6 (b) that
spread is 20%. On the x-axis, the relative negotiation cost is drawn. The y-axis illustrates
the probability as a function of negotiation cost. Additionally to the lower bounds that
are calculated from proposition 4, the simulated probabilities are illustrated. The simula-
tions are close approximations to the true probability that a ﬁrm’s management chooses the
shortest negotiation process. Intuitively, the simulation therefore exceeds the lower bound
of that probability. In both ﬁgures, however, the calculated lower bound is close to the true
probability.
In ﬁgure 6 (a), where the spread in ﬁnancing conditions is 5%, the shortest negotiation
process is deterministically preferable, when relative negotiation cost exceeds 1.67%. That can
be seen from the ﬁgure when both, the simulation and the analytically calculated probability
for this event are 1. A probability that exceeds 0.5 is obtained from negotiation cost that
exceed 0.05/12% ≈ 0.42% of loan size.
In ﬁgure 6 (b), where the spread in ﬁnancing conditions is 20%, the shortest negotiation
process is deterministically preferable, when relative negotiation cost exceeds 16.7%. That can
be seen from the ﬁgure when both, the simulation and the analytically calculated probability
for this event are 1. A probability that exceeds 0.5 is obtained from negotiation cost that
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exceed 0.2/12% ≈ 1.67% of loan size.
Comparing ﬁgure 6 (a) and (b), one can see that the shapes of the lines in both ﬁgures are
similar. Just the scale of the x−axis is diﬀerent. That is, in ﬁgure 6 (a), relative negotiation
cost reach up to 0.02, whereas the scale of ﬁgure 6 (b) reaches its maximum at 0.08. The latter
ﬁgure however, illustrates probabilities for a ﬁnancing spread that is 4 times higher than that
in ﬁgure 6 (a). As a result one can see that the probability for the shortest negotiation process
to be optimal is linear in the ﬁnancing spread, as these ﬁgures are almost indistinguishable
from their shape.
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Fig. 6 – Calculated lower bound and simulation of the probability that the shortest negotiation
process is most eﬃcient negotiation strategy
Now, let us introduce an investment banker’s strategy.
4 Intermediation
The placement of debt securities is conducted pursuant to the 1933 Securities Act or to
Rule 506 of regulation D., as Arena (2010) notes. According to these rules, ﬁrms may issue an
unlimited amount of securities to an arbitrary number of accredited investors and up to 35 so
called sophisticated investors. Typically ﬁrms place private debt with insurance companies,
banks, high net worth individuals and private investment ﬁrms. Although these ﬁrms are
still important players, they lost their dominance after the private debt market crunch in the
early 1990s, as Carey et al. (1993) note.
An intermediary brings issuer and investor together. They are usually underwriters of
banks or private investment ﬁrms. Usually private oﬀerings are conduced on a best eﬀorts
rather than on ﬁrm commitment basis.
Underwriter’s compensation is often closely bounded to bond volume and therefore depen-
dent on the underwriter’s success and the bond volume he places. Smith (1985) asks, "What
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determines optimal fee structure?" Baron (1979) analyses contracts in investment banking in
general and in particular focuses on contracts under asymmetric information together with
Holstrom (1980). In our model we work with fees that are proportional to bond volume.
Section 3 showed that the negotiation process in loan ﬁnancing is cost intensive for a ﬁrm
and investors, with negotiation costs cM and cI , respectively. An underwriter, such as an
investment banker, is assigned to market a ﬁrm’s debt in the form of bonds in this section.
In our model, the bond volume is ﬁxed at K∗. The intermediary operates under a best eﬀorts
basis and earns a ﬁxed fee f (that is a proportion of bond volume K∗) when he successfully
markets the bonds. Therefore the costs for the bond issuance are deterministic for the ﬁrm.
A ﬁrm’s management and investors are aware of costs that are associated with loan ﬁnancing.
In our model, the ﬁrm’s management is therefore willing to accept a discount d ≥ 0 on their
valuation of the ﬁrm. Analogously investors are willing to increase their valuation by a certain
amount u ≥ 0. The investment banker then matches the ﬁrm’s management’s and investor’s
adjusted valuations. Thereby the parties must not know their respective adjusted valuations.
Otherwise they could ﬁnd a mutually satisfying agreement without the intermediary, who
would be redundant. He therefore creates an environment of information asymmetry, where
he systematically hides information from either party. In this section we show that this
strategy creates positive expected earnings for the underwriter and that it is beneﬁcial for
the ﬁrm and its investors.
In our model the expected costs for deal settlement in loan ﬁnancing are known and
given as proportions of ﬁnancing volume, represented by c∗I = cI/K∗ and c∗M = cM/K∗. The
intermediary’s fee is denoted by f and a proportion of bond volume.
The next propositions shows when a ﬁrm and its creditor proﬁt from the intermediaries
services.
Proposition 7. The ﬁrm proﬁts from intermediation while d ≤ c∗M − f and a creditor proﬁts
from intermediation while u ≤ c∗I . This means that these players proﬁt from intermediation
while discount d (valuation adjustment u) is lower than the deal settlement costs for loan
negotiations (minus dealer fee in case of the ﬁrm).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 7 determines the conditions under which the ﬁrm and lenders proﬁt from
intermediation.
A ﬁrm proﬁts, while discount d on their valuation is below loan negotiation cost minus
investment banker’s fee (each given as a proportion of placed debtK∗). Therefore low discount
d favours bond issuing over loan ﬁnancing. A low dealer fee f has the same eﬀect. As an
intuitive result, an investment banker can attract more clients when he oﬀers lower fees.
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A creditor prefers intermediation over granting a loan, while his increase in valuation is
below deal settlement cost for loan negotiations. Investing in a bond does not incur cost for
deal settlement for an investor. Thus he is willing to adjust his ﬁrm valuation while that
adjustment does not exceed deal settlement cost in loan negotiations.
The next proposition calculates the probability for successful bond placement.
Proposition 8. The probability that an intermediary can match a ﬁnancier and a borrower
is
1
2 + (u+ d− f)K
∗/2/V/α.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 8 shows the inﬂuence of model parameters on the probability for successful
bond placement. It is 0.5 plus the product (u+ d− f)K∗/2/V/α.
Management’s valuation discount d thus has positive eﬀect on the success probability.
That is, a high discount makes it easier for the investment banker’s to successfully place the
bond. Therefore the ﬁrm’s reduction in their valuation favours bond ﬁnancing negotiations
to be successful.
A high investor’s valuation adjustment u further increases the success probability for
the bond placement. That is, an investor with a higher valuation is more likely to exceed
management’s valuation than an investor with a lower valuation. When an investor accepts
a higher valuation adjustment u, then he thereby aﬀects negotiation success positively.
Low intermediation fee favours the probability that the bond can be placed successfully.
The ﬁrm pays the underwriter’s fee. Therefore it reduces the ﬁrm’s value. Compared to a
high company value, a lower valued ﬁrm is less attractive for investors. Therefore higher fees
are accompanied with a decrease in the probability that the bond can be placed successfully.
When the bond volume as a fraction of company value (K∗/V ) increases, then this aﬀects
the intermediary’s success probability negatively. K∗/V is a measure of debt to ﬁrm value.
That is, when the bond volume increases, then that ratio rises. This bares a higher risk and
consequently deal success probability decreases. This can be deducted from proposition 8 with
an analysis of the term (u+ d− f)K∗/2/V/α = (uK∗ + dK∗ − fK∗)/2/V/α. Increasing K∗
by keeping all other values ﬁxed needs some care in this case. uK∗ and dK∗ are constant
values management and investors use to adjust their respective valuations. Increasing K∗/V
thus solely aﬀects an investment banker’s fee fK∗, which is per deﬁnition a variable dependent
on K∗. It therefore can summarised that a rise in K∗/V aﬀects deal settlement probability
negatively.
Valuation imprecision α inﬂuences the intermediary’s probability for successful bond place-
186
ment negatively. High valuation imprecision implies that management’s and investor’s val-
uations may diﬀer to a greater extent. A ﬁrm’s Management increases their valuation and
investors decrease their valuation. However, given a higher valuation imprecision, the prob-
ability that adjusted valuations are compatible decreases. This aﬀects investment banker’s
success probability negatively. When valuation imprecision is minimal (α = 0), then all val-
uations are equal. As a result, any valuation adjustment that exceeds zero has the eﬀect
that a ﬁrm’s management’s and an investor’s adjusted valuations are compatible. Then the
intermediary may agree with the ﬁrst investor on terms to place the bond.
The intermediary tries to sell bonds to investors sequentially until mutually satisfactory
agreement is met. The next lemma calculates the expected negotiations until the bond is
placed.
Lemma 3. On average the intermediary conducts
E(N) = α2α + (u+ d− f)K∗/V
negotiations until the bond is successfully placed.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Lemma 3 calculates average number of negotiations until the bond is successfully placed
by an underwriter. This negotiation process can be interpreted as a geometrical distribution
with success probability p = 12 + (u+ d− f)K∗/2/V/α. The expectation of that process is
E(N) = 1/p, as stated in lemma 3.
A high success probability p lowers the expected number of necessary negotiations until
the bond is placed. Therefore the interpretations from proposition 8 apply to E(N): high in-
vestor’s adjustment, high management’s valuation discount, low intermediation fee, lowK∗/V
and low valuation imprecision have positive eﬀect on the number of necessary negotiations
until the investment banker successfully places the bond.
Proposition 8 show the inﬂuence of the model’s parameters on the intermediary’s negoti-
ation success. He earns a fee f for his services. Lemma 3 shows that the negotiation success
probability of that results from low fees exceeds that from higher fees. For an intermediary,
the upside of high fees are more earnings for successful bond placement. The downside of high
fees are more (costly) negotiations until the bond is successfully placed. Therefore there is
an optimal adequately chosen fee that maximises an intermediary’s expected earnings. When
we combine proposition 8 and lemma 3 we can calculate a dealer’s expected earnings. These
calculations are the ﬁrst step to determine the dealer’s optimal fee strategy.
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Proposition 9. Let dealer’s cost (as a proportion of K∗) per negotiation be cd. Then his
expected earnings are
E (D) = K∗ (f −E(N)cd) = K∗ (f − cd/pd) = K∗
(
f − 2αcd
α + (u+ d− f)K∗/V
)
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 9 shows that the dealer’s expected earnings depend on a number of parameters:
his fee f and cost per negotiation cd. A further determinant is E(N), the expected number
of negotiations until an agreement is met. Lemma 3 shows that the ﬁgure E(N) depends on
further model parameters.
The dealer’s expected earnings drop when his negotiation costs increase. That is, a higher
cost per negotiation aﬀect his earnings negatively. That fact can be seen from the formula,
where cd and expected earnings are negatively connected. This is intuitive, has higher costs
usually have negative eﬀect on one’s earnings.
Expected negotiations E(N) is a major determinant to a dealer’s expected earnings. In
particular, high investor’s adjustment, high management’s valuation discount, low K∗/V and
low valuation imprecision have positive eﬀect on the number of negotiations and therefore for
a dealer’s expected earnings.
His fee f further determines an intermediary’s expected earnings. His earnings are neither
strictly increasing nor decreasing as a function of that fee. In fact, there is an optimal fee fopt
for which earnings are maximised. The next propositions develop a formula for the optimal
dealer’s fee strategy. The next proposition shows how the dealer optimally treats the ﬁrm
and investors.
Proposition 10. The dealer optimizes his earnings by persuading the ﬁrm’s management and
the investors to maximally discount their valuation (d = c∗M − f) and to maximally increase
their valuation (u = c∗I), respectively.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 10 shows that an intermediary tries to persuade management to undervalue
their ﬁrm as much as possible. At the same time he persuades investors for a maximal increase
in their valuation. This strategy allows the intermediary to earn maximal fee, as shown in
proposition 10.
The optimal investment banker’s fee and its inﬂuence on expected earnings are analysed
in the next theorem.
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Theorem 2. When the intermediary’s auxiliary condition is to require at the most as many
negotiations as an investor in bilateral loan negotiations, then his optimal fee and expected
earnings in fee optimum are
fopt = min{u+ d+ αV/K∗ −
√
2cdαV/K∗, u+ d}
E(D) = K∗ ·
u+ d− 2cd, cd ≤
α
2K∗/V
u+ d+ αV/K∗ − 2
√
2αcdV/K∗, cd > α2K∗/V .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Lemma 4. When the intermediary applies optimal fee fopt, then the intermediation success
probability per negotiation is greater or equal 0.5.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Theorem 2 calculates the optimal intermediary’s fee fopt, such that his expected earnings
are maximised. This maximum is calculated under the constraint that the dealer places the
bond quicker than bilateral loan negotiations are. That goal is achieved by requiring the
intermediation success probability per approach to exceed 0.5. Lemma 4 shows that this
requirement is met. By theorem 2 the intermediary’s expected earnings are
E(D) = K∗ ·
u+ d− 2cd, cd ≤
α
2K∗/V
u+ d+ αV/K∗ − 2
√
2αcdV/K∗, cd > α2K∗/V ,
when the intermediary applies optimal fee fopt.
When his negotiation costs are suﬃciently low (cd ≤ α2K∗/V ), then his expected earnings
are K∗(u + d − 2cd). In this case the earnings can be calculated by 3 parameters - man-
agement’s and investor’s valuation adjustments and the dealer’s negotiation cost. Then the
statement from proposition 10 becomes more intuitive: The dealer maximises his expected
earnings by persuading management for maximal undervaluation and investors for maximal
over valuation. Furthermore he proﬁts from minimising his own negotiation costs.
When the intermediary’s negotiation costs exceed a critical level (cd > α2K∗/V ), then a
lower bound for his expected earnings can be established:
K∗(u+ d+ αV/K∗ − 2
√
2αcdV/K∗) > K∗
u+ d+ αV/K∗ − 2
√√√√2αV/K∗α
2K∗/V

= K∗(u+ d+ αV/K∗ − 2αV/K∗)
= K∗(u+ d− αV/K∗).
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In that case it can be observed that the valuation imprecision α has negative eﬀect on the
lower bound of the dealer’s expected earnings. Analysing the eﬀect of valuation imprecision
in more detail, we see that it also inﬂuences the case cd ≤ α2K∗/V : For any ﬁxed negotiation
cost, there is a suﬃciently high valuation imprecision, such that the case cd ≤ α2K∗/V is met.
This is beneﬁcial for the dealer. That is, when valuation imprecision is suﬃciently high, then
it stops to inﬂuence a dealer’s earnings.
Let us formalise a further property of the dealer’s earnings in the following proposition.
Proposition 11. When the intermediary applies optimal fee schedule, then his earnings are
strictly positive while cd ≤ (u+ d)/2.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 11 shows that the intermediary expects positive earnings while his negotiation
costs are lower or equal to average valuation adjustments of management and investors. When
this condition is met, then he proﬁts from intermediation. An intermediary’s skills therefore
are a critical issue, as it is of his beneﬁt when he can pursue a ﬁrm’s management and investors
to maximally adjust their original valuations.
The next proposition formalises the inﬂuence of the valuation imprecision on an interme-
diary’s earnings.
Proposition 12. When an intermediary applies optimal fee fopt, then his earnings are in-
dependent of valuation imprecision while cd ≤ α2K∗/V . When cd > α2K∗/V , then valuation
imprecision has negative eﬀect on his expected earnings.
Proof: See the Appendix.
When the intermediary’s negotiation costs are below or equal to α2K∗/V , then proposition
12 states that valuation imprecision and his expected earnings are independent. When his
negotiation costs exceed that bound, then the party’s valuation imprecision has negative eﬀect
on his earnings. The bound α2K∗/V is dependent on valuation imprecision α. Therefore for any
given negotiation cost cd, there is a suﬃciently large valuation imprecision α, such that the
intermediary’s expected earnings are independent of imprecision. That is, for each negotiation
cost cd, there is some valuation imprecision α∗, such that the imprecision has negative eﬀect
on the expected earnings while α ∈ [0, α∗] and no eﬀect on expected earnings while α > α∗.
Therefore the intermediary does not need to consider valuation imprecision when it exceeds
α∗. In that case, his earnings are independent of valuation imprecision.
A ﬁrm and investors proﬁt from intermediation while their valuation adjustments stay
within certain bounds. Proposition 7 calculates these bounds explicitly. The intermediary
proﬁts from strong valuation adjustments and thus peruses management for strong discount
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and investors for high adjustment of their valuations. Proposition 11 shows that this behaviour
is the most eﬃcient strategy for the intermediary.
Theorem 2, lemma 4 and propositions 11 and 12 build the framework for further analysis
on optimal intermediary’s strategy. Theorem 2 determines the optimal fee as a function of
the model parameters. It furthermore includes the constraint that intermediation needs to be
at least as eﬃcient as loan ﬁnancing with respect to the duration of the negotiation process.
Lemma 4 proves that intermediation is more eﬃcient than bilateral loan negotiations under
optimal fee fopt. Theorem 2 closes with the calculation of the expected intermediary’s gain
in fee optimum. That formula is the basis to determine the intermediary’s optimal strategy
to maximise his gain.
Proposition 11 introduces the condition cd < (u + d)/2 ≤ (c∗M + c∗I)/2. This means that
the intermediary’s cost for negotiations are necessary lower than average negotiation costs of
management and investors. That is reasonable as an intermediary leads negotiations more
often than management or investors and therefore is more skilled and can more easily conduct
negotiations. Under this condition proposition 11 states that the intermediary’s expected gain
is always positive. An intermediary always proﬁts on average from bond marketing when his
negotiation cost is suﬃciently low.
Proposition 12 shows that there always is a certain border α∗, such that intermediary’s
expected gain is independent of the distribution of valuation imprecision. That is, an interme-
diary may proﬁt from intermediation independent of the imprecision’s distribution. Therefore,
when imprecision exceeds a certain bound α∗, he has no intention to inﬂuence management
or investors with regards to the accuracy of their valuation precision. This point of view is
valid as long as the intermediary possesses only the ability to alter valuations symmetrically.
That is, higher valuation imprecision bares the same risk of high over- and undervaluation.
Intuitively speaking, the expected gain of an intermediary increase when bilateral loan
negotiations are costly. Furthermore low intermediation costs lead to a higher expected gain
for the intermediary. An intermediary tries to cut his own costs on intermediation and
persuades management and investors to high valuation adjustments.
The relative advantage of bond ﬁnancing and intermediation over bilateral loan negotia-
tions is discussed in the next section.
5 The Upside of Information Asymmetry
In this section, we will discuss when bond ﬁnancing by intermediation is preferred by all
parties over loan ﬁnancing. The investment banker creates an environment of information
asymmetry, whereas in loan ﬁnancing negotiations full information is available. Consequently
the preference of intermediation over loan ﬁnancing implies preference of information asym-
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metry over full information.
The next theorem states conditions for Pareto eﬃciency of bond ﬁnancing.
Theorem 3. When a ﬁrm’s management’s and investor’s valuation adjustments are bounded
by d ≤ c∗M − f and u ≤ c∗I , respectively and the intermediary’s cost per negotiation is bounded
by cd < (d+u)/2, then all players prefer bond ﬁnancing by intermediation over loan ﬁnancing.
That is, then information asymmetry Pareto dominates full information.
Proof: See the Appendix.
When the conditions of the theorem are satisﬁed, then the ﬁrm and an investor prefer in-
termediation over bilateral loan negotiations. Furthermore, then the intermediary has positive
expected earnings from his strategy. Therefore all parties ﬁnd that intermediation dominates
bilateral loan negotiations. As a consequence, bond ﬁnancing by intermediation is Pareto
eﬃcient over bilateral loan negotiations. The intermediary holds more information than the
other parties and systematically hides information from them. In bond ﬁnancing information
is therefore asymmetrically distributed, compared to bilateral loan negotiations, where full
information is available.
The theorem holds, while the intermediary pursues management to increase their valuation
by u and bond investor to decrease his valuation by d. His costs must not exceed average
valuation adjustments (u + d)/2. That is, he either needs ex post low negotiation costs or
needs to pursue management and investor to high valuation adjustments. These parties are
willing to adjust their valuations until a certain bound is met. When the adjustment exceeds
that bound, then the ﬁrm and investors prefer bilateral loan negotiations over bond ﬁnancing.
Next, the previous 2 sample negotiation processes from section 3 are discussed and the
intermediary’s strategy is illustrated.
Example (Sample process A): In sample process A, management approaches 8 po-
tential lenders until management and lender agree on loan ﬁnancing conditions in the ninth
negotiation with ﬁnancing charge 5.5%. Cost per negotiation are 0.1% of loan volume. There-
fore negotiation costs for the ﬁrm add up to 0.9% of loan volume and the investor’s negotiation
costs add up to 0.2% by lemma 2. If loan volume K∗ is 500, then the ﬁrm’s negotiation costs
are 4.5 and cost of capital is 27.5, whereas the investor faces absolute negotiation cost of 0.5
and earns 27.5 on interest.
In our example the intermediary’s fee is 0.5% of bond volume. Then management can
be pursued to reduce their valuation by up to 0.4% of bond volume, which is 2 in absolute
terms. Let management’s original valuation be 1005. Then it can be pursued to reduce its
valuation to 1003. Furthermore, the intermediary may pursue a bond investor to increase his
original valuation by up to 0.2% of bond volume, which is 4.5 in absolute terms. Now let ﬁrst
investor’s valuation be 975. Even if the intermediary achieves maximum valuation increase
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to 979.5, management’s and investor’s valuation are incompatible. Let the second investor’s
valuation be 999. The intermediary may pursue the investor for a valuation of 1003.5. Then
that investor’s valuation is higher than management’s valuation and the bond can be placed.
In our example, the coupon is 5.5%. Then the costs of capital (and proﬁt from interest) are
the same as in loan ﬁnancing.
The ﬁrm pays the dealer a fee for successful bond placement, which is 2.5 and lower than
negotiation costs of 4.5 in the loan negotiation case. Investors save negotiation costs of 4.5
compared to loan negotiations. At last, the intermediary faces costs for two negotiations
and has earned a fee of 2.5. When the cost per negotiation is lower than management’s and
investor’s, then his negotiation costs are at the most 1 and he earns at least 1.5. Summing
up the preferences of all parties, intermediation and bond ﬁnancing Pareto dominates loan
ﬁnancing in this example.
Example (Sample process B): In sample process B, the ﬁrm’s management approaches
5 potential lenders until the parties agree on ﬁnancing conditions after the 6th negotiation.
The negotiated ﬁnancing charge is 8.4%. The costs per negotiation are 1% of loan volume.
Therefore the negotiation costs for the ﬁrm add up to 6% of loan volume and the investor’s
negotiation costs add up to 2% by lemma 2. That is, when the loan volume K∗ is 200, then
the ﬁrm’s negotiation costs are 12 and the ﬁnancing charge is 16.8. The investor has absolute
negotiation cost of 4 and earns 16.8 on ﬁnancing charges.
In this example, the intermediary’s fee is 1% of bond volume. Then the ﬁrm’s management
can be pursued to reduce their valuation by op to 5% of bond volume, which is 10 in absolute
terms. When the ﬁrm’s management’s original valuation is 1005, then it can be pursued to
reduce valuation to 995. Furthermore, the intermediary may pursue an investor to overvalue
his original valuation by up to 2% of bond volume, which is 4 in absolute terms. When the
ﬁrst investor’s valuation is 996, then the intermediary may achieve a maximum valuation
increase to 1000. That is, then investor’s valuation exceeds management’s valuation and the
bond can be successfully placed. Note that the investor does not have to adjust her valuation
when management adjusts to 995. In our example, the coupon is 8.4%. Then the cost of
capital (and proﬁt from capital) is as high as in loan ﬁnancing.
The ﬁrm pays the dealer a fee for bond placement, which is 2 and thus lower than negoti-
ation costs of 12 in loan negotiations. Investors save negotiation costs of 4 compared to loan
negotiations. At last, the intermediary has costs for one negotiation and has earned a fee of
2. When the intermediary’s negotiation costs are lower than management’s and investor’s,
then his negotiation costs are at the most 1. That is, his earnings are at least 1. Summing up
the preferences of all parties in this example, bond marketing with intermediation is Pareto
eﬃcient over loan ﬁnancing.
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6 Conclusion
We have presented a model that shows how a ﬁrm’s management and potential investors
optimally behave in loan negotiations. That model’s parameters were negotiation costs and
- although investors have full insight into the ﬁrm’s books - valuation imprecision on both
sides. When the management’s and the investor’s valuations are not compatible, then loan
negotiations are unsuccessful and negotiation costs are lost on both sides. If these negotiations
are successful, the ﬁrm’s management still may choose to conduct negotiations with further
investors as the expected reduction in ﬁnancing costs may be higher than the costs of fur-
ther negotiations. The negotiation process is closed when a mutually satisfactory agreement
between the ﬁrm and an investor is achieved. That process is associated with an expected
negotiation cost on both sides.
As an alternative, an intermediary can be hired to market a ﬁrm’s bonds. He necessarily
needs to maintain information asymmetry between a ﬁrm and an investor to create an "either-
or" decision between bilateral loan negotiations and the intermediary’s services. Otherwise,
a ﬁrm’s management and an investor ﬁrst may conduct bilateral negotiations. When their
negotiations fail, the intermediary can be hired as a second alternative. Finally only "lemons"
are left for the intermediary. This means ﬁrms with high expectations on their value and
investors with low valuations seek his services. While the intermediary maintains information
asymmetry between the parties, he experiences the full spectrum of valuations. In fact,
when he determines his fee wisely, his services can be Pareto eﬃcient over bilateral loan
negotiations. Then the ﬁrm and investors prefer his services over conducting bilateral loan
negotiations. That is, they accept information asymmetry over bilateral loan negotiations
under full information.
Our framework can be extended in various ways. For example, the parties’ valuation im-
precision may be distributed more generally. A log-normally distributed valuation imprecision
can be such an intuitive extension. Furthermore, a ﬁrm’s and an investor’s valuation may
have a diﬀerent distribution, as their information on a ﬁrm’s value is divergent. Additionally,
the loan ﬁnancing charges and the coupon size may be modelled in a more general way. In
fact, considering bonds with a maturity that exceeds one period is an interesting extension
of our model.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The cdf of min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) is given by
M(x) = P (min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) ≤ x) = 1−P (min(X1, X2, ..., Xn) > x)
= 1−P (Xi > x, i = 1, ..., n) = 1−P (X1 > x)n = 1−
(
x2 − x
x2 − x1
)n
.
The pdf is given by the ﬁrst derivative of M(x).
Proof of Proposition 1: We ﬁrst calculate the updated distribution function of manage-
ment’s valuation imprecision, given negotiation history.
Fm,n(x) = P(VM < x|n negotiations successful, m negotiations unsuccessful )
= P(VM < x, n negotiations successful, m negotiations unsuccessful)P(n negotiations successful, m negotiations unsuccessful )
=
∫ x
1−α
1
2α P(y < min(X1, ..., Xn))P(y > max(X1, ..., Xm)) dy∫ 1+α
1−α
1
2α P(y < min(X1, ..., Xn))P(y > max(X1, ..., Xm)) dy
=
∫ x
1−α
1
2α
(
b−y
b−a
)n (y−a
b−a
)m
dy∫ 1+α
1−α
1
2α P(y < min(X1, ..., Xn))P(y > max(X1, ..., Xm) dy
= (2α)
−m−n−1 ∫ x
1−α (b− y)n (y − a)m dy
(2α)−m−n−1
∫ 1+α
1−α (b− y)n (y − a)m dy
.
The density is the ﬁrst derivative of this distribution function. Due to the First Fundamental
Theorem of Calculus and the Binomial Theorem we derive the density.
fm,n(x) =
∂Fm,n(x)
∂x
= (b− x)
n (x− a)m∫ 1+α
1−α (b− y)n (y − a)m dy
= (b− x)
n (x− a)m∫ 1+α
1−α
∑n
k=0
(
n
k
)
(−1)kykbn−k∑ml=0 (ml )(−1)m−lylam−l dy
= (b− x)
n (x− a)m∑n
k=0
∑m
l=0
∫ 1+α
1−α
(
n
k
)
(−1)kykbn−k
(
m
l
)
(−1)m−lylam−l dy
= (b− x)
n (x− a)m∑n
k=0
∑m
l=0
(
n
k
)(
m
l
)
(−1)k+m−lam−lbn−k 1
k+l+1((1 + α)k+l+1 − (1− α)k+l+1)
.
Proof of Theorem 1: The probability P that the next negotiation is successful (after n
negotiations were successful and m were unsuccessful) can be calculated from proposition 1.
Assume that this probability exceeds zero. Otherwise further negotiations are unsuccessful
deterministically and are therefore not conducted.
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It is a ﬁrm’s management preference to continue negotiations, when the expected reduction
in ﬁnancing charges exceeds the cost for that negotiation. That is,
E (Improvement in ﬁnancing charges|Negotiation history) > crel
⇐⇒P (Deal success|Negotiation history)P (Better oﬀer than r) (r − E (Oﬀer|Oﬀer < r)) > crel
⇐⇒P r − r∆r
(
r
2 −
r
2
)
> crel
⇐⇒
(
r2 − 2rr + r2
) P
2∆r − crel > 0.
The above term is zero for
r1,2 = r ±
√
2∆rcrel/P .
When r = r, then the term is negative while relative negotiation cost exceed zero, that is
crel > 0. For r → ∞, that term is positive. As a result, the above term is positive, when
r > r2 = r ±
√
2∆rcrel/P . In that case, management favours further negotiations. When
r < r ±
√
2∆rcrel/P , then further negotiations are rejected. Then the next negotiation’s
expected improvement in ﬁnancing conditions is lower than the cost that negotiation.
Proof of Proposition 2: Take the assumption that the ﬁrst negotiation is successful with
highest ﬁnancing charge r. If the ﬁrst negotiation is successful, then a ﬁrm’s management
estimates their success probability in future negotiations higher than that, when the ﬁrst nego-
tiation is not successful. Given highest charge r, a success in a future negotiation deterministi-
cally leads to lowered costs for ﬁnancing. Therefore, in this setting it is the most probable that
management continues negotiations. In all other variations negotiation (un)successfulness and
ﬁnancing charges, management is thus less inclined to continue negotiations, compared to the
case where the ﬁnancing charge is maximal at r. Therefore, if management rejects further
negotiations in this case, it will reject further negotiations in any other case as well.
Density of valuation imprecision after the ﬁrst negotiation was successful is
f1,0(y) =
y − a∫ b
a (y − a) dy
= y − a(b− a)2/2 =
y − 1 + α
2α2
Management rejects further negotiations if expected cost reductions due to better ﬁnancing
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conditions are lower than the cost for these negotiations. This is represented by the inequality
E(rK∗ − rK∗|1 negotiation success) < cM
⇐⇒ K∗P(Negotiation success|1 previous negotiation success) (r − E(r)) < cM
⇐⇒ K∗ (r − (r + r)/2)
∫ b
a
f(x)P(VI > x) dx < cM
⇐⇒ K∗(r − r)/2 14α3
∫ b
a
(x− a)2 dx < cM
⇐⇒ K∗(r − r)/2 8α
3
12α3 < cM
⇐⇒ (r − r)/3 < cM/K∗.
Therefore relative negotiation cost cM/K∗ higher than (r− r)/3 deterministically make man-
agement accept the ﬁrst successful negotiation’s ﬁnancing conditions. On average these ne-
gotiation’s charges are given by (r + r)/2.
Proof of Proposition 3: Take the assumption that the ﬁrst negotiation is successful with
average ﬁnancing charge r∗ = (r − r)/2. If the ﬁrst negotiation is successful, a ﬁrm’s man-
agement updates their estimation of valuation imprecision in a way that aﬀects further ne-
gotiations positively. Given average ﬁnancing charges (r − r)/2 underlines that the ﬁrst
negotiation’s oﬀer is average. Management rejects further negotiations if its expected cost
reductions due to better ﬁnancing conditions are lower than the cost for these negotiations.
This is represented by the inequality
P(Negotiation success|1 previous negotiation success)P(r > r∗) (r∗ − E(r|r < r∗)) < cM/K∗
⇐⇒ 23
1
2 ((r + r)/2− (r/4 + 3r/4)) < cM/K
∗
⇐⇒ (r − r)/12 < cM/K∗
Therefore on average relative negotiation cost c/K∗ higher than (r−r)/12 make management
accept the ﬁrst successfully negotiated oﬀer with probability of at least 0.5.
Proof of Proposition 4: As in the proofs of propositions 2 and 3, we assume that the ﬁrst
negotiation is successful. When the ﬁrst successful negotiation is not the ﬁrst negotiation
then, due to a worse estimated negotiation success probability, a ﬁrm’s management is more
likely to decide to conduct no further negotiations.
Let p ∈ [0, 1] be some probability. After the ﬁrst successful negotiation, a ﬁrm’s man-
agement gets oﬀered a ﬁnancing charge that is at least as good as R = r(1 − p) + rp with
probability p.
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When management gets oﬀered ﬁnancing charge R after the ﬁrst negotiation, then it
conducts no further negotiations if expected cost reductions due to better ﬁnancing conditions
are lower then the cost for these negotiations. That is,
K∗P (Negotiation Success)P (Oﬀer < R)E (Oﬀer|Oﬀer < R) < cM
⇐⇒ 23
R− r
∆r
R− r
2 < cM/K
∗
⇐⇒ (R− r)
2
3∆r < crel
⇐⇒ p
2∆r
3 < crel.
The above calculation are lead along the lines of these from propositions 2 and 3. The formula
above establishes a lower bound for relative negotiation cost, such that the probability that
a ﬁrm’s management chooses the shortest negotiation process is at least p ∈ [0, 1]. This
lower bound is in accordance with propositions 2 and 3, which calculated lower bounds for
relative negotiation costs such that management chooses the shortest negotiation process
deterministically and with probability of at least 0.5. Rearranging the above equation gives
p∗ = 3crel∆r .
Proof of Proposition 5: Take the assumption that all prior negotiations were successful.
This scenario makes management assume best success probability for future negotiations and
therefore dominates all other negotiation processes with respect to future success probability.
Taking the limit of this process, management assumes to succeed in future negotiations with
probability 1. Assume that a ﬁrm’s management will not continue negotiations in this optimal
negotiation process, then it will not continue negotiations in any other negotiation process as
well.
Assume management gets oﬀered ﬁnancing charges r∗1 and management decides to continue
negotiations. Then, after the next successful negotiation, the best ﬁnancing conditions r∗2 are
uniformly distributed on the interval [r, r∗1]. Continuing negotiations suﬃciently ﬁnally gives
management an oﬀer r∗ = r + ε for all 0 < ε. This means that after a suﬃcient number of
successful negotiations, management can receive an oﬀer r∗ arbitrary close to best available
oﬀer r.
These described assumptions are the best negotiation results that a ﬁrm’s management
can possibly achieve. Therefore, if management does not continue this negotiation process,
it will not continue any other negotiation process. Given rate r∗ management rejects further
negotiations if and only if expected cost reductions due to better ﬁnancing conditions are
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lower than the cost for these negotiations. This is represented by the inequality
P(Negotiation success)P(r < r∗) (r∗ − E(r|r < r∗)) < cM/K∗
⇐⇒ 1 · ε
r − r (r + ε− r − ε/2) < c/K
∗ ⇐⇒ ε
2
2(r − r) < cM/K
∗
Management may receive oﬀers r∗ = r + ε arbitrary close to best oﬀer r. Therefore for any
given negotiation cost cM > 0, there will be best oﬀer rate r∗ such that management decides
against further negotiations. The only cost, where management always decides to continue
the negotiation process thus is a negotiation cost of zero.
Proof of Proposition 6: Let X be a geometrically-like distributed random variable with
success probability p ∈ [0, 1], with the diﬀerence that all mass that exceeds N lies on zero,
that is
X :=
Geo(p), when Geo(p) ≤ N0, when Geo(p) > N .
Then the expectation of X is
E(X) =
N∑
k=1
kpqk−1 =
N−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)pqk =
N−1∑
k=0
kpqk +
N−1∑
k=0
pqk
= q
N−1∑
k=0
kpqk−1 + p
N−1∑
k=0
qk = q
(
E(X)−NpqN−1
)
+ p1− q
N
1− q
= qE(X)−NpqN + 1− qN .
We rearrange the equation and obtain
E(X) = 1
p
(
1− qN
)
−NqN .
Now consider a geometrically-like distributed random variable Y that is deﬁned as follows:
Let Geo(p) be geometrically distributed with success probability p ∈ [0, 1]. Then we deﬁne
Y :=
0, when Geo(p) ≤ NN, when Geo(p) > N .
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Then the expectation of Y is
E(Y ) =
∞∑
k=N+1
Npqk−1 = Np
∞∑
k=N
qk = Np
(
1
1− q −
1− qN
1− q
)
= NqN
Management’s negotiation success probability pv is dependent on its valuation. When that
valuation is v ∈ [1− α, 1 + α], then pv = (1 + α − v)/(2α) and qv = (v − 1 + α)/(2α). In
summary, the expected number of negotiations is
E = 12α
∫ 1+α
1−α
(E(X)(pv) + E(Y )(pv)) dv
= 12α
∫ 1+α
1−α
1− qNv
pv
dv = 12α
∫ 1+α
1−α
N−1∑
k=0
qkv dv
= 12α
N−1∑
k=0
1
2kαk
∫ 1+α
1−α
(v − 1 + α)k dv = 12α
N−1∑
k=0
1
2kαk
∫ 2α
0
xk dx
= 12α
N−1∑
k=0
1
2kαk
1
k + 1(2α)
k+1 =
N−1∑
k=0
1
k + 1 = ln(N) + γ +O
( 1
N2
)
,
where γ ≈ 0.5772 is the Euler Mascheroni constant. The ﬁrm’s expected negotiation cost is
the product of the above expectation and cost per negotiation cM .
Proof of Lemma 2: The number of companies an investor negotiates with is geometrically
distributed with parameter 1/2. Thus expected number of negotiations is given by 1/p = 2.
Each negotiation involves cost of cI such that expected cost of deal settlement is 2cI .
Proof of Proposition 7: From management’s perspective, intermediation is favoured while
VM − c∗M ≤ VM − u− f ⇐⇒ u ≤ c∗M − f,
which is exactly the statement of the proposition. An investor’s preferences are proven ac-
cordingly.
Proof of Proposition 8: An intermediary can place a bond if and only if
VM − dK∗ + fK∗ < VI + uK∗ ⇐⇒ VM − VI + fK∗ < uK∗ + dK∗
⇐⇒ XM −XI < (u+ d− f)K
∗
V
.
Note that valuation imprecision is independently uniformly distributed, i.e.
XM , XI
d= unif [1− α, 1 + α].
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The probability that an intermediary can match a ﬁnancier and borrower is
P
(
XM −XI < (u+ d− f)K
∗
V
)
.
To keep notation to a minimum deﬁne t := (u+ d− f)K∗
V
. Then
P (XM −XI < t) =
∫ 1+α
1−α
∫ 1+α
m−t
1/(4α2) dn dm
= 1/(4α2)
∫ 1+α
1−α
1 + α + t−m dm
= 1/(4α2)
(
(1 + α + t)2α−
(
(1 + α)2 − (1− α)2
)
/2
)
= α+ t2α ,
which is the formula that is stated in the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 3: Proposition 8 established negotiation success probability pd. As the
negotiation process is geometrically distributed, the expected number of negotiations until
deal settlement is
E(N) = 1/pd =
α
2α + (u+ d− f)K∗/V .
Proof of Proposition 9: An intermediary’s expected earnings E(D) are
E (P ) =
∞∑
k=1
pd(1− pd)k−1(fK∗ − kcdK∗)
= K∗
(
f
∞∑
k=1
pd(1− pd)k−1 − cd
∞∑
k=1
pd(1− pd)k−1k
)
= K∗
(
f − cd
∞∑
k=1
pd(1− pd)k−1k
)
Along the lines of lemma 3 the second sum can be interpreted as the expected value of a
geometrically distributed random variable with success parameter pd. That expectation is
given by 1/pd. As a result, the expected earnings are
E (D) = K∗ (f − cd/pd)
= K∗
(
f − 2αcd
α + (u+ d− f)K∗/V
)
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Proof of Proposition 10: Proposition 9 calculates a formula for dealer’s expected earnings.
These are determined by K∗ (f − cd/pd). Obviously expected earnings increase when negotia-
tion success probability pd increases. Proposition 8 shows that pd = 12+(u+ d− f)K∗/2/V/α,
which is increasing in u and d. Therefore a dealer proﬁts from increasing u and d. There-
fore the dealer tries to increase these parameters maximally. That maximum is given by the
boundary conditions u ≤ cM and d ≤ cI .
Proof of Theorem 2: It is necessary thatXM−XI < ((u+d)−f)K∗/V for an intermediary
to match a borrower with a ﬁnancier. With proposition 8 we obtain probability of successful
matching at a time pd = (α + ((u + d) − f)K∗/V )/2/α. An intermediary’s objective is to
deliver at least as high negotiation success as capital market success rate. Therefore pd ≥ 1/2
is a necessary condition. We derive that the condition implies f ∈ (0, u + d). Expected
intermediary’s gain E(D) and its derivative with respect to fee f are
E (D) = K∗ (f − cd/pd)
= K∗
(
f − 2αcd
α + ((u+ d)− f)K∗/V
)
E′ (D) = K∗
(
f − αcdK
∗/V
(α+ ((u+ d)− f)K∗/V )2
)
The ﬁrst derivative is zero for
f1,2 =
K∗ (u+ d) + V α±√2V
√
K α,cd
V
K∗
= (u+ d) + αV/K∗ ±
√
2cdαV/K∗.
There is at the most one f1,2 in the feasible region (0, u+ d) It is given by
f1 = (u+ d) + αV/K∗ −
√
2cdαV/K∗.
As the constraint f ∈ (0, u+ d) must hold, optimal fee is
fopt = min{(u+ d) + αV/K∗ −
√
2cdαV/K∗, u+ d},
which is the formula stated in the theorem. Expected earnings in fee optimum are obtained
by plugging optimal dealer’s fee into the formula for his expected earnings.
Proof of Lemma 4: A negotiation’s success probability in fee optimum is
pd = (α + u+ d− fopt)/2/α ≥ 1/2,
because fopt ≤ u+ d.
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Proof of Proposition 11: Theorem 2 introduced optimal intermediary’s fee
fopt = min{(u+ d) + αV/K∗ −
√
2cdαV/K∗, u+ d}.
Assume dealer’s fee is fopt = u + d. We show that his expected earnings that result from
this fee are positive. That is suﬃcient in order to prove that expected earned fee is always
positive under fopt. Applying fee u + d yields expected earnings E(D) = u + d − 2cd, which
is greater zero if and only if cd ≤ (u+ d)/2.
Proof of Proposition 12: We analyse the cases (a) : cd ≤ α2K∗/V and (b) : cd > α2K∗/V . In
case (a) intermediary’s expected earnings are (u + d) − 2cd. That formula is not dependent
on valuation imprecision. In case (b) intermediary’s expected earnings and ﬁrst derivative as
a function of α are
E(P ) = (u+ d) + αV/K∗ − 2
√
2αcdV/K∗
E′(P ) = V/K∗ −
√
2cd
αK∗/V
Assume the intermediary proﬁts from increasing valuation imprecision. Then
E′(P ) > 0⇐⇒ V/K∗ −
√
2cd
αK∗/V
> 0
⇐⇒ V/K∗ >
√
2cd
αK∗/V
.
As we observe case (b), we conclude
√
2cd
αK∗/V
>
√
2
αK∗/V
α
2K∗/V = V/K
∗
Thus for valuation imprecision to be beneﬁcial for the intermediary, it must hold that
V/K∗ > V/K∗,
which is not possible. Therefore valuation imprecision has negative eﬀect on an intermediary’s
expected earnings.
Proof of Theorem 3: Proposition 7 proved that within the bounds u < c∗M −f and d < c∗I ,
a ﬁrm’s management and an investor prefer bond ﬁnancing by intermediation. Furthermore,
proposition 11 introduced the condition cd < (u + d)/2 for the intermediary to expect posi-
tive earnings. Consequently, while all conditions hold, each party prefers bond ﬁnancing by
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intermediation over loan negotiations.
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Concluding Remarks
When negotiations for a trade are modelled and the negotiating parties have different
valuations of the traded object, then literature usually models these different valuations as
randomly distributed. These distributions are usually known to the bargaining parties, so
each party knows the lowest and highest possible valuations. Gibbons (1992) as well as
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) model the parties’ valuations in that fashion. Accordingly,
each trader can benchmark his own valuation to the distribution of his peers’ valuations.
That information endows a negotiant with a detailed bargaining strategy. As a matter of
fact, when a seller’s valuation is comparatively high, then that seller sets a price that is close
to his valuation. In contrast, a seller with a comparatively low valuation may exaggerate his
price to a greater extent.
This work takes a different approach. Each party knows that its valuation is imprecise and
is aware of the maximal degree of imprecision. However, there is no valuation benchmark.
Hence, a bargainer only knows the percentage of his maximum valuation imprecision compared
to an unknown average valuation. In particular, he does not know whether his valuation is
above or below average. Thus, although some information is known to each negotiating party,
that party’s negotiation strategy is limited, compared to the model investigated in numerous
papers as mentioned above.
This work comes to the result that rational behaving traders are less efficient than naive
bargainers. It can be observed that an intermediary may exploit this inefficiency and offer a
higher gain for all traders. At the same time, his price strategy allows him a positive gain as
well. While there may be full information when the parties trade without the intermediary,
that intermediary maintains an environment of information asymmetry. Thus, when the
traders are in preference of the intermediary, they prefer information asymmetry over full
information. A noteworthy result, when other literature in this field is considered.
Applicable examples illustrate the theory of this work. For instance, the first paper’s
theory can be used to explain why a firm that wants to hire an employee should prefer a
recruitment firm over direct negotiations with a job applicant. It becomes clear that the
recruitment firm’s strategy can be more efficient than direct salary negotiations, even if the
firm and the job applicant are truthful to each other.
Another application is the IPO of a firm’s shares, where an investor’s information is
limited. In contrast, the firm opens its books to an investor when they directly negotiate
over the price of a firm’s share. In this case, full information is available. Determinants
for a firm’s and an investor’s preference of an IPO under information asymmetry over their
bilateral negotiations under full information are examined. Furthermore, our model presents
an explanation for the underpricing of IPOs.
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This work compares different market designs, which allow bargainers to directly trade with
each other. The efficiency of these platforms, under different information sets, is analysed
thoroughly. Additionally, a dealer - operating under information asymmetry - and the attrac-
tiveness of his pricing strategy for the bargainers is presented. All papers within this work
introduce conditions for the dealer being more efficient than direct trade. In this case, infor-
mation asymmetry may Pareto dominate full information. There are numerous further market
designs that allow for direct trade. Their attractiveness can be compared to an intermedi-
ary’s pricing strategy. It would be interesting to establish criteria allowing the intermediary
to Pareto dominate these market designs as well.
The determinant for profit from trade often is the players’ imprecision in their valuations.
Throughout this work, valuation imprecision is uniformly and identically distributed. A
worthwhile extension of the models presented in each paper would be allowing different,
non identical distributions of the players’ valuation abilities. When these distributions are
symmetrical, we believe that major results in this work remain valid. Our simulations already
support this hypothesis.
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